

LIFE OF  
LINCOLN  
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
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The Life of  
Abraham Lincoln  
Volume II.  
Part I.







LIFE MASK OF LINCOLN. 1860. AGE 51.  
Made in 1860 by Leonard W. Volk of Chicago. From a photograph.



# The Life of Abraham Lincoln

Drawn from original sources and containing  
many Speeches, Letters, and Telegrams  
hitherto unpublished and

Illustrated  
with many reproductions from  
original Paintings, Photographs, etc.

By  
Ida M. Warbell



Part One of the  
Second Volume

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THE LIFE  
OF  
ABRAHAM LINCOLN





# LIFE OF LINCOLN

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## CHAPTER XXII

### THE FIRST INAUGURATION OF LINCOLN—THE RELIEF OF FORT SUMTER—SEWARD'S AMBITION TO CONTROL THE ADMINISTRATION

DAYBREAK of March 4, 1861, found the city of Washington astir. The Senate, which had met at seven o'clock the night before, was still in session; scores of persons who had come to see the inauguration of the first Republican President, and who had been unable to find other bed than the floor, were walking the streets; the morning trains were bringing new crowds. Added to the stir of those who had not slept through the night were sounds unusual in Washington—the clatter of cavalry, the tramp of soldiers.

All this morning bustle of the city must have reached the ears of the President-elect, at his rooms in Willard's Hotel, where from an early hour he had been at work. An amendment to the Constitution of the United States had passed the Senate in the all-night session, and as it concerned the subject of his inaugural, he must incorporate a reference to it in the address. Then he had not replied to the note he had received two days before from Mr. Seward, asking to be released from his promise to accept the portfolio of State. He could wait no longer. "I can't afford," he said to Mr. Nicolay, his secretary, "to let Seward take the first trick." And he despatched the following letter:

*My dear Sir:* Your note of the 2d instant, asking to withdraw your acceptance of my invitation to take charge of the State Department, was duly received. It is the subject of the most painful solicitude with me, and I feel constrained to beg that you will countermand the withdrawal. The public interest, I think, demands that you should; and my personal feelings are deeply enlisted in the same direction. Please consider and answer by 9 A. M. to-morrow. Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

At noon, Mr. Lincoln's work was interrupted. The President of the United States was announced. Mr. Buchanan had come to escort his successor to the Capitol. The route of the procession was the historic one over which almost every President since Jefferson had travelled to take his oath of office; but the scene Mr. Lincoln looked upon as his carriage rolled up the avenue was very different from that upon which one looks to-day. No great blocks lined the streets; instead, the buildings were low, and there were numerous vacant spaces. Instead of asphalt, the carriage passed over cobblestones. Nor did the present stately and beautiful approach to the Capitol exist. The west front rose abrupt and stiff from an unkept lawn. The great building itself was still uncompleted, and high above his head Mr. Lincoln could see the swinging arm of an enormous crane rising from the unfinished dome.

But, as he drove that morning from Willard's to the Capitol, the President-elect saw far more significant sights than these. Closed about his carriage, "so thickly," complained the newspapers, "as to hide it from view," was a protecting guard. Stationed at intervals along the avenue were platoons of soldiers. At every corner were mounted orderlies. On the very roof-tops were groups of riflemen. When Lincoln reached the north side of the Capitol, where he descended to enter the building, he found a board tunnel,

strongly guarded at its mouth, through which he passed into the building. If he had taken pains to inquire what means had been provided for protecting his life while in the building, he would have been told that squads of riflemen were in each wing; that under the platform from which he was to speak were fifty or sixty armed soldiers; that General Scott and two batteries of flying artillery were in adjacent streets; and that a ring of volunteers encircled the waiting crowd. The thoroughness with which these guards did their work may be judged by the experience which Colonel Clark E. Carr, of Illinois, tells:

“I was only a young man then,” says Colonel Carr, “and this was the first inauguration I had ever attended. I came because it was Lincoln’s. For three years Lincoln had been my political idol, as he had been that of many young men in the West. The first debate I heard between him and Douglas had converted me from popular sovereignty, and after that I had followed him all over the State, so fascinated was I by his logic, his manner, and his character.

“Well, I went to Washington, but somehow, in the interest of the procession, I failed to get to the Capitol in time to find a place within hearing distance; thousands of people were packed between me and the stand. I did get, however, close to the high double fence which had been built from the driveway to the north door. It suddenly occurred to me that, if I could scale that wall, I might walk right in after the President, perhaps on to the very platform. It wasn’t a minute before I ‘shinned’ up and jumped into the tunnel; but before I lit on my feet, a half dozen soldiers had me by the leg and arms. I suppose they thought I was the agent of the long-talked-of plot to capture Washington and kill Mr. Lincoln. They searched me, and then started me to the mouth of the tunnel, to take me to the guard-house, but the crowd was so thick we couldn’t get out. This gave me time, and I finally convinced them that it was really my eagerness to hear Mr. Lincoln, and no evil intent, that had brought me in. When they finally came to that conclusion, they took me

around to one of the basement doors on the east side and let me out. I got a place in front of Mr. Lincoln, and heard every word."

The precautions taken against the long-threatened attack on Lincoln's life produced various impressions on the throng. Opponents scornfully insisted that the new Administration was "scared." Radical Republicans rejoiced. "I was thoroughly convinced at the time," says the Hon. James Harlan, at that time a Senator from Iowa, "that Mr. Lincoln's enemies meant what they said, and that General Scott's determination that the inauguration should go off peaceably prevented any hostile demonstration." Other supporters of Mr. Lincoln felt differently.

"Nothing could have been more ill-advised or more ostentatious," wrote the "Public Man" that night in his "Diary," "than the way in which the troops were thrust everywhere upon the public attention, even to the roofs of the houses on Pennsylvania avenue, on which little squads of sharpshooters were absurdly stationed. I never expected to experience such a sense of mortification and shame in my own country as I felt to-day, in entering the Capitol through hedges of marines armed to the teeth. . . . Fortunately, all passed off well, but it is appalling to think of the mischief which might have been done by a single evil-disposed person to-day. A blank cartridge fired from a window on Pennsylvania avenue might have disconcerted all our hopes, and thrown the whole country into inextricable confusion. That nothing of the sort was done, or even so much as attempted, is the most conclusive evidence that could be asked of the groundlessness of the rumors and old women's tales on the strength of which General Scott has been led into this great mistake."

Arm in arm with Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Lincoln passed

through the long tunnel erected for his protection, entered the Capitol, and passed into the Senate Chamber, filled to overflowing with Senators, members of the Diplomatic Corps, and visitors. The contrast between the two men as they entered struck every observer. "Mr. Buchanan was so withered and bowed with age," wrote George W. Julian, of Indiana, who was among the spectators, "that in contrast with the towering form of Mr. Lincoln he seemed little more than half a man."

A few moments' delay, and the movement from the Senate towards the east front began, the justices of the Supreme Court, in cap and gown, heading the procession. As soon as the large company was seated on the platform erected on the east portico of the Capitol, Mr. Lincoln arose and advanced to the front, where he was introduced by his friend, Senator Baker, of Oregon. He carried a cane and a little roll—the manuscript of his inaugural address. There was a moment's pause after the introduction, as he vainly looked for a spot where he might place his high silk hat. Stephen A. Douglas, the political antagonist of his whole public life, the man who had pressed him hardest in the campaign of 1860, was seated just behind him. Douglas stepped forward quickly, and took the hat which Mr. Lincoln held helplessly in his hand. "If I can't be President," he whispered smilingly to Mrs. Brown, a cousin of Mrs. Lincoln and a member of the President's party, "I at least can hold his hat."

This simple act of courtesy was really the most significant incident of the day, and after the inaugural the most discussed.

"Douglas's conduct can not be overpraised," wrote the "Public Man" in his "Diary." "I saw him for a moment in the morning, when he told me that he meant to put himself as prominently forward in the ceremonies as he properly could, and to leave no doubt on any one's mind of his de-

termination to stand by the new Administration in the performance of its first great duty to maintain the Union."

Adjusting his spectacles and unrolling his manuscript, the President-elect turned his eyes upon the faces of the throng before him. It was the largest gathering that had been seen at any inauguration up to that date, variously estimated at from fifty thousand to one hundred thousand. Who of the men that composed it were his friends, who his enemies, he could not tell; but he did know that almost every one of them was waiting with painful eagerness to hear what answer he would make there to the questions they had been hurling at his head since his election.

Six weeks before, when he wrote the document, he had determined to answer some of their questions. The first of these was, "Will Mr. Lincoln stand by the platform of the Republican party?" He meant to open his address with this reply:

The [more] modern custom of electing a Chief Magistrate upon a previously declared platform of principles supersedes, in a great measure, the necessity of restating those principles in an address of this sort. Upon the plainest grounds of good faith, one so elected is not at liberty to shift his position. . . . .

Having been so elected upon the Chicago platform, and while I would repeat nothing in it of aspersion or epithet or question of motive against any man or party, I hold myself bound by duty, as well as impelled by inclination, to follow, within the executive sphere, the principles therein declared. By no other course could I meet the reasonable expectations of the country.

But these paragraphs were not read. On reaching Washington in February, Mr. Lincoln's first act had been to give to Mr. Seward a copy of the paper he had prepared, and to ask for his criticisms. Of the paragraphs quoted above, Mr. Seward wrote:

I declare to you my conviction that the second and third paragraphs, even if modified as I propose in my amendments, will give such advantages to the Disunionists that Virginia and Maryland will secede, and we shall, within ninety, perhaps within sixty, days, be obliged to fight the South for this Capital, with a divided North for our reliance.

Mr. Lincoln dropped the paragraphs, and began by answering another question: "Does the President intend to interfere with the property of the South?"

"Apprehension seems to exist," he said, "among the people of the Southern States that by the accession of a Republican administration their property and their peace and personal security are to be endangered. There has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed and been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the published speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of those speeches when I declare that 'I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so. Those who nominated and elected me did so with full knowledge that I had made this and many similar declarations, and had never recanted them.'

He followed this conciliatory statement by a full answer to the question, "Will Mr. Lincoln repeal the fugitive slave laws?"

"There is much controversy about the delivering up of fugitives from service or labor. The clause I now read is as plainly written in the Constitution as any other of its provisions:

"'No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.'

"It is scarcely questioned that this provision was intended

by those who made it for the reclaiming of what we call fugitive slaves, and the intention of the lawgiver is the law. All members of Congress swear their support to the whole Constitution—to this provision as much as to any other. To the proposition, then, that slaves whose cases come within the terms of this clause ‘shall be delivered up,’ their oaths are unanimous. ”

Next he took up the question of Secession, “Has a State the right to go out of the Union if it wants to?”

I hold that, in contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution, the Union of these States is perpetual. Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments. It is safe to assert that no government proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its own termination. . . . Again, if the United States be not a government proper, but an association of States in the nature of contract merely, can it, as a contract, be peaceably unmade by less than all the parties who made it? One party to a contract may violate it—break it, so to speak; but does it not require all to lawfully rescind it? . . . It follows from these views that no State, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the Union; that resolves and ordinances to that effect are legally void; and that acts of violence, within any State or States, against the authority of the United States, are insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to circumstances.

The answer to this question led him directly to the point on which the public was most deeply stirred at that moment. What did he intend to do about enforcing laws in States which had repudiated Federal authority; what about the property seized by the Southern States?

“. . . . to the extent of my ability,” he answered, “I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States. Doing this I deem to be only a simple duty on my part; and I shall perform it so far as practicable, un-



less my rightful masters, the American people, shall withhold the requisite means, or in some authoritative manner direct the contrary. I trust this will not be regarded as a menace, but only as the declared purpose of the Union that it will constitutionally defend and maintain itself.

“In doing this there needs to be no bloodshed or violence; and there shall be none, unless it be forced upon the national authority. The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere.”

In his original copy of the inaugural address Mr. Lincoln wrote, “All the power at my disposal will be used to *reclaim the public property and places which have fallen*; to hold, occupy, and possess these, and all other property and places belonging to the government.” At the suggestion of his friend, the Hon. O. H. Browning, of Illinois, he dropped the words “to reclaim the public property and places which have fallen.” Mr. Seward disapproved of the entire selection and prepared a non-committal substitute. Mr. Lincoln, however, retained his own sentences.

The foregoing quotations are a fairly complete expression of what may be called Mr. Lincoln’s policy at the beginning of his administration. He followed this statement of his principle by an appeal and a warning to those who really loved the Union and who yet were ready for the “destruction of the national fabric with all its benefits, its memories and its hopes.”

“Will you hazard so desperate a step while there is any possibility that any portion of the ills you fly from have no real existence? Will you, while the certain ills you fly to are greater than all the real ones you fly from—will you risk the commission of so fearful a mistake? . . . . .

"Physically speaking, we cannot separate. We cannot remove our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife may be divorced, and go out of the presence and beyond the reach of each other; but the different parts of our country cannot do this. They cannot but remain face to face, and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory after separation than before? Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens than laws can among friends? Suppose you go to war, you cannot fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides, and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old questions as to terms of intercourse are again upon you. . . .

Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world? In our present differences is either party without faith of being in the right? If the Almighty Ruler of Nations, with His eternal truth and justice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South, that truth and that justice will surely prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal of the American people. . . .

My countrymen, one and all, think calmly and *well* upon this whole subject. Nothing valuable can be lost by taking time. If there be an object to HURRY any of you in hot haste to a step which you would never take *deliberately*, that object will be frustrated by taking time; but no good object can be frustrated by it. Such of you as are now dissatisfied, still have the old Constitution unimpaired, and, on the sensitive point, the laws of your own framing under it; while the new administration will have no immediate power, if it would, to change either. If it were admitted that you who are dissatisfied hold the right side in the dispute, there still is no single good reason for precipitate action. Intelligence, patriotism, Christianity, and a firm reliance on Him who has never yet forsaken this favored land, are still competent to adjust in the best way all our present difficulty.

In YOUR hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and

While the people remain patient, and true to themselves, no man, even in the presidential chair, by any extreme of wickedness or folly, can very seriously injure the government in the short space of four years.

My countrymen, one and all, take *time* and think *well*, upon this whole subject. Nothing valuable can be lost by taking time. Nothing worth preserving is either breaking or burning. If there be an object to *hurry* any of you, in hot haste, to a step which you would never take *deliberately*, that object will be frustrated by taking time; but no good object can be frustrated by it. Such of you as are now dissatisfied, still have the old Constitution unimpaired, and, on the sensitive point, the laws of your own framing under it; while the new administration will have no immediate power, if it would, to change either. If it were admitted that you who are dissatisfied, hold the right side in the dispute, there still is no single good reason for precipitate action. Intelligence, patriotism, Christianity, and a firm reliance on Him, who has never yet forsaken this favored land, are still competent to adjust, in the best way, all our present difficulty.

In *your* hands, my dissatisfied fellow countrymen, and not in *mine*, is the momentous issue of civil war. The government will not assail *you*, unless you *first* assail it. You can have no conflict, without being yourselves the aggressors. *You* have no oath registered in Heaven to destroy the government, while *I* shall have the most solemn one to "preserve, protect and defend" it. *You* can forbear the *assault* upon it; *I* can not shrink from the *defense* of it. With *you*, and not with *me*, is the solemn question of "Shall it be peace, or a sword?"

In compliance with a custom as old as the government itself, I appear before you to address you briefly, and to take, in your presence, the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, to be taken by the President "before he enters on the execution of his office."

I do not consider it necessary at present for me to say more than I have, in relation to those matters of administration, about which there is no special excitement.

Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern States, that by the accession of a Republican Administration, their property, and their peace, and per-



not in MINE is the momentous issue of civil war. The government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the government, while *I* shall have the most solemn one to "preserve, protect, and defend it."

With this last paragraph Mr. Lincoln had meant to close this his first address to the nation. Mr. Seward objected, and submitted two suggestions for a closing; one of his paragraphs read as follows:

I close. We are not, we must not be, aliens or enemies, but fellow-countrymen and brethren. Although passion has strained our bonds of affection too hardly, they must not, I am sure they will not be broken. The mystic chords which, proceeding from so many battlefields and so many patriotic graves, pass through all the hearts and all hearths in this broad continent of ours, will yet again harmonize in their ancient music when breathed upon by the guardian angel of the nation.

Mr. Lincoln made a few changes in the paragraphs quoted, and rewrote the above suggestion of Mr. Seward, making of it the now famous closing words:\*

I am loath to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.

"Mr. Lincoln read his inaugural," says Mr. Harlan in his unpublished "Recollections of Abraham Lincoln," "in

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\* The reader interested in the first inaugural of Mr. Lincoln should not fail to read the admirable chapter on the subject in Vol. III. of Nicolay and Hay's *Life of Abraham Lincoln*, where Mr. Seward's criticisms are given in full.

a clear, distinct, and musical voice, which seemed to be heard and distinctly understood to the very outskirts of this vast concourse of his fellow-citizens. At its conclusion, he turned partially around on his left, facing the justices of the Supreme Court, and said, 'I am now ready to take the oath prescribed by the Constitution,' which was then administered by Chief Justice Taney, the President saluting the Bible with his lips.

"At that moment, in response to a signal, batteries of field guns, stationed a mile or so away, commenced firing a national salute, in honor of the nation's new chief. And Mr. Buchanan, now a private citizen, escorted President Lincoln to the Executive Mansion, followed by a multitude of people."

"What do you think of it?" was the question this crowd was asking as it left the scene of the inauguration. Throughout the day, on every corner of Washington, and by night on every corner of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Buffalo, and every other city and town of the country reached by the telegraph, men were asking the same question. The answers showed that the address was not the equivocal document Mr. Seward had tried to make it.

"It is marked," said the New York "Tribune" of March 5, "by no feeble expression. 'He who runs may read' it; and to twenty millions of people it will carry the tidings, good or not, as the case may be, that the Federal Government of the United States is still in existence, with a Man at the head of it."

"The inaugural is not a crude performance," said the New York "Herald;" "it abounds in traits of craft and cunning; it is neither candid nor statesmanlike, nor does it possess any essential of dignity or patriotism. It would have caused a Washington to mourn, and would have inspired Jefferson, Madison, or Jackson with contempt."

"Our community has not been disappointed, and exhibited

very little feeling on the subject," telegraphed Charleston, South Carolina. "They are content to leave Mr. Lincoln and the inaugural in the hands of Jefferson Davis and the Congress of the Confederate States."

"The Pennsylvanian" declared it "a tiger's claw concealed under the fur of Sewardism." While "The Atlas and Argus," of Albany, characterized it as "weak, rambling, loose-jointed," and as "inviting civil war."

From Charleston, South Carolina, came the dispatch, "Our community has not been disappointed, and exhibited very little feeling on the subject. They are content to leave Mr. Lincoln and the inaugural in the hands of Jefferson Davis and the Congress of the Confederate States." In New Orleans the assertion that the ordinance was void and that Federal property must be taken and held was considered a declaration of war. At Montgomery the head of the Confederacy, the universal feeling provoked by the inaugural was that war was inevitable.

The literary form of the document aroused general comment.

"The style of the address is as characteristic as its temper," said the Boston "Transcript." "It has not one fawning expression in the whole course of its firm and explicit statements. The language is level to the popular mind—the plain, homespun language of a man accustomed to talk with 'the folks' and 'the neighbors;' the language of a man of vital common-sense, whose words exactly fit in his facts and thoughts."

This "homespun language" was a shock to many. The Toronto "Globe" found the address of "a tawdry, corrupt, school-boy style." And ex-President Tyler complained to Francis Lieber of its grammar. Lieber replied:

"You complain of the bad grammar of President Lincoln's message. We have to look at other things, just now,

than grammar. For aught I know, the last resolution of the South Carolina Convention may have been worded in sufficiently good grammar, but it is an attempt, unique in its disgracefulness, to whitewash an act of the dirtiest infamy. Let us leave grammar alone in these days of shame, and rather ask whether people act according to the first and simplest rules of morals and of honor."

The question which most deeply stirred the country, however, was "Does Lincoln mean what he says? Will he really use the power confided to him to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government?" The President was called upon for an answer sooner than he had expected. Almost the first thing brought to his attention on the morning of his first full day in office (March 5) was a letter from Major Robert Anderson, the officer in command of Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, saying that he had but a week's provisions, and that if the place was to be re-enforced so that it could be held, it would take 20,000 "good and well-disciplined men" to do it.

A graver matter the new President could not have been called upon to decide, for all the issues between North and South were at that moment focused in the fate of Fort Sumter. A series of dramatic incidents had given the fort this peculiar prominence. At the time of Mr. Lincoln's election Charleston Harbor was commanded by Major Anderson. Although there were three forts in the harbor, but one was garrisoned, Fort Moultrie, and that not the strongest in position. Not long after the election Anderson, himself a Southerner, thoroughly familiar with the feeling in Charleston, wrote the War Department that if the harbor was to be held by the United States, Fort Sumter and Castle Pinckney must be garrisoned. Later he repeated this warning. President Buchanan was loath to heed him. He feared irritating the South Carolinians. Instead of re-enforcements he sent An-



derson orders to hold the forts but to do nothing which would cause a collision. At the same time he entered into a half-contract with the South Carolina Congressmen not to re-enforce Anderson if the State did not attack him. All through the early winter Anderson remained in Moultrie, his position constantly becoming more dangerous. Interest in him increased with his peril, and the discussion as to whether the government should relieve, recall, or let him alone, waxed more and more excited.

Anderson had seen from the first that if the South Carolinians attempted to seize Moultrie he could not sustain his position. Accordingly, on the night of December 26 he spiked the guns of that fort and secretly transferred his force to Sumter, an almost impregnable position in the centre of the harbor. In the South the uproar over this act was terrific. The administration was accused of treachery. It in turn censured Anderson, though he had acted exactly within his orders which gave him the right to occupy whichever fort he thought best. In the North there was an outburst of exultation. It was the first act in defense of United States property, and Anderson became at once a popular hero and reinforcements for him were vehemently demanded.

Early in January Buchanan yielded to the pressure and sent the *Star of the West* with supplies. The vessel was fired on by the South Carolinians as she entered the harbor, and retired. This hostile act did not quicken the sluggish blood of the administration. Indeed, a quasi-agreement with the Governor followed, that if the fort was not attacked no further attempt would be made to re-enforce it, and there the matter stood when Mr. Lincoln on the morning of March 5 received Anderson's letter.

What was to be done? The garrison must not be allowed to starve; but evidently 20,000 disciplined men could not be had to relieve it—the whole United States army numbered

but 16,000. But if Mr. Lincoln could not relieve it, how could he surrender it? The effect of any weakening or compromise in his own position was perfectly clear to him. "When Anderson goes out of Fort Sumter," he said ruefully, "I shall have to go out of the White House." The exact way in which he looked at the matter he stated later to Congress, in substantially the following words:

To abandon that position, under the circumstances, would have been utterly ruinous; the necessity under which it was done would not have been fully understood; by many it would have been construed as a part of a voluntary policy; at home it would have discouraged the friends of the Union, emboldened its adversaries, and gone far to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; in fact, it would have been our national destruction consummated. This could not be allowed.

In his dilemma he sought the advice of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Scott, who told him sadly that "evacuation seemed almost inevitable."

Unwilling to decide at once, Lincoln devised a manœuvre by which he hoped to shift public attention from Fort Sumter to Fort Pickens, in Pensacola Harbor. The situation of the two forts was similar, although that at Sumter was more critical and interested the public far more intensely. It seemed to Mr. Lincoln that if Fort Pickens could be re-enforced, this would be a clear enough indication to both sections that he meant what he had said in his inaugural address, and after it had been accomplished the North would accept the evacuation of Fort Sumter as a military necessity, and on March 11 he sent an order that troops which had been sent to Pensacola in January by Mr. Buchanan, but never landed, should be placed in Fort Pickens.

As this order went by sea, it was necessarily some time before it arrived. Night and day during this interval Lin-

coln was busy in a series of original investigations of all sides of the Sumter question. While doing his utmost to obtain such information as would enable him to come to an intelligent conclusion, he was beset by both North and South. A report went out early in the month that Sumter was to be evacuated. It could not be verified; but it spread generally until there was, particularly in Washington, around Mr. Lincoln, a fever of excitement. Finally, on March 25, the Senate asked for the correspondence of Anderson. The President did not believe the time had come, however, to take the public into his confidence, and he replied:

. . . On examination of the correspondence thus called for, I have, with the highest respect for the Senate, come to the conclusion that at the present moment the publication of it would be inexpedient.

Three days later, March 28, while he still was uncertain whether his order had reached Fort Pickens or not, General Scott, who was ill, sent a letter over to the White House, advising Mr. Lincoln to abandon both Sumter and Pickens. Coming from such a source, the letter was a heavy blow to the President. One of the men he most trusted had failed to recognize that the policy he had laid down in his inaugural address was serious and intended to be acted upon. It was time to do something. Summoning an officer from the Navy Department, he asked him to prepare at once a plan for a relief expedition to Fort Sumter. That night Mr. Lincoln gave his first state dinner. It was a large affair, many friends besides the members of the Cabinet being present. The conversation was animated, and Lincoln was seemingly in excellent spirits. W. H. Russell, the correspondent of the London "Times," was present, and he notes in his Diary how Lincoln used anecdotes in his conversation that evening:

"Mr. Bates was remonstrating, apparently, against the appointment of some indifferent lawyer to a place of judicial importance," says Mr. Russell. "The President interposed with, 'Come now, Bates, he's not half as bad as you think. Besides that, I must tell you he did me a good turn long ago. When I took to the law, I was going to court one morning, with some ten or twelve miles of bad road before me, and I had no horse. The judge overtook me in his wagon. 'Hello, Lincoln! Are you not going to the courthouse? Come in, and I'll give you a seat.' Well, I got in, and the judge went on reading his papers. Presently the wagon struck a stump on one side of the road; then it hopped off to the other. I looked out, and I saw the driver was jerking from side to side in his seat; so says I, 'Judge, I think your coachman has been taking a little drop too much this morning.' 'Well, I declare, Lincoln,' said he, 'I should not wonder if you are right; for he has nearly upset me half a dozen times since starting.' So putting his head out of the window, he shouted, 'Why, you infernal scoundrel, you are drunk!' Upon which, pulling up his horses, and turning round with great gravity, the coachman said, 'By gorra! that's the first rightful decision you have given for the last twelvemonth.' While the company were laughing, the President beat a quiet retreat from the neighborhood of the Attorney-General."

Lincoln's story-telling that evening was used, as often happened, to cover a serious mental struggle. After many of his guests had retired, he called his Cabinet aside, and agitatedly told them of General Scott's letter. He then asked them to meet him the next day. That night the President did not close his eyes in sleep. The moment had come, as it must come, at one time or another, to every President of the United States, when his vote was the only vote in the Cabinet—the only vote in the country. The decision and orders he should give the next day might plunge the country into civil war. Could he escape it? All night he went over the problem, but his watch only strengthened his purpose.

When the Cabinet met, the President put the case before them in such a light that, on his asking the members to give him their views, only two, Seward and Smith, opposed the relief of Fort Sumter.

That day Lincoln gave his order that the expedition be prepared and ready to sail on April 6. Two days later, he ordered that an expedition for the relief of Fort Pickens be prepared. With the latter order he sent a verbal message to General Scott:

Tell him that I wish this thing done, and not to let it fail unless he can show that I have refused him something he asked for.

By April 6, news reached Mr. Lincoln from Fort Pickens. The commander of the vessel on which the troops were quartered, acting upon the armistice of Mr. Buchanan, had refused to land the re-enforcements. To relieve Sumter was the only alternative, and Lincoln immediately ordered forward the expeditions he had been preparing. At the same time he wrote with his own hand instructions for an agent whom he sent to Charleston to notify the Governor of South Carolina that an effort would be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only.

At last it was evident to the members of the Cabinet and to others in the secret that Mr. Lincoln did mean what he had said in his inaugural address: "The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government."

Mr. Lincoln had another matter on hand at the moment as vital as the relief of Sumter—how to prevent further accessions to the Southern Confederacy. When he was inaugurated, seven of the slave-holding States had left the Union. In two others, Virginia and Missouri, conventions were in session considering secession; but in both, Union

sentiment predominated. Three others, North Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee, had by popular vote decided to hold no convention. Maryland had already held an irregular State assembly, but nothing had been accomplished by the separatists. Mr. Lincoln's problem was how to strengthen this surviving Union sentiment sufficiently to prevent secession in case the Administration was forced to relieve Sumter. Evidently he could do nothing at the moment but inform himself as accurately as possible, by correspondence and conferences, of the temper of the people and put himself into relations with men in each State on whom he could rely in case of emergency. He did this with care and persistency, and so effectively that later, when matters became more serious, visitors from the doubtful States often expressed their amazement at the President's knowledge of the sentiments and conditions of their parts of the country.

The first State in which Lincoln attempted any active interference in favor of the Union was one which had already voted itself out, Texas. A conflict had arisen there between the Southern party and the Governor, Sam Houston, and on March 18 the latter had been deposed. When Mr. Lincoln heard of this, he decided to try to get a message to the Governor, offering United States support if he would put himself at the head of the Union party of the State. The messenger who carried this word to Houston was Mr. G. H. Giddings, at that time the holder of the contract for carrying the mails by the El Paso route to California. He was taken to the White House by his friend Postmaster-General Blair, and gives the following account of what occurred at the interview. It is one of the very few descriptions of Mr. Lincoln in a Cabinet meeting which we have:

I was taken into the Cabinet room, and introduced by the Postmaster-General to President Lincoln and all the members of the Cabinet, who were there apparently waiting for

us. The President asked me to take a seat at the big table next to him. He then said to me, "You have been highly recommended to me as a reliable man by the Postmaster-General, the Hon. G. A. Grow, and others. They tell me that you are an old citizen of Texas and about to return to your home. My object in wishing to see you is that I desire to intrust to you a secret message to Governor Houston."

I said, "Yes, Mr. President, I should have left to-night but for this invitation to call on you, which was a great pleasure to me."

He then asked me a great many questions, where I was born, when I went to Texas, what I had been doing there, how I liked the State, and what was the public sentiment in Texas in regard to the prospects of a war—all of which I answered to the best of my ability.

He then said to me that the message was of such importance that, before handing it to me, he would read it to me. Before beginning to read he said, "This is a confidential and secret message. No one besides my Cabinet and myself knows anything about it, and we are all sworn to secrecy. I am going to swear you in as one of my Cabinet." And then he said to me in a jocular way, "Hold up your right hand," which I did. "Now," said he, "consider yourself a member of my Cabinet."

He then read the message, explaining his meaning at times as he was reading it. The message was written in big bold hand, on large sheets of paper, and consisted of several pages. It was signed "A. Lincoln." I cannot give the exact words of the message, but the substance was as follows:

It referred first to the surrender, by General Twiggs, of the United States troops, forts, and property in Texas to the rebels, and offered to appoint Governor Houston a major-general in the United States army in case he would accept. It authorized him to take full command in Texas, taking charge of all Government property and such of the old army as he could get together, and to recruit 100,000 men, if possible, and to hold Texas in the Union. In case he did accept, the President promised to support him with the whole power of the Government, both of the army and navy. After hearing the message read, I suggested to the President that it was

of such importance that perhaps he had better send it by some government official.

"No," he said. "Those Texans would hang any official caught with that paper."

I replied that they would hang me, too, if they caught me with that message.

"I do not wish to have you hung," he replied; "and if you think there is so much danger, I will not ask you to take it, although I am anxious to get it to Governor Houston as soon as possible. As you live in Texas and are about to return, I was in hopes you would take it."

"I will take the message with much pleasure," I replied, "as you personally request it, and will deliver it safely to Governor Houston, only stipulating that it shall remain as one of your Cabinet secrets." This he assured me should be done.

I remained there until about midnight. The question of war or no war was discussed by different members of the Cabinet. Mr. Seward said there would be no war. The President said he hoped and prayed that there would not be a war. I said to Mr. Seward that, as he knew, Congress had extended my overland mail contract one contract term and doubled the service; that to put the increased service in operation would cost me over \$50,000, which would be lost in case of war; and I asked him what I had better do.

"There will be no war," Mr. Seward said; "go ahead and put on the increased service. You will run no risk in doing so." He said that Humphrey Marshall and some others, whose names I have forgotten, had left Washington a few days before that, to go into the border States and hold public meetings and ask the South to meet the North and have a National Convention for the purpose of amending the Constitution. He had no doubt, he said, that this would be done, and that, so far as he was individually concerned, he would prefer giving the Southern brothers the parchment and let them enter the amendment to the Constitution to suit themselves rather than have a civil war. He said, in all probability, some arrangements would be made to pay for the slaves and the gradual abolishment of slavery.



With these momentous affairs on hand, Lincoln needed freedom from trivial and personal matters, if ever a President needed it; yet one who reads the documents of the period would infer that his entire time was spent in appointing postmasters. There was no escape for him. The office-seekers had seized Washington, and were making the White House their headquarters.

"There were days," says William O. Stoddard, "when the throng of eager applicants for office filled the broad staircase to its lower steps; the corridors of the first floor; the famous East room; the private parlors; while anxious groups and individuals paraded up and down the outer porch, the walks, and the avenue."

They even attacked Lincoln on the street. One day as his carriage rolled up the avenue, a man stopped it and attempted to present his application and credentials. "No, no," said Mr. Lincoln indignantly, "I won't open shop in the street."

This raid had begun in Springfield with the election. As Mr. Lincoln had been elected without bargains on his part, he did not propose to consider minor appointments until actually inaugurated.

"I have made up my mind," he said to a visitor a few days after his election, "not to be badgered about these places. I have promised nothing high or low, and will not. By-and-by, when I call somebody to me in the character of an adviser, we will examine the claims to the most responsible posts and decide what shall be done. As for the rest, I shall have enough to do without reading recommendations for country postmasters."

All of the hundreds who had been put off in the winter, now reappeared in Washington. Now, Lincoln had clear notions of the use of the appointing power. One side should not gobble up everything, he declared; but in the pressure of

applications, it gave him the greatest difficulty to prevent this "gobbling up." Another rule he had adopted was not to appoint over the heads of his advisers. He preferred to win their consent to an appointment by tact rather than to make it by his own power. A case in point is disclosed in a letter he wrote to General Scott, in June, in which he said:

Doubtless you begin to understand how disagreeable it is for me to do a thing arbitrarily when it is unsatisfactory to others associated with me.

I very much wish to appoint Colonel Meigs Quartermaster-General, and yet General Cameron does not quite consent. I have come to know Colonel Meigs quite well for a short acquaintance, and, so far as I am capable of judging, I do not know one who combines the qualities of masculine intellect, learning, and experience of the right sort, and physical power of labor and endurance, so well as he.

I know he has great confidence in you, always sustaining, so far as I have observed, your opinions against any differing ones.

You will lay me under one more obligation if you can and will use your influence to remove General Cameron's objection. I scarcely need tell you I have nothing personal in this, having never seen or heard of Colonel Meigs until about the end of last March.

But that he could appoint arbitrarily is certain from the following letter:

. . . You must make a job of it, and provide a place for the bearer of this, Elias Wampole. Make a job of it with the collector and have it done. You *can* do it for me, and you *must*.

In spite of the terrible pressure brought to bear upon him by the place-hunters; in spite of the frequent dissatisfaction his appointments gave, and the abuse the disappointed heaped upon him, he rarely lost his patience, rarely was anything but



MARY TODD LINCOLN, WIFE OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN.

From a photograph taken by Brady, in the War Department Collection of Civil War Photographs



kind. His sense of humor aided him wonderfully in this particular. The incongruity of a man in his position, and with the very life of the country at stake, pausing to appoint postmasters, struck him forcibly. "What is the matter, Mr. Lincoln," said a friend one day, when he saw him looking particularly grave and dispirited. "Has anything gone wrong at the front?"

"No," said the President, with a tired smile. "It isn't the war; it's the post-office at Brownsville, Missouri."

The "Public Man" relates in his "Diary" the end of an interview he and a friend had with the President on March 7:

"He walked into the corridor with us; and, as he bade us good-by and thanked —— for what he had told him, he again brightened up for a moment and asked him in an abrupt kind of way, laying his hand as he spoke with a queer but not uncivil familiarity on his shoulder, 'You haven't such a thing as a postmaster in your pocket, have you?' —— stared at him in astonishment, and I thought a little in alarm, as if he suspected a sudden attack of insanity; then Mr. Lincoln went on: 'You see it seems to me kind of unnatural that you shouldn't have at least a postmaster in your pocket. Everybody I've seen for days past has had foreign ministers, and collectors, and all kinds, and I thought you couldn't have got in here without having at least a postmaster get into your pocket!'"

The "strange bed-fellows" politics was constantly making always amused him. One day a man turned up who had letters of recommendation from the most prominent pair of enemies in the Republican party, Horace Greeley and Thurlow Weed. The President immediately did what he could for him:

Mr. Adams is magnificently recommended; but the great point in his favor is that Thurlow Weed and Horace Greeley join in recommending him. I suppose the like never

happened before, and never will again; so that it is now or never. What say you?

A less obvious perplexity than the office-seekers for Mr. Lincoln at this period, though a no less real one, was the attitude of his Secretary of State—his cheerful assumption that he, not Mr. Lincoln, was the final authority of the administration.

Mr. Seward had been for years the leader of the Republican party. His defeat in the Chicago Convention of 1860 had been a terrible blow to a large number of people, though Seward himself had taken it nobly. "The Republican party was not made for Mr. Seward," he told his friends, "but Mr. Seward for the Republican party," and he went heartily into the campaign. But he believed, as many Republicans did, that Lincoln was unfit for the presidency, and that some one of his associates would be obliged to assume leadership. When Mr. Seward accepted the Secretaryship of State, he evidently did it with the idea that he was to be the Providence of the administration. "It is inevitable," he wrote to his wife on December 28th, the very day he wrote to Mr. Lincoln of his acceptance. "I will try to save freedom and my country." A week later he wrote home, "I have assumed a sort of dictatorship for defense, and am laboring night and day with the cities and States. My hope, rather my confidence, is unabated." And again, on January 18th; "It seems to me if I am absent only eight days, this administration, the Congress, and the District would fall into consternation and despair. I am the only *hopeful, calm, conciliatory* person here."

When Lincoln arrived in Washington and asked Seward to read the inaugural address, the latter gave it the closest attention, modifying it to fit his own policy, and in defense of the changes he made, he wrote to the President-elect: "Only the soothing words which I have spoken have saved

us and carried us along thus far. Every loyal man, and indeed every disloyal man, in the South will tell you this."

He began his duties as Secretary of State with the same confidence in his call to be the real, if not the apparent, head of affairs. When the question of relieving Sumter came up, he believed that it was he who was managing the matter. "I wish I could tell you something of the political troubles of the country," he wrote home, "but I cannot find the time. They are enough to tax the wisdom of the wisest. Fort Sumter is in danger. Relief of it practically impossible. The commissioners from the Southern Confederacy are here. These cares fall chiefly on me."

According to Mr. Welles, Secretary of the Navy, "confidence and mutual frankness on public affairs and matters pertaining to the government, particularly on what related to present and threatened disturbances, existed among all the members [of the cabinet], with the exception of Mr. Seward, who had, or affected, a certain mysterious knowledge which he was not prepared to impart." Mr. Welles asserts that Mr. Seward carried so far his assumption of the "cares" of Sumter and other questions as to meddle in the duties of his associates in the cabinet. He opposed regular cabinet meetings, and at first had his way. After Tuesdays and Fridays were set as cabinet days, he contended that it was not necessary that a member should come to the meetings unless especially summoned by Mr. Lincoln or himself.

If Mr. Seward had been less self-confident, he would have seen before the end of March that Mr. Lincoln had a mind of his own, and with it a quiet way of following its decisions. Others had seen this. For instance, he had had his own way about who should go into the cabinet. "There can be no doubt of it any longer," wrote the "Public Man" in his "Diary" on March 2, "this man from Illinois is not

in the hands of Mr. Seward." Then there was the inaugural address—it was *his*, not Mr. Seward's; and more than one prominent newspaper commented with astonishment on that fact.

Nobody knew these facts better than the Secretary of State. He had discovered also that Mr. Lincoln attended to his business. "This President proposes to do all his work," he wrote to Mrs. Seward on March 16. He had received, too, at least one severe lesson, which ought to have shown him that it was Mr. Lincoln, not he, who was casting the decisive vote in the cabinet. This was in reference to Sumter. During the period when the President was waiting to hear from Fort Pickens, commissioners from the Southern Confederacy had been in Washington. Mr. Seward had not received them, but through a trusted agent he had assured them that Sumter would be evacuated. There is no proof, so far as I know, that Mr. Lincoln knew of this quasi-promise of his Secretary of State. As we have seen, he did not decide to order an expedition prepared to relieve the fort until March 29. From what we know of the character of the man, it is inconceivable that he should have authorized Mr. Seward to promise to do a thing which he had not yet decided to do. The Secretary assumed that, because he believed in evacuation, it would follow, and he assured the Southern commissioners to that effect. Suddenly he realized that the President was not going to evacuate Sumter, that his representations to the Southerners were worthless, that he had been following a course which was bound to bring on the administration the charge of deception and fraud. Yet all these things taught him nothing of the man he had to deal with, and on April 1 he sent Mr. Lincoln a letter in which he laid down an astounding policy—to make war on half Europe—and offered to take the reins of administration into his own hands.



SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S CONSIDERATION,  
APRIL 1, 1861.

*First.* We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy, either domestic or foreign.

*Second.* This, however, is not culpable, and it has even been unavoidable. The presence of the Senate, with the need to meet applications for patronage, have prevented attention to other and more grave matters.

*Third.* But further delay to adopt and prosecute our policies for both domestic and foreign affairs would not only bring scandal on the administration, but danger upon the country.

*Fourth.* To do this we must dismiss the applicants for office. But how? I suggest that we make the local appointments forthwith, leaving foreign or general ones for ulterior and occasional action.

*Fifth.* The policy at home. I am aware that my views are singular, and perhaps not sufficiently explained. My system is built upon this idea as a ruling one, namely, that we must

CHANGE THE QUESTION BEFORE THE PUBLIC FROM ONE UPON SLAVERY, OR ABOUT SLAVERY, for a question upon UNION OR DISUNION :

In other words, from what would be regarded as a party question, to one of patriotism or union.

The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although not in fact a slavery or a party question, is so regarded. Witness the temper manifested by the Republicans in the free States, and even by the Union men in the South.

I would therefore terminate it as a safe means for changing the issue. I deem it fortunate that the last administration created the necessity.

For the rest, I would simultaneously defend and re-enforce all the ports in the Gulf, and have the navy recalled from foreign stations to be prepared for a blockade. Put the island of Key West under martial law.

This will raise distinctly the question of union or disunion. I would maintain every fort and possession in the South.

## FOR FOREIGN NATIONS.

I would demand explanations from Spain and France, categorically, at once.

I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention.

And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France,

Would convene Congress and declare war against them.

But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it.

For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it incessantly.

Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it, or

Devolve it on some member of his cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide.

It is not in my especial province;

But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility.

Mr. Lincoln replied:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *April 1, 1861.*

HON. W. H. SEWARD.

*My dear Sir:* Since parting with you, I have been considering your paper dated this day, and entitled "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration." The first proposition in it is, "*First*, We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy, either domestic or foreign."

At the beginning of that month, in the inaugural, I said: "The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts." This had your distinct approval at the time; and taken in connection with the order I immediately gave General Scott, directing him to employ

every means in his power to strengthen and hold the forts, comprises the exact domestic policy you now urge, with the single exception that it does not propose to abandon Fort Sumter.

Again, I do not perceive how the re-enforcement of Fort Sumter would be done on a slavery or a party issue, while that of Fort Pickens would be on a more national and patriotic one.

The news received yesterday in regard to St. Domingo certainly brings a new item within the range of our foreign policy; but up to that time we have been preparing circulars and instructions to ministers and the like, all in perfect harmony, without even a suggestion that we had no foreign policy.

Upon your closing proposition—that “whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it.

“For this purpose it must be somebody’s business to pursue and direct it incessantly.

“Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it, or

“Devolve it on some member of his cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide”—I remark that if this must be done, I must do it. When a general line of policy is adopted, I apprehend there is no danger of its being changed without good reason, or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its progress I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of all the cabinet.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.\*

The magnanimity of this letter was only excelled by the President’s treatment of the matter. He never revealed Mr. Seward’s amazing proposition to any one but Mr. Nicolay, his private secretary, and it never reached the public until Nicolay and Hay published it. Mr. Lincoln’s action in this matter, and his handling of the events which followed,

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\* Abraham Lincoln, a History, Vol. III. By Nicolay and Hay.

gradually dispelled Mr. Seward's illusion. By June, the Secretary had begun to understand Mr. Lincoln. He was quick and generous to acknowledge his power. "Executive force and vigor are rare qualities," he wrote to Mrs. Seward on June 5. "The President is the best of us."

## CHAPTER XXIII

### THE BEGINNING OF CIVIL WAR

IT WAS on April 9, 1861, that the expedition ordered by President Lincoln for the relief of Fort Sumter sailed from New York. The day before, the Governor of South Carolina had received from the President the notification sent on the 6th that he might expect an attempt to be made to provision the fort. Ever since Mr. Lincoln's inauguration the Confederate government had been watching intently the new Administration's course. Sumter, it was resolved, should never be captured, re-enforced, even provisioned. When it was certain that an expedition had started for its relief an order to attack the fort was given, and it was bombarded until it fell.

The bombardment of Sumter began at half past four o'clock in the morning of April 12. All that day rumors and private telegrams came to the White House reporting the progress of the attack and Anderson's heroic defense, but there was nothing official. By evening, however, there was no doubt that Fort Sumter was being reduced. Mr. Lincoln was already formulating his plan of action, his one question to the excited visitors who called upon him being, "Will your State support me with military power?" The way in which the matter presented itself to his mind he stated clearly to Congress, when that body next came together :

. . . The assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter was in no sense a matter of self-defense on the part of the

assailants. They well knew that the garrison in the fort could by no possibility commit aggression upon them. They knew—they were expressly notified—that the giving of bread to the few brave and hungry men of the garrison was all which would on that occasion be attempted, unless themselves, by resisting so much, should provoke more. They knew that this government desired to keep the garrison in the fort, not to assail them, but merely to maintain visible possession, and thus to preserve the Union from actual and immediate dissolution—trusting, as hereinbefore stated, to time, discussion, and the ballot-box for final adjustment; and they assailed and reduced the fort for precisely the reverse object—to drive out the visible authority of the Federal Union, and thus force it to immediate dissolution. . . .

And this issue embraces more than the fate of these United States. It presents to the whole family of man the question whether a constitutional republic or democracy—a government of the people by the same people—can or can not maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic foes. . . .

So viewing the issue, no choice was left but to call out the war power of the government; and so to resist force employed for its destruction, by force for its preservation.

This was not Mr. Lincoln's view alone. It was the view of the North. And when, on April 15, he issued a proclamation calling for 75,000 militia and appealing to all loyal citizens "to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence of our National Union, and the perpetuity of popular government, and to redress wrongs already long enough endured," there was an immediate and overwhelming response. The telegraph of the very day of the proclamation announced that in almost every city and town of the North volunteer regiments were forming and that Union mass meetings were in session in halls and churches and public squares. "What portion of the 75,000 militia you call for do you give to Ohio? We will

furnish the largest number you will receive," telegraphed the Governor of that State in response to the President's message. Indiana, whose quota was less than 5,000 men, telegraphed back that 10,000 were ready. "We will furnish you the regiments in thirty days if you want them, and 50,000 men if you need them," telegraphed Zachariah Chandler from Michigan. So rapidly did men come in under this call for 75,000, that in spite of the efforts of the War Department to keep the number down, it swelled to 91,816.

It was not troops alone that were offered. Banks and private individuals offered money and credit. Supplies of every sort were put at the government's order. Corporations sent their presidents to Washington, offering railroads and factories. Stephen Douglas sought Lincoln and offered all his splendid power to the Administration. Edward Everett, who had strongly sympathized with the South, declared for the movement. Individuals suspected of Southern sympathy were promptly hooted off the streets and newspapers which had been advocating disunion were forced to hang out the Stars and Stripes, or suffer a mob to raze their establishments. The fall of Sumter seemed for the moment to make a unit of the North.

Patriotic fervor was intensified by the satisfaction that at last the long tension was over. Nor was this strange. For months the war fever had been burning in the veins of both North and South. At times compromise had seemed certain, then suddenly no one knew why it seemed as if another twenty-four hours would plunge the country into war. Many a public man on both sides had grown thin and haggard in wrestling with the terrible problem that winter and spring. Congressmen in Washington had walked the streets arguing, groaning, seeking an escape. Many a sleepless man had tossed nightly on his bed until daybreak, then rose to smoke and walk, always pursued by the same problems and never

seeing any final solution but war. The struggle had penetrated the social circles, particularly in border cities like Washington, and rarely did people assemble that hot discussions did not rise. The very children in the schools took up the debates, and for many weeks in Washington the school grounds were the scenes of small daily quarrels, ending often in blows and tears. The fall of Sumter ended this exhausting uncertainty. Henceforth there was nothing to do but range yourself on one side or the other and fight it out.

But if Sumter unified the sentiment of the North, it did no less for the South. Henceforth there was but one voice in the Southern States, and that for the Confederacy. North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Arkansas, all refused the President's call for troops. In Virginia a convention was in session, whose members up to that day were in the main for the Union. On April 17 that convention passed an ordinance of secession. The next day the arsenal at Harper's Ferry was seized by the State, and the Southern Confederacy at Montgomery was informed that Virginia was open to its troops. The line of hostility had reached the very boundaries of Washington. The bluffs across the Potomac, now beautiful in the first green of spring, on which Mr. Lincoln looked every morning from his windows in the White House, were no longer in his country. They belonged to the enemy.

With the news of the secession of Virginia, there reached Washington on Thursday, April 18, a rumor that a large Confederate force was marching on the city. Now there were not over 2,500 armed men in Washington. Regiments were known to be on their way from Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, but nobody could say when they would arrive. Washington might be razed to the ground before they came. A hurried effort at defense was at once made. Women and children were sent out of the city. At the



White House, Mrs. Lincoln was urged to go with her boys, but she refused positively. "I am as safe as Mr. Lincoln, and I shall not leave him," was her stout answer.

Guards were stationed at every approach to the city, cannon were planted in commanding positions, while "government officials, foreign ministers, governors, senators, office-seekers" were pressed into one or the other of two impromptu organizations, the Clay Battalion of Cassius M. Clay, and the Frontier Guards of Senator Lane of Kansas. For a short time the Frontier Guards were quartered in the East Room of the White House, and Clay's Battalion at Willard's Hotel, which had been stripped of its guests in a night.

The confusion and alarm of the city was greatly increased on Friday by news received from Baltimore. The Sixth Massachusetts, *en route* to the Capital, had reached there that day, and had been attacked as it marched through by a mob of Southern sympathizers. Four of its members had been killed and many wounded. "No troops should go through Maryland," the people of Baltimore declared, "whose purpose was to invade Virginia and coerce sister States." That evening about five o'clock the regiment reached Washington. Dusty, torn, and bleeding, they marched two by two through a great crowd of silent people to the Capitol. Behind them there came, in single line, seventeen stretchers, bearing the wounded. The dead had been left behind.

Early the next day, Saturday, the 20th, a delegation of Baltimore men appeared at the White House. They had come to beg Mr. Lincoln to bring no more troops through their city. After a long discussion, he sent them away with a note to the Maryland authorities, suggesting that the troops be marched *around* Baltimore. But as he gave them the letter, Mr. Nicolay heard him say laughingly: "If I grant you this concession, that no troops shall pass through the

city, you will be back here to-morrow, demanding that none shall be marched around it."

The President was right. That afternoon, and again on Sunday and Monday, committees sought him, protesting that Maryland soil should not be "polluted" by the feet of soldiers marching against the South. The President had but one reply: "We must have troops; and as they can neither crawl under Maryland nor fly over it, they must come across it."

While the controversy with the Baltimoreans was going on, the condition of Washington had become hourly more alarming. In 1861 there was but *one* railroad running north from Washington. At Annapolis Junction this line connected with a branch to Chesapeake Bay; at the Relay House, with the Baltimore and Ohio to the west; at Baltimore, with the only two lines then entering that city from the North, one from Harrisburg, the other from Philadelphia. On Friday, April 19, after the attack on the Sixth Massachusetts, the Maryland authorities ordered that certain of the bridges on the railroads running from Baltimore to Harrisburg and Philadelphia be destroyed. This was done to prevent any more trains bearing troops entering the city. The telegraph lines were also partially destroyed at this time. Inspired by this example, the excited Marylanders, in the course of the next two or three days, tore up much of the track running north from Washington, as well as that of the Annapolis branch, and still further damaged the telegraph. Exit from Washington to the north, east, and west by rail was now impossible. On Sunday night matters were made still worse by the complete interruption of the telegraph to the north. The last wire had been cut. All the news which reached Washington now came by way of the south, and it was all of the most disturbing nature. From twelve to fifteen thousand Confederates were reported near Alexandria, and an

army under Jefferson Davis was said to be ready to march from Richmond. The alarmed citizens, expecting hourly to be attacked, were constantly reporting that they heard cannon booming from this or that direction, or had seen scouts prowling around the outskirts of the town.

The activity of the War Department under these conditions was extraordinary. General Scott had only four or five thousand men under arms, but he proposed, if the town was attacked, to contest possession point by point, and he had every public building, including school-houses, barricaded. At the Capitol, barricades of cement barrels, sandbags, and iron plates such as were being used in the construction of the dome were erected ten feet high, at every entrance. In all his efforts the General was assisted by the loyal citizens. Even the men exempted from service by age formed a company called the "Silver Grays," and the soldiers of the War of 1812 offered themselves.


By Tuesday, April 23, a new terror was added to the situation—that of famine. The country around had been scoured for provisions, and supplies were getting short. If Washington was to be besieged, as it looked, what was to be done about food? The government at once ordered that the flour at the Georgetown mills, some 25,000 barrels, be seized, and sold according to the discretion of the military authorities.

In its distress, it was to Mr. Lincoln that the city turned. The fiber of the man began to show at once. Bayard Taylor happened to be in Washington at the very beginning of the alarm, and called on the President. "His demeanor was thoroughly calm and collected," Taylor wrote to the New York "Tribune," "and he spoke of the present crisis with that solemn, earnest composure which is the sign of a soul not easily perturbed. I came away from his presence cheered and encouraged." However, the suspense of the

days when the Capital was isolated, the expected troops not arriving, an hourly attack feared, wore on Mr. Lincoln greatly. "I begin to believe," Mr. Hay heard him say bitterly, one day, to some Massachusetts soldiers, "that there is no North. The Seventh Regiment is a myth. Rhode Island is another. You are the only real thing." And again, after pacing the floor of his deserted office for a half hour, he was heard to exclaim to himself, in an anguished tone, "Why don't they come! Why don't they come!"

The delay of the troops to arrive was, perhaps, the most mysterious and terrifying element in the situation for Mr. Lincoln. He knew that several regiments had started, and that the Seventh New York was at Annapolis, having come down Chesapeake Bay. Why they did not make a way through he could not understand. The most disquieting rumors reached him—now that an army had been raised in Maryland to oppose their advance; now that they had attempted to come up the Potomac, and were aground on Virginia soil. At last, however, the long suspense was broken. About noon, on Thursday, the 25th, the whole city was thrown into excitement by the shrill whistle of a locomotive. A great crowd gathered at the station, where the Seventh New York was debarking. The regiment had worked its way from Annapolis to the city, building bridges and laying track as it went. Worn and dirty as the men were, they marched gaily up Pennsylvania avenue, through the crowds of cheering, weeping people, to the White House, where Mr. Lincoln received them. The next day, 1,200 Rhode Island troops and the Butler Brigade of 1,400 arrived. Before the end of the week, there were said to be 17,000 troops in the city, and it was believed that the number could easily be increased to 40,000. Mr. Lincoln had won his first point. He had soldiers to defend his Capital.

But it was evident by this time that something more was



LINCOLN EARLY IN 1861.

From photograph in the collection of H. W. Fay of De Kalb, Illinois, taken probably in Springfield early in 1861. It is supposed to have been the first, or at least one of the first, portraits made of Mr. Lincoln after he began to wear a beard. As is well known, his face was smooth until about the end of 1860; when he first allowed his beard to grow, it became a topic of newspaper comment, and even of caricature.



necessary than to defend Washington. When, on April 15, Mr. Lincoln called for 75,000 men for three months, he had commanded the persons disturbing the public peace "to disperse and retire peacefully to their respective abodes within twenty days from date."

In reply the South had marched on his Capital, cutting it off from all communication with the North for nearly a week, and had so threatened Harper's Ferry and Norfolk that to prevent the arsenal and shipyards from falling into the hands of the enemy, the Federal commanders had destroyed both these fine government properties.

Before ten of the twenty days had passed, it was plain that the order was worthless.

"I have desired as sincerely as any man, and I sometimes think more than any other man," said the President on April 27 to a visiting military company, "that our present difficulties might be settled without the shedding of blood. I *will not* say that all hope has yet gone; but if the alternative is presented whether the Union is to be broken in fragments and the liberties of the people lost, or blood be shed, you will probably make the choice with which I shall not be dissatisfied."

If not as yet quite convinced that war was coming, Mr. Lincoln saw that it was so probable that he must have an army of something beside "three months' men," for the very next day after this speech, the Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron, wrote to a correspondent that the President had decided to add twenty-five regiments to the regular army.

There was great need that the regular army be re-enforced. At the beginning of the year it had numbered 16,367 men, but a large part of this force was in the West, and the efficiency of the whole was greatly weakened by the desertion of officers to the South, 313 of the commissioned officers, nearly one-third of the whole number, having resigned. To

Mr. Lincoln's great satisfaction, this disaffection did not extend to the "common soldiers and common sailors." "To the last man, so far as is known," he said proudly, "they have successfully resisted the traitorous efforts of those whose commands, but an hour before, they obeyed as absolute law." It was on May 3 that the President issued a proclamation increasing the regulars by 22,714, and calling for three years' volunteers to the number of 42,034. But the country was not satisfied to send so few. When the War Department refused troops from States beyond the quota assigned, Governors literally begged that they be allowed to send more.

"You have no conception of the depth of feeling universal in the Northern mind for the prosecution of this war until the flag floats from every spot on which it had a right to float a year ago," wrote Galusha A. Grow, on May 5. . . . In my judgment, the enthusiasm of the hour ought not to be represented by flat refusals on the part of the government, but let them (troops offered above the quota) be held in readiness (in some way) in the States."

A meeting of the Governors of the Western and Border States was held in Cleveland, Ohio, about the time of the second call, and Mr. Randall, the Governor of Wisconsin, wrote to Lincoln on May 6:

"I must be permitted to say it, because it is a fact, there is a spirit evoked by this rebellion among the liberty-loving people of the country that is driving them to action, and if the government will not permit them to act for it, they will act for themselves. It is better for the government to direct this spirit than to let it run wild. . . . If it was absolutely certain that the 75,000 troops first called would wipe out this rebellion in three weeks from to-day, it would still be the policy of your Administration, and for the best interest of the government, in view of what ought to be the



great future of this nation, to call into the field at once 300,000 men."

At the same time from Maine W. P. Fessenden wrote: "Rely upon it, you cannot at Washington fairly estimate the resolute determination existing among all classes of people in the free States to put down at once and forever this monstrous rebellion."

Under this pressure, regiment after regiment was added to the three years' volunteers. It was Mr. Lincoln's personal interference which brought in many of these regiments. "Why cannot Colonel Small's Philadelphia regiment be received?" he wrote to the Secretary of War on May 21, "I sincerely wish it could. There is something strange about it. Give those gentlemen an interview, and take their regiment." Again on June 13 he wrote: "There is, it seems, a regiment in Massachusetts commanded by Fletcher Webster, and which the Hon. Daniel Webster's old friends very much wish to get into the service. If it can be received with the approval of your department and the consent of the Governor of Massachusetts, I shall indeed be much gratified. Give Mr. Ashmun a chance to explain fully." And again on June 17: "With your concurrence, and that of the Governor of Indiana, I am in favor of accepting into what we call the three years' service any number not exceeding four additional regiments from that State. Probably they should come from the triangular region between the Ohio and Wabash rivers, including my own old boyhood home."\*

So rapid was the increase of the army under this policy, that on July 1, the Secretary of War reported 310,000 men at his command, and added: "At the present moment the government presents the striking anomaly of being em-

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\* These extracts are from letters to Mr. Cameron found in a volume of the War Records as yet unpublished. Others of the same tenor are in the volume.

barrassed by the generous outpouring of volunteers to support its action."

But Mr. Lincoln soon found that enrolling men does not make an army. He must uniform, arm, shelter, feed, nurse, and transport them as needed. It was in providing for the needs of the men that came so willingly into service that the Administration found its chief embarrassment. The most serious difficulty was in getting arms. Men could go ununiformed, and sleep in the open air, but to fight they must have guns. The supplies of the United States arsenals in the North had been greatly depleted in the winter of 1860 and 1861 by transfers to the South, between one-fifth and one-sixth of all the muskets in the country and between one-fourth and one-fifth of all the rifles having been sent to the six seceding States. The Confederates had not only obtained a large share of government arms, but through January, February, March, April, and May they bought from private factories in the North, "under the very noses of the United States officers." This became such a scandal that the Administration had to send out an agent to investigate the trade. At the same time the Federal ministers abroad were warning Mr. Lincoln that the South was picking up all the arms Europe had to spare, and the North was buying nothing. The need of arms opened the way for inventors, and Washington was overrun with men having guns to be tested. Mr. Lincoln took the liveliest interest in these new arms, and it sometimes happened that, when an inventor could get nobody else in the government to listen to him, the President would personally test his gun. A former clerk in the Navy Department tells an incident illustrative. He had stayed late one night at his desk, when he heard some one striding up and down the hall muttering: "I do wonder if they have gone already and left the building all alone." Looking out, the clerk was surprised to see the President.

"Good evening," said Mr. Lincoln. "I was just looking for that man who goes shooting with me sometimes."

The clerk knew that Mr. Lincoln referred to a certain messenger of the Ordnance Department who had been accustomed to going with him to test weapons, but as this man had gone home, the clerk offered his services. Together they went to the lawn south of the White House, where Mr. Lincoln fixed up a target cut from a sheet of white Congressional note-paper. "Then pacing off a distance of about eighty or a hundred feet," writes the clerk, "he raised the rifle to a level, took a quick aim, and drove the round of seven shots in quick succession, the bullets shooting all around the target like a Gatling gun and one striking near the centre."

"'I believe I can make this gun shoot better,' said Mr. Lincoln, after we had looked at the result of the first fire. With this he took from his vest pocket a small wooden sight which he had whittled from a pine stick, and adjusted it over the sight of the carbine. He then shot two rounds, and of the fourteen bullets nearly a dozen hit the paper!"

It was in these early days of preparing for war that Mr. Lincoln interested himself, too, in experiments with the balloon. He was one of the first persons in this country to receive a telegraphic message from a balloon sent up to make observations on an enemy's works. This experiment was made in June, and so pleased the President that the balloonist was allowed to continue his observations from the Virginia side. These observations were successful, and on June 21, Joseph Henry, the distinguished secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, declared in a report to the Administration that, "from experiments made here for the first time, it is conclusively proved that telegrams can be sent with ease and certainty between the balloon and the quarters of the commanding officer."

The extraordinary conditions under which Mr. Lincoln

entered the White House prevented him for some weeks from adopting anything like systematic habits. By the time of his second call for troops, however, he had adjusted himself to his new home as well as he ever was able to do. The arrangement of the White House was not materially different then from what it is now. The entrance, halls, the East Room, the Green Room, the Blue Room, the State Dining-room, all were the same, the only difference being in furnishings and decorations. The Lincoln family used the west end of the second floor as a private apartment; the east end being devoted to business. Mr. Lincoln's office was the large room on the south side of the house, between the office of Private Secretary Nicolay, at the southeast corner, and the room now used as a Cabinet-room.

"The furniture of this room," says Mr. Isaac Arnold, a friend and frequent visitor of the President, "consisted of a large oak table covered with cloth, extending north and south, and it was around this table that the Cabinet sat when it held its meetings. Near the end of the table and between the windows was another table, on the west side of which the President sat, in a large arm-chair, and at this table he wrote. A tall desk, with pigeon-holes for papers, stood against the south wall. The only books usually found in this room were the Bible, the United States Statutes and a copy of Shakespeare. There were a few chairs and two plain hair-covered sofas. There were two or three map frames, from which hung military maps, on which the positions and movements of the armies were traced. There was an old and discolored engraving of General Jackson on the mantel and a later photograph of John Bright. Doors opened into this room from the room of the Secretary and from the outside hall, running east and west across the house. A bell cord within reach of his hand extended to the Secretary's office. A messenger sat at the door opening from the hall, and took in the cards and names of visitors."

One serious annoyance in the arrangement of the business

part of the White House at that date arose from the fact that to reach his office Mr. Lincoln was obliged, in coming from his private apartment, to pass through the hall. As this hall was always filled with persons anxious to see him, it was especially difficult for a man of his informal habits and genial nature to get through. Late in 1864 this difficulty was remedied. At the suggestion of one of his body-guard, a door was cut from the family library into the present cabinet-room and a light partition was run across the south end, thus enabling him to pass into his office without interruption.

Most of his time, while President, Mr. Lincoln undoubtedly spent in his office. He was a very early riser, being often at his desk at six o'clock in the morning, and sometimes even going out on errands at this early hour. A friend tells of passing the White House early one morning in the spring of 1861 and seeing Mr. Lincoln standing at the gate, looking anxiously up and down the street. "Good morning, good morning," he said. "I am looking for a newsboy. When you get to the corner, I wish you would send one up this way."

After the firing on Fort Sumter and the alarm for the safety of Washington, the office-seekers fell off sufficiently for the President to announce that he would see no visitors before nine o'clock in the morning or after two in the afternoon. He never kept the rule himself, but those about him did their best to keep it for him. He was most informal in receiving visitors. Sometimes he even went out into the hall himself to reply to cards. Ben: Perley Poore says he did this frequently for newspaper men. Indeed, it was so much more natural for Mr. Lincoln to do things for himself than to call on others, to go to others than have them come to him, that he was constantly appearing in unexpected places. The place to which he went oftenest was the War Department.

In 1861, separate buildings occupied the space now covered by the State, Army, and Navy Building. The War Department stood on the site of the northeast corner of the present structure, facing on Pennsylvania avenue. The Navy Building was south and in line, and no street separated the White House from these buildings, as now, but the lawn was continuous, and a gravel walk ran from one to another. Mr. Lincoln had no telegraph apparatus in the White House, so that all war news was brought to him from the War Department, unless he went after it. He much preferred to go after it, and he began soon after the fall of Fort Sumter to run over to the Department whenever anything important occurred. Mr. William B. Wilson, of Philadelphia, was in the military telegraph office of the War Department from the first of May, 1861, and in some unpublished recollections of Mr. Lincoln he recalls an incident illustrating admirably the President's informal relation to the telegraph office. Mr. Wilson had been sent to the White House hurriedly to repeat an important message from an excited Governor.

"Mr. Lincoln considered it of sufficient importance," writes Mr. Wilson, "to return with me to the War Department for the purpose of having a 'wire-talk' with the perturbed Governor. Calling one of his two younger boys to join him, we then started from the White House, between stately trees, along a gravel path which led to the rear of the old War Department building. It was a warm day, and Mr. Lincoln wore as part of his costume a faded gray linen duster which hung loosely around his long gaunt frame; his kindly eye was beaming with good nature, and his ever-thoughtful brow was unruffled. We had barely reached the gravel walk before he stooped over, picked up a round smooth pebble, and shooting it off his thumb, challenged us to a game of 'followings,' which we accepted. Each in turn tried to hit the outlying stone, which was being constantly projected onward by the President. The game was short, but exciting; the cheerfulness of childhood, the ambition of young man-

hood, and the gravity of the statesman were all injected into it. The game was not won until the steps of the War Department were reached. Every inch of progression was toughly contested, and when the President was declared victor, it was only by a hand span. He appeared to be as much pleased as if he had won a battle, and softened the defeat of the vanquished by attributing his success to his greater height of person and longer reach of arm."

One noticeable feature of Mr. Lincoln's life, at this time, was his relation to the common soldier. Officers he respected, even deferred to, but from the first arrival of troops in Washington it was the man on foot, with a gun on his shoulder, that had Mr. Lincoln's heart. Even at this early period the men found it out, and went to him confidently for favors refused elsewhere. Thus the franking of letters by Congressmen was one of the perquisites of the boys, and there are cases of their going to the President with letters to be franked when they failed to find, or were refused by, their Congressman. But they also soon learned that trivial pleas or complaints were met by rebukes as caustic as the help they received was genuine when they had a just cause. General Sherman relates the following incident that befell one day when he was riding through camp with Mr. Lincoln:

"I saw," says the general, "an officer with whom I had had a little difficulty that morning. His face was pale and his lips compressed. I foresaw a scene, but sat on the front seat of the carriage as quiet as a lamb. The officer forced his way through the crowd to the carriage, and said: 'Mr. President, I have a cause of grievance. This morning I went to speak to Colonel Sherman, and he threatened to shoot me.' Mr. Lincoln said: 'Threatened to shoot you?' 'Yes, sir, threatened to shoot me.' Mr. Lincoln looked at him, then at me, and stooping his tall form towards the officer, said to him, in a loud stage whisper, easily heard for some yards

around, *'Well, if I were you, and he threatened to shoot me, I would not trust him, for I believe he would do it.'*"

It is curious to note in the records of the time how soon, not only the soldiers, but the general public of Washington discovered the big heart of the new President. A correspondent of the Philadelphia "Press," in a letter of May 23, tells how he saw Mr. Lincoln one day sitting in his "new barouche" in front of the Treasury, awaiting Mr. Chase, when there came along a boy on crutches. Lincoln immediately called the boy to him, asked him several questions, and then slipped a gold piece into his hands. "Such acts of liberality and disinterested charity," said the correspondent, "are frequently practiced by our Executive, who can never look upon distress without attempting to relieve it."

As soon as the first rush of soldiers to Washington was over and the Capital was comparatively safe, Mr. Lincoln began to take a drive every afternoon. It was among the soldiers that he went almost invariably. Indeed, it was impossible to escape the camps, so fully was the city turned over to the military. The Capitol, Inauguration Ball-room, Patent Office, and other public buildings were used as temporary quarters for incoming troops. The Corcoran Art Gallery had been turned into a store-house for army supplies. A bakery was established in the basement of the Capitol. The Twelfth New York was in Franklin Park. At the Georgetown College was another regiment. On Meridian Hill the Seventh New York was stationed. Everywhere were soldiers. Mr. Lincoln and his Cabinet officers drove daily to one or another of these camps. Very often his outing for the day was attending some ceremony incident to camp life: a military funeral, a camp wedding, a review, a flag-raising. He did not often make speeches. "I have made a great many poor speeches," he said one day, in ex-



cluding himself, "and I now feel relieved that my dignity does not permit me to be a public speaker."

All through these early days of calling the army to Washington there was little to make one feel how terrible a thing it is to collect and prepare men for battle. So far it was the splendid outburst of patriotism, the dash of adventure, the holiday gaiety of it all, which had impressed the country. There were critics now who said, as they had said before the inauguration and again before the firing on Fort Sumter, that the President did not understand what was going on before his eyes. General Sherman himself confesses his irritation at what seemed to him an unbecoming placidity on the part of Mr. Lincoln. The General had just come from Louisiana. "How are they getting on down there?" asked the President.

"They are getting on swimmingly," Sherman replied. "They are preparing for war."

"Oh, well," Lincoln said, "I guess we'll manage to keep house."

More penetrating observers saw something else in the President, an inner man, wrestling incessantly with an awful problem. N. P. Willis, who saw him at one of the many flag-raising of that spring, records an impression common enough among thoughtful observers:

"There was a momentary interval," writes Willis, "while the band played the 'Star-Spangled Banner,' and during this 'brief waiting for the word,' all eyes, of course, were on the President's face, in which (at least for those near enough to see it well) there was the same curious problem of expression which has been more than once noticed by the close observer of that singular countenance—the two-fold working of the twofold nature of the man. Lincoln the Westerner, slightly humorous but thoroughly practical and sagacious, was measuring the 'chore' that was to be done, and wondering whether that string was going to draw that heap of stuff

through the hole in the top of the partition, determining that it should, but seeing clearly that it was mechanically a badly arranged job, and expecting the difficulty that did actually occur. Lincoln the President and statesman was another nature, seen in those abstract and serious eyes, which seemed withdrawn to an inner sanctuary of thought, sitting in judgment on the scene and feeling its far reach into the future. A whole man, and an exceedingly handy and joyous one, was to hoist the flag, but an anxious and reverent and deep-thinking statesman and patriot was to stand apart while it went up and pray God for its long waving and sacred welfare. Completely, and yet separately, the one strange face told both stories, and told them well."

By the middle of May, 1861, the problem of Mr. Lincoln's life was how to use the army he had called together. The capital was now well guarded. Troops were at Norfolk, Baltimore, and Harper's Ferry, the points at which the Confederates had made their earliest demonstrations. The uncertainty as to whether Kentucky would leave the Union had imperiled the line of the Ohio and compelled military demonstrations at Cincinnati and Cairo, and in Missouri the struggle between the Northern and Southern sympathizers had become so violent that a Military Department had been created there. Thus the President had a zig-zag line of troops running from Missouri eastward to Norfolk. The bulk of all the troops however, were in and around Washington. The North had been urging the President, from the day it answered his first call, to advance the volunteers into Virginia. "Don't establish batteries on Georgetown Heights," wrote Zachariah Chandler from Michigan on April 17. "March your troops into Virginia. Quarter them there." Finally, about the middle of May, the President decided that a movement across the river should be made, the object being to seize the heights from Arlington south to Alexandria. Mr. Lincoln had the success of this movement deeply at heart.

The Confederate flag flying from a staff at Alexandria had been a constant eyesore to him. Again and again he was seen standing with a gloomy face before one of the south windows of the White House looking through a glass at this flag.

The time for the advance was set for the night of May 23. By morning, Arlington, the shores of the Potomac southward, and the town of Alexandria were occupied by Federal troops. The enemy had fled at their approach. The flag which had caused Mr. Lincoln so much pain was gone, but its removal had cost a life very precious to the President. Young Colonel Ellsworth, one of the most brilliant officers in the volunteer service, a man whom the President had brought to Washington and for whom he felt the warmest affection, had been shot.

The Arlington heights seized, the army lay for weeks inactive. The one movement for which the North now clamored was a march from Arlington to Richmond. The delay to move made the country irritable and sarcastic. Perhaps the completest expression of the discontent of the North with the military policy of the Administration is found in the New York "Tribune." For days, beginning early in June, that paper kept standing at the head of its editorial columns what it called "The Nation's War Cry." "Forward to Richmond. Forward to Richmond. The Rebel Congress must not be allowed to meet there on the 20th of July. By that date the place must be held by the National Army."

Mr. Lincoln was as anxious for a successful movement southward as any man in the country; but for some time he resisted the popular outcry, giving his generals the opportunity to make ready for which they begged. At last, towards the end of June, he decided that an advance must be made, and he summoned his Cabinet and the leading military men near Washington to meet him on the evening of

June 29 and discuss the advisability of and the plans for an immediate attack on the enemy's army, then entrenched at Manassas Junction, some twenty miles southwest of Washington. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Scott, opposed the advance. He had another plan of campaign; the army was not ready. But Mr. Lincoln insisted that the country demanded a movement, and that if the Federal army was "green," so was that of the Confederates. General Scott waived his objections, and the advance was ordered for July 9.

Before the battle came off, however, the President wished to impress again on the North what it was fighting for. On July 4, when he sent his message to Congress, which he had summoned in extra session, he put before them clearly his theory of and justification for the war.

"This is essentially a people's contest. On the side of the Union it is a struggle for maintaining in the world that form and substance of government whose leading object is to elevate the condition of men—to lift artificial weights from all shoulders; to clear the paths of laudable pursuits for all; to afford all an unfettered start, and a fair chance in the race of life. Yielding to partial and temporary departures, from necessity, this is the leading object of the government for whose existence we contend. . . .

"Our popular government has often been called an experiment. Two points in it our people have already settled—the successful establishing and the successful administering of it. One still remains—its successful maintenance against a formidable internal attempt to overthrow it. It is now for them to demonstrate to the world that those who can fairly carry an election can also suppress a rebellion; that ballots are the rightful and peaceful successors of bullets; and that when ballots have fairly and constitutionally decided, there can be no successful appeal back to bullets; that there can be no successful appeal except to ballots themselves at succeeding elections. Such will be a great lesson of peace; teaching

men that what they cannot take by election, neither can they take it by a war; teaching all the folly of being the beginners of a war. . . .

"As a private citizen the executive could not have consented that the institutions of this country shall perish; much less could he, in betrayal of so vast and so sacred a trust as the free people have confided to him. He felt that he had no moral right to shrink, nor even to count the chances of his own life in what might follow. In full view of his great responsibility he has, so far, done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment, perform yours. He sincerely hopes that your views and your actions may so accord with his, as to assure all faithful citizens who have been disturbed in their rights of a certain and speedy restoration to them, under the Constitution and the laws.

"And having thus chosen our course, without guile and with pure purpose, let us renew our trust in God, and go forward without fear and with manly hearts."

With these words Mr. Lincoln started the first War Congress on its duties and the Army of Northeastern Virginia towards Bull Run.

The advance of the Federals from Arlington towards Manassas Junction had been ordered for July 9. For one and another reason, however, it was July 21 before the army was ready to attack. The day was Sunday, a brilliant, hot Washington day. Anxious as Mr. Lincoln was over the coming battle, he went to church as usual. It was while he was there that a distant roar of cannon, the first sounds of the battle, only twenty miles away, reached him. Returning to the White House after the services, the President's first inquiry was for news. Telegrams had just begun to come in. They continued at intervals all the afternoon—broken reports from now this, now that, part of the field. Although fragmentary, they were as a whole encouraging. The President studied them carefully, and after a time went over to

General Scott's headquarters to talk the news over with him. By half-past five he felt so sure that the field was won that he went out for his usual afternoon drive. What happened at the White House then the only eye witnesses, his secretaries, have told in their History:

"He had not returned when, at six o'clock, Secretary Seward came to the Executive Mansion, pale and haggard. 'Where is the President?' he asked hoarsely of the private secretaries. 'Gone to drive,' they answered. 'Have you any late news?' he continued. They read him the telegrams which announced victory. 'Tell no one,' said he. 'That is not true. The battle is lost. The telegraph says that McDowell is in full retreat and calls on General Scott to save the capital. Find the President and tell him to come immediately to General Scott's.'

"Half an hour later the President returned from his drive, and his private secretaries gave him Seward's message, the first intimation he received of the trying news. He listened in silence, without the slightest change of feature or expression, and walked away to army headquarters. There he read the unwelcome report in a telegram from a captain of engineers: 'General McDowell's army in full retreat through Centreville. The day is lost. Save Washington and the remnants of this army. . . The routed troops will not reform.'"

From that time on, for at least twenty-four hours, a continuous stream of tales of disaster was poured upon Mr. Lincoln. A number of public men had gone from Washington to see the battle. Ex-Senator Dawes, who was among them, says that General Scott urged him to go, telling him that it was undoubtedly the only battle he would ever have a chance to see. About midnight they began to return. They came in haggard, worn, and horror-stricken, and a number of them repaired to the White House, where Mr. Lincoln, lying on his office sofa, listened to their tales of the panic that had seized the army about four in the afternoon and of the re-

treat that had followed. All of those who returned that night to Washington were positive that the Confederates would attack the city before morning.

The events of the next day were no less harrowing to Mr. Lincoln than those of the night. A drizzling rain was falling, and from daybreak there could be seen, crowding and staggering across the Long Bridge, hundreds of soldiers, civilians, negroes, and horses. Hour by hour the streets of the city grew fuller. On the corners white-faced women stood beside boilers of coffee, feeding the exhausted men. Now and then the remnants of a regiment or company which somehow had kept together marched up the street, mud-splashed and dejected. One of the most pathetic sights of the day was the return of Burnside and his men. The regiment and its handsome general had been one of the town's delights. Now they came back broken in numbers and so overcome with fatigue that man after man dropped in the streets as he marched, while slowly in front, his head on his breast, the reins on the neck of his exhausted horse, rode Burnside.

Before Monday night, it was known that the enemy was not following up his advantage. Two days later the Union army was reintrenched on Arlington heights. A revulsion of feeling had already begun. The effort to make out the rout to be as complete and terrible as it could be, was followed by an attempt to show that it was nothing but a panic among teamsters and sight-seers. Mr. Lincoln was asked to listen to a number of these explanations. "Ah, I see," he said to one vindicator of the day, "we whipped the enemy, and then ran away from him."

Explanations of the Battle of Bull Run did not interest the President. He was giving his whole mind to repairing the disaster. Two days later, July 23, he wrote out the following "Memoranda of Military Policy suggested by the Bull Run Defeat." Nicolay and Hay, to whose history we owe

this document, say that the President made the first notes of this "policy" while men were bringing him news of the disaster.

1. Let the plan for making the blockade effective be pushed forward with all possible dispatch.

2. Let the volunteer forces at Fort Monroe and vicinity under General Butler be constantly drilled, disciplined, and instructed without more for the present.

3. Let Baltimore be held as now, with a gentle but firm and certain hand.

4. Let the force now under Patterson or Banks be strengthened and made secure in its position.

5. Let the forces in Western Virginia act till further orders according to instructions or orders from General McClellan.

6. Let General Frémont push forward his organization and operations in the West as rapidly as possible, giving rather special attention to Missouri.

7. Let the forces late before Manassas, except the three months' men, be reorganized as rapidly as possible in their camps here and about Arlington.

8. Let the three months' forces who decline to enter the longer service be discharged as rapidly as circumstances will permit.

9. Let the new volunteer forces be brought forward as fast as possible; and especially into the camps on the two sides of the river here.

July 27, 1861.

When the foregoing shall be substantially attended to:

1. Let Manassas Junction (or some point on one or other of the railroads near it) and Strasburg be seized, and permanently held, with an open line from Washington to Manassas, and an open line from Harper's Ferry to Strasburg—the military men to find the way of doing these.

2. This done, a joint movement from Cairo on Memphis; and from Cincinnati on East Tennessee.

It was to points 7, 8 and 9 of the above memorandum that the President gave his first attention.



Congress, prostrated as it was by the unexpected defeat, stood by Lincoln bravely, voting him men and money. Resources he was not going to lack. The confidence of the country was what he needed. To stimulate this confidence, Mr. Lincoln and his advisers summoned to Washington, on July 22, George B. McClellan, the only man who had thus far accomplished anything in the war on which the North looked with pride, and asked him to take the command of the demoralized army. A more effective move could not have been made.

McClellan was a West Point graduate who had seen service in the Mexican War, but who, in the spring of 1861 held a position as a railroad president. His home was in Cincinnati. After the fall of Sumter the fear of invasion spread rapidly westward from Washington. On April 21 the Governor of Ohio wired the Secretary of War that he desired a suitable United States officer to be detailed at once to take command of the volunteers of Cincinnati and to provide for the defense of that city, and the next day several leading men wired that the "People of Cincinnati" wished Captain McClellan to be appointed to the position.

A month later, when West Virginia had decided to stay with the Union and Eastern Virginia had decided to coerce her to remain with the South, McClellan, who had been put in charge of the Ohio troops as his friends requested, was ordered to protect the Unionists of the section against the Southern army. Early in July he undertook an offensive campaign against the enemy, completely driving him from the country in less than three weeks. McClellan announced his victories in a series of addresses which thrilled the North. They saw in him a great general, a second Napoleon and were satisfied when he was put in charge of the army that the disgrace of Bull Run would be speedily wiped out.

While occupied in reorganizing and increasing the army,

Mr. Lincoln did his best to improve the *morale* of officers and men. One of the first things he did, in fact, after the battle was to "run over and see the boys," as he expressed it. General Sherman, who was with Mr. Lincoln as he drove about the camps on this visit, says that he made one of the "neatest, best, and most feeling addresses" he ever listened to, and that its effect on the troops was "excellent." As often as he could after this, Mr. Lincoln went to the Arlington camps. Frequently in these visits he left his carriage and walked up and down the lines shaking hands with the men, repeating heartily as he did so, "God bless you, God bless you." Before a month had passed, he saw that under McClellan's training the Army of the Potomac, as it had come to be called, had recovered almost completely from the panic of Bull Run, and that it was growing every day in efficiency. But scarcely had his anxiety over the condition of things around Washington been allayed, before a grave problem was raised in the West. The severest criticisms began to come to him on the conduct of a man whom he had made a major-general and whom he had put in command of the important Western division, John C. Frémont. The force of these criticisms was intensified by serious disasters to the Union troops in Missouri.

## CHAPTER XXIV

### THE FAILURE OF FREMONT—LINCOLN'S FIRST DIFFICULTIES WITH McCLELLAN—THE DEATH OF WILLIE LINCOLN

THE most popular military appointment Lincoln made before McClellan was that of John C. Frémont to the command of the Department of the West. Republicans appreciated it, for had not Frémont been the first candidate of their party for the Presidency? The West was jubilant: Frémont's explorations had years before made him the hero of the land along the Mississippi. The cabinet was satisfied, particularly Postmaster-General Blair, whose "pet and *protégé*" Frémont was. Lincoln himself "thought well of Frémont," believed he could do the work to be done; and he had already had experience enough to discern that his great trouble was to be, not finding major-generals—he had more *pegs* than *holes* to put them in, he said one day—but finding major-generals who could do the thing they were ordered to do.

Frémont had gone to his headquarters at St. Louis, Missouri, late in July. Before a month had passed, the gravest charges of incompetency and neglect of duty were being made against him. It was even intimated to the President that the General was using his position to work up a Northwestern Confederacy.\* Mr. Lincoln had listened to all these

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\* Dr. Emil Preetorius, editor of the "Westliche Post" of St. Louis, Mo., said of this charge, in an interview for this work: "I know that Frémont gave no countenance to any scheme which others may have conceived for the establishment of a Northwestern Confederacy. I had abundant proof, through the years that I knew him, that he was a patriot and a most unselfish man. The defect in Frémont was that he was a dreamer. Impractical, visionary things went a long way with him. He was a poor judge of men and formed strange associations. He surrounded himself with foreigners, especially Hungarians, most of whom

charges, but taken no action, when, on the morning of August 30, he was amazed to read it in his newspaper that Frémont had issued a proclamation declaring, among other things, that the property, real and personal, of all the persons in the State of Missouri who should take up arms against the United States, or who should be directly proved to have taken an active part with its enemies in the field, would be confiscated to public use and their slaves, if they had any, declared freemen.

Frémont's proclamation astonished the country as much as it did the President. In the North it elicited almost universal satisfaction. This was striking at the root of the trouble—slavery. But in the Border States, particularly in Kentucky, the Union party was dismayed. The only possible method of keeping those sections in the Union was not to interfere with slavery. Mr. Lincoln saw this as clearly as his Border State supporters. It was well known that this was his policy. He felt that Frémont had not only defied the policy of the administration, he had usurped power which belonged only to the legislative part of the government. He had a good excuse for reprimanding the general, even for removing him. Instead, he wrote him, on September 2, a most kindly letter:

I think there is great danger that the closing paragraph [of the proclamation], in relation to the confiscation of property and the liberating slaves of traitorous owners, will

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were adventurers and some of whom were swindlers. I struggled hard to persuade him not to let these men have so much to do with his administration. Mrs. Frémont, unlike the General, was most practical. She was fond of success. She and the General were alike, however, in their notions of the loyalty due between friends. Once, when I protested against the character of the men who surrounded Frémont, she replied: 'Do you know these very men went out with us on horseback when we took possession of the Mariposa? They risked their lives for us. Now we can't go back on them.' It was the woman's feeling. She forgot that brave men may sometimes be downright thieves and robbers."

alarm our Southern Union friends and turn them against us; perhaps ruin our rather fair prospect for Kentucky. Allow me, therefore, to ask that you will, as of your own motion, modify that paragraph so as to conform to the first and fourth sections of the act of Congress entitled, "An act to confiscate property used for insurrectionary purposes," approved August 6, 1861, and a copy of which act I herewith send you.

This letter is written in a spirit of caution, and not of censure. I send it by special messenger, in order that it may certainly and speedily reach you.

But Lincoln did more than this. Without waiting for Frémont's reply to the above, he went over carefully all the criticisms on the General's administration, in order to see if he could help him. His conclusion was that Frémont was isolating himself too much from men who were interested in the same cause, and so did not know what was going on in the very matter he was dealing with. That Mr. Lincoln hit the very root of Frémont's difficulty is evident from the testimony of the men who were with the General in Missouri at the time. Colonel George E. Leighton of St. Louis, who became provost-marshal of the city in the fall of 1861, says:

Frémont isolated himself, and, unlike Grant, Halleck, and others of like rank, was unapproachable. When Halleck came here to assume command and called on Frémont, he was accompanied simply by a member of his staff; but when Frémont returned the call, he rode down with great pomp and ceremony, escorted by his staff and bodyguard of one hundred men.

General B. G. Farrar recounts his experience in trying to get an important message to Frémont from General Lyon, who was at Springfield with an insufficient force:

Word was returned to me that General Frémont was very busy, that he could not receive the dispatch then, and re-

quested me to call in the afternoon. I called in the afternoon, and was again told that General Frémont was very busy. Three days passed before I succeeded in obtaining an audience with Frémont. As commander of the department Frémont assumed all the prerogatives of an absolute ruler. The approach to his headquarters was through a long line of guards. There were guards at the corners of the streets, guards at the gate, guards at the door, guards at the entrance to the adjutant-general's office, and a whole regiment of troops in the barracks adjacent to his headquarters. I saw his order making Colonel Harding of the home guard a brigadier-general. This was done without consultation with the President and without authority of law. The Czar of Russia could hardly be more absolute in his authority than Frémont assumed to be at St. Louis. . . . Frémont never asked Washington for authority to do a thing. While at St. Louis Frémont visited nobody, so far as I know. When he went forth from his headquarters at all he went under the escort of his bodyguard and a staff brilliantly uniformed. When he removed his headquarters to Jefferson City he went on a special train, with all the trappings and surroundings of a royal potentate. . . ."

Having made up his mind what Frémont's fault was, Lincoln asked General David Hunter to go to Missouri. "He [Frémont] needs to have at his side a man of large experience," he wrote to Hunter. "Will you not, for me, take that place? Your rank is one grade too high to be ordered to it, but will you not serve the country and oblige me by taking it voluntarily?" At the same time that Hunter was asked to go to Frémont's relief, Postmaster-General Blair went to St. Louis, with the President's approbation, to talk with the General "as a friend."

In the meantime, Lincoln's letter of September 2 had reached Frémont. After a few days the General replied that he wished the President himself would make the general order modifying the clause of the proclamation which referred to the liberation of slaves. This letter he sent by his wife,

Jessie Benton Frémont, a woman of ambition and great energy of character. "While Frémont was in command of the Department, Mrs. Frémont was the real chief of staff," says Col. Geo. F. Leighton. "She was a woman of strong personality, having inherited much of the brains and force of character which distinguished her father, Senator Benton." "Mrs. Frémont was much like her father," says Judge Clover of St. Louis. "She was intellectual and possessed great force of will." She started East deeply indignant that Mr. Lincoln should ask her husband to modify his proclamation. When she reached Washington, she learned that Mr. Blair had gone to St. Louis. Jumping to the conclusion that it was with an order to remove her husband she hastened to Mr. Lincoln. It was midnight, but the President gave her an audience. Without waiting for an explanation, she violently charged him with sending an enemy to Missouri, to look into Frémont's case and threatening that if Frémont desired to he could set up a government for himself. "I had to exercise all the rude tact I have to avoid quarrelling with her," said Mr. Lincoln afterwards.

The day after this interview Lincoln sent the order modifying the clause as Frémont had requested. When this was made public, a perfect storm of denunciation broke over the President. The whole North felt outraged. There was talk of impeaching Lincoln and of replacing him with Frémont. Great newspapers criticised his action, warning him to learn whither he was tending. Influential men in all professions spoke bitterly of his action. "How many times," wrote James Russell Lowell to Miss Norton, "are we to save Kentucky and lose our self-respect?" The hardest of these criticisms for Lincoln to bear were those from his old friends in Illinois, nearly all of whom supported Frémont.

The general supposition throughout the country at this time was that the President would remove Frémont. He,

however, had no idea of dismissing the General on the ground of the proclamation, and he hoped, as he wrote to Senator Browning, that no real necessity existed for it on any ground. The hope was vain. Disasters to the Union army, the evident result of the General's inefficiency, and positive proofs of corruption in the management of the financial affairs of the Department, multiplied. In spite of expostulations and threats from Frémont's supporters, Lincoln decided to remove him. But he would not do it without giving him a last chance. In sending the order for his removal and the appointment of General Hunter to his place, he directed that it was not to be delivered if there was any evidence that Frémont had fought, or was about to fight, a battle. It was not only Lincoln's sense of justice which led him to give a last chance to Frémont; it was a part of that far-seeing political wisdom of his—not to displace men until they themselves had demonstrated their unfitness so clearly that even their friends must finally agree that he had done right.

It was generally believed in Missouri that Frémont had decided to receive no bearer of despatches, so that if the President did remove him he could say that he never had been informed of the fact. General Curtis, to whom Lincoln forwarded his order by his friend Leonard Swett knowing this, sent copies by three separate messengers to Frémont's headquarters. The one who delivered it first was General T. I. McKenny, now of Olympia, Washington. His story, written out for this work, is good evidence of the pass to which things had come in Frémont's department:

About three o'clock at night, on October 27, 1861, I think it was, I was awakened by a messenger stating that General Curtis desired to see me at his headquarters. I found Leonard Swett there with the General, who informed me that he had an important message from the President to be taken



to General Frémont, then in the field, it not being known where. I was shown the order that I was to convey, that General Frémont was relieved of his command of the Department of the West and General Hunter placed temporarily in his stead. Aside from this, I had special instructions which I understood were Mr. Lincoln's own—

1st. If General Frémont had fought and gained a decided victory—not a mere skirmish—then not to deliver the message.

2d. If he was in the immediate presence of the enemy and about to begin a battle, not to deliver it.

3d. If neither of these conditions prevailed, to deliver it and to make it known immediately, as it was thought that he was determined to receive no orders superseding him.

I immediately went to St. Louis, waked up a second-hand dealer in clothing and fitted myself out as a Southern planter, and then took the train for Rolla, Missouri. There I secured horses and a guide, and about two o'clock at night rode rapidly south in the direction of Springfield, Missouri, where I expected to find Frémont. I rode this distance principally in the night, passing through the small rebel towns at a very rapid gait. About 117 miles from Rolla I reached the outer cordon of Frémont's pickets. Here I had difficulty getting through the lines, as the instructions to the guard were very stringent. When I finally got in, there being no immediate prospects of a battle, I straightway made my way to Frémont's headquarters, where I met the officer of the day, who told me that I could not see General Frémont, but that he would introduce me to his chief of staff, Colonel Eaton. The latter also told me that I could not see the General; but if I would make my business known to him, that he would communicate it to Frémont. This I positively refused to do. He returned to Frémont, and communicated what I had said, but it had no effect. Late in the evening, however, I was hunted up by Colonel Eaton, who took me to General Frémont's office.

The General was sitting at the end of quite a long table facing the door by which I entered. I never can forget the appearance of the man as he sat there, with his piercing eye, and his hair parted in the middle. I ripped from my coat

lining the document, which had been sewed in there, and handed the same to him, which he nervously took and opened. He glanced at the superscription, and then at the signature at the bottom, not looking at the contents. A frown came over his brow, and he slammed the paper down on the table, and said, "Sir, how did you get admission into my lines?" I told him that I had come in as a messenger bearing information from the rebel lines. He waved me out, saying, "That will do for the present."

I had orders to make the contents of the document known as soon as delivered. The first man I met was General Sturgis, to whom I gave the information. I was then overtaken by the chief of staff, Eaton, who said that General Frémont was much disappointed with the communication, as he had thought that I had information from the rebel forces, and that he requested me not to make the message known for the present.

I then told Colonel Eaton that I had important despatches for General Hunter and would like transportation and a guide, and he remarked that he would consult General Frémont on the subject. He soon returned with the information that Frémont did not know where General Hunter was and refused to give me any transportation, saying that he had been relieved and had no authority to do so. I then went to a self-styled "Colonel" Richardson, who had a kind of marauding company, having been mustered into neither the United States service nor the State service. I gave him to understand that I would use my influence to have him regularly mustered into the service, whereupon he furnished me with a good horse and a pretended guide. I could get no information in regard to Hunter, but there was a rumor that he was making towards Springfield and was in the region of a place called Buffalo. I therefore started out about eleven o'clock at night on the Buffalo road, and, after great difficulty, reached the town about daylight, but I could hear nothing of General Hunter. I left my guide, and started out on the road to Bolivar. I had not proceeded more than twelve or fifteen miles before I heard the rattling of horses' hoofs in my rear. I stopped to await their arrival, and found that they were a small detachment of Hunter's troops to in-

form me that the General had just arrived in Buffalo, whereupon I retraced my steps and delivered my message. General Hunter immediately started for Springfield in a four-mule ambulance. Arriving, he issued a short proclamation assuming command. It was thought by some that this would produce a mutiny among the foreign element. It did not.

It was not in the West alone that the President was suffering disappointment. At the time when Frémont received the order retiring him, McClellan had been in command of the Army of the Potomac for over three months. His force had been increased until it numbered over 168,000 men. He had given night and day to organizing and drilling this army, and it seemed to those who watched him that he now had a force as near ready for battle as an army could be made ready by anything save actual fighting. Mr. Lincoln had fully sympathized with his young general's desire to prepare the Army of the Potomac for the field, and he had given him repeated proofs of his support. McClellan, however, seems to have felt from the first that Mr. Lincoln's kindness was merely a personal recognition of his own military genius. He had conceived the idea that it was he alone who was to save the country. "The people call upon me to save the country," he wrote to his wife. "I must save it, and cannot respect anything that is in the way." The President's suggestions, when they did not agree with his own ideas, he regarded as an interference. Thus he imagined that the enemy had three or four times his force, and when the President doubted this he complained, "The President cannot or will not see the true state of affairs." Lincoln, in his anxiety to know the details of the work in the army, went frequently to McClellan's headquarters. That the President had a serious purpose in these visits McClellan did not see. "I enclose a card just received from 'A. Lincoln,'" he wrote to his wife one day; "it shows too much deference to be seen

outside." In another letter to Mrs. McClellan he spoke of being "interrupted" by the President and Secretary Seward, "who had nothing in particular to say," and again of concealing himself "to dodge all enemies in shape of 'browsing' Presidents, etc." His plans he kept to himself, and when at the Cabinet meetings, to which he was constantly summoned, military matters were discussed, he seemed to feel that it was an encroachment on his special business. "I am becoming daily more disgusted with this Administration—perfectly sick of it," he wrote early in October; and a few days later, "I was obliged to attend a meeting of the Cabinet at 8 P. M. and was bored and annoyed. There are some of the greatest geese in the Cabinet I have ever seen—enough to tax the patience of Job."

As time went on, he began to show plainly his contempt of the President, frequently allowing him to wait in the ante-room of his house while he transacted business with others. This discourtesy was so open that McClellan's staff noticed it, and newspaper correspondents commented on it. The President was too keen not to see the situation, but he was strong enough to ignore it. It was a battle he wanted from McClellan, not deference. "I will hold McClellan's horse, if he will only bring us success," he said one day.

While there was a pretty general disposition at first to give McClellan time to organize, before the first three months were up Lincoln was receiving impatient comments on the inactivity of the army. This impatience became anger and dismay when, on October 21, the battle of Ball's Bluff ended in defeat. To Mr. Lincoln, Ball's Bluff was more than a military reverse. By it he suffered a terrible personal loss, in the death of one of his oldest and dearest friends, Colonel E. D. Baker. Mr. C. C. Coffin, who was at McClellan's headquarters when Lincoln received the news of his friend's death, tells of the scene:

The afternoon was lovely, a rare October day. I learned early in the day that something was going on up the Potomac, near Edwards's Ferry, by the troops under General Banks. What was going on no one knew, even at McClellan's headquarters. It was near sunset when, accompanied by a fellow correspondent, I went to ascertain what was taking place. We entered the ante-room, and sent our cards to General McClellan. While we waited, President Lincoln came in; he recognized us, reached out his hand, spoke of the beauty of the afternoon, while waiting for the return of the young lieutenant who had gone to announce his arrival. The lines were deeper in the President's face than when I saw him in his own home, the cheeks more sunken. They had lines of care and anxiety. For eighteen months he had borne a burden such as has fallen upon few men, a burden as weighty as that which rested upon the great law-giver of Israel.

"Please to walk this way," said the lieutenant. We could hear the click of the telegraph in the adjoining room and low conversation between the President and General McClellan, succeeded by silence, excepting the click, click of the instrument, which went on with its tale of disaster. Five minutes passed, and then Mr. Lincoln, unattended, with bowed head and tears rolling down his furrowed cheeks, his face pale and wan, his breast heaving with emotion, passed through the room. He almost fell as he stepped into the street. We sprang involuntarily from our seats to render assistance, but he did not fall. With both hands pressed upon his heart, he walked down the street, not returning the salute of the sentinel pacing his beat before the door.

General McClellan came a moment later. "I have not much news to tell you," he said. "There has been a movement of troops across the Potomac at Edwards's Ferry, under General Stone, and Colonel Baker is reported killed. That is about all I can give you."

After Ball's Bluff, the grumbling against inaction in the Army of the Potomac increased until public attention was suddenly distracted by an incident of an entirely new character, and one which changed the discouragement of the

North over the repeated military failures and the inactivity of the army into exultation. This incident was the capture, on November 8, by Captain Wilkes, of the warship *San Jacinto*, of two Confederate commissioners to Europe, Messrs. Mason and Slidell. Captain Wilkes had stopped the British royal mail packet *Trent*, one day out from Havana, and taken the envoys with their secretaries from her. It was not until November 15 that Captain Wilkes put into Hampton Roads and sent the Navy Department word of his performance.

Of course the message was immediately carried to Mr. Lincoln at the White House. A few hours later Benson J. Lossing called on the President, and the conversation turned on the news. Mr. Lincoln did not hesitate to express himself.

"I fear the traitors will prove to be white elephants," he said. "We must stick to American principles concerning the rights of neutrals. We fought Great Britain for insisting by theory and practice on the right to do exactly what Captain Wilkes has done. If Great Britain shall now protest against the act and demand their release, we must give them up, apologize for the act as a violation of our doctrines, and thus forever bind her over to keep the peace in relation to neutrals, and so acknowledge that she has been wrong for sixty years."

As time went on, Lincoln had every reason to suppose that there was an overwhelming sentiment in the country in favor of keeping the commissioners and braving the wrath of England. Banquets and presentations, votes of thanks by the cabinet and by Congress, all kinds of ovation, were accorded Captain Wilkes. During this excitement the President held his peace, not even referring to the affair in the message he sent to Congress on December 3. He was studying the situation. Before his inauguration he had said one day to

Seward: "One part of the business, Governor Seward, I think I shall leave almost entirely in your hands; that is, the dealing with those foreign nations and their governments." Now, however, he saw that he must exercise a controlling influence. The person with whom he seems to have discussed the case most seriously was Charles Sumner, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Sumner was one of the few men who had from the first believed in Lincoln. Although himself most radical, he had been appreciative of the President-elect's point of view, and had seen in the interval between the election and the inauguration that, as a matter of fact, Lincoln was, on the essential question at issue, "firm as a chain of steel." Thus, on January 26, he wrote, "Mr. Lincoln is perfectly firm. He says that the Republican party shall not, with his assent, become a mere sucked egg, all shell and no meat, the principle all sucked out." Although himself a most polished, even a fastidious gentleman, Sumner never allowed Lincoln's homely ways to hide his great qualities. He gave him a respect and esteem at the start which others accorded only after experience. The Senator was most tactful, too, in his dealings with Mrs. Lincoln, and soon had a firm footing in the household. That he was proud of this, perhaps a little boastful, there is no doubt. Lincoln himself appreciated this. "Sumner thinks he runs me," he said, with an amused twinkle, one day. After the seizure of Mason and Slidell, the President talked over the question frequently with Sumner, who had, from the receipt of the news, declared, "We shall have to give them up."

Early in December, word reached America that England was getting ready to go to war in case we did not give up the commissioners. The news aroused the deepest indignation, and the determination to keep Mason and Slidell was for a brief time stronger than ever. Common sense was doing its

work, however. Gradually the people began to feel that, after all, the commissioners were "white elephants." On December 19, the Administration received a notice that the only redress which would satisfy the British government would be "the liberation of the four gentlemen," and their delivery to the British minister at Washington and a "suitable apology for the aggression which had been committed." In the days which followed, while the Secretary of State was preparing the reply to be submitted, Sumner was much with the President. We have the Senator's assurance that the President was applying his mind carefully to the answer, so that it would be essentially his. It is evident from Sumner's letter, that Lincoln was resolved that there should be no war with England. Thus, on December 23, Sumner wrote to John Bright, with whom he maintained a regular correspondence: "Your letter and also Cobden's I showed at once to the President, who is much moved and astonished by the English intelligence. He is essentially honest and pacific in disposition, with a natural slowness. Yesterday he said to me, 'There will be no war unless England is bent upon having one.'"

It was on Christmas day that Seward finally had his answer ready. It granted the British demand as to the surrender of the prisoners, though it refused an apology—on the ground that Captain Wilkes had acted without orders. After the paper had been discussed by the Cabinet, but no decision reached, and all of the members but Seward had departed, Lincoln said, according to Mr. Frederick Seward: "Governor Seward, you will go on, of course, preparing your answer, which, as I understand it, will state the reasons why they ought to be given up. Now, I have a mind to try my hand at stating the reasons why they ought *not* to be given up. We will compare the points on each side."

But the next day, after a Cabinet meeting at which it was



decided finally to return the prisoners, when Secretary Seward said to the President: "You thought you might frame an argument for the other side?" Mr. Lincoln smiled, and shook his head. "I found I could not make an argument that would satisfy my own mind," he said; "and that proved to me your ground was the right one."

Lincoln's first conclusion was the real ground on which the Administration submitted: "We must stick to American principles concerning the rights of neutrals." The country grimaced at the conclusion. It was to many, as Chase declared it was to him, "gall and wormwood." Lowell's clever verse expressed best the popular feeling:

We give the critters back, John,  
Cos Abram thought 't was right;  
It warn't your bullyin' clack, John,  
Provokin' us to fight.

The decision raised Mr. Lincoln immeasurably in the view of thoughtful men, especially in England.

"If reparation were made at all, of which few of us felt more than a hope," wrote John Stuart Mill, "we thought that it would be made obviously as a concession to prudence, not to principle. We thought that there would have been truckling to the newspaper editors and supposed fire-eaters who were crying out for retaining the prisoners at all hazards. . . . We expected everything, in short, which would have been weak, and timid, and paltry. The only thing which no one seemed to expect is what has actually happened. Mr. Lincoln's government have done none of these things. Like honest men they have said in direct terms that our demand was right; that they yielded to it because it was just; that if they themselves had received the same treatment, they would have demanded the same reparation; and if what seemed to be the American side of the question was not the just side, they would be on the side of justice, happy as they were to find after their resolution had been taken, that it was also the side which America had formerly

defended. Is there any one capable of a moral judgment or feeling, who will say that his opinion of America and American statesmen is not raised by such an act, done on such grounds?"

Before the *Trent* affair was settled another matter came up to distract attention from McClellan's inactivity and to harass Mr. Lincoln. This time it was trouble in his official family. Mr. Cameron, his Secretary of War, had become even more obnoxious to the public than Frémont or McClellan. Like Seward, Cameron had been one of Lincoln's competitors at the Chicago Convention in 1860. His appointment to the Cabinet, however, had not been made, like Seward's, because of his eminent fitness. It was the one case in which a bargain had been made before the nomination. This bargain was not struck by Mr. Lincoln, but by his friend and ablest supporter at Chicago, Judge David Davis. There was so general a belief in the country that Cameron was corrupt in his political methods that, when it was noised that he was to be one of Lincoln's Cabinet, a strong effort was made to displace him. It succeeded temporarily, the President-elect withdrawing the promise of appointment after he had made it. Such pressure was brought to bear, however, that in the end he made Judge Davis's pledge good and gave the portfolio of war to Mr. Cameron.

The unsatisfactory preliminaries to the appointment must have affected the relations of the two men. Cameron's enemies watched his Administration with sharp eyes, and not long after the war began commenced to bring accusations of maladministration to the President. The gist of them was that contracts were awarded for politics' sake and that the government was being swindled wholesale.

"We hear," said the "Evening Post" in June, "of knapsacks glued together and falling to pieces after the first day's use; of uniform coats which are torn to pieces with a slight

pull of the fingers; of blankets too small if they were good, and too poor stuff to be useful if they were of the proper size, shoes, caps, trousers, coats—all are too often of such poor material that before a soldier is ready for service he must be clothed anew.”

Soon after the extra session of Congress assembled in July, a committee was appointed to look into the contracts the War Department was making. This committee spent the entire fall in investigation, sitting in Boston, New York, Chicago, St. Louis, and other cities. Its report, when made public in December, proved to be full of sensational developments. The Secretary of War, it was clear, had not been able to manage his department without great scandal. If he himself were incorruptible he was not big enough for his duties and inefficiency in affairs of State, particularly in time of war, is criminal. The matter was too serious a one for Mr. Lincoln to overlook. The public would not have permitted him to overlook it, even if he had been so disposed.

Cameron not only brought the President into trouble by his bad management of the business of his office; but in his December report he attempted, without Mr. Lincoln's knowledge, to advocate a measure in direct opposition to what he knew to be the President's policy in regard to slavery. This measure declared in favor of arming the slaves and employing “their services against the rebels, under proper military regulation, discipline, and command.” This report was mailed before the President saw it; but by his order it was promptly withdrawn from circulation as soon as he knew its contents.

Nine months of this sort of experience convinced Lincoln that Cameron was not the man for the place, and he took advantage of a remark which the Secretary, probably in a moment of depression, had made to him more than once, that he wanted a “change of position,” and made him Minister

to Russia. It is plain from Lincoln's letters to Cameron at this time and his subsequent treatment of him that, with characteristic fair-dealing, he took into consideration all the enormous difficulties which beset the Secretary of War. He saw what the public refused to see, that "to bring the War Department up to the standard of the times, and work an army of 500,000 with machinery adapted to a peace establishment of 12,000, is no easy task." He had all this in mind evidently when he relieved Cameron, for he assured him of his personal regard and of his confidence in his "ability, patriotism, and fidelity to public trust." A few months later he did still more for Cameron. In April, 1862, Congress passed a bill censuring the Secretary for certain of his transactions. The President soon after sent the body a message in which he claimed that he himself was equally responsible in the transaction for which Cameron was being censured:

I should be wanting equally in candor and in justice if I should leave the censure expressed in this resolution to rest exclusively or chiefly upon Mr. Cameron. The same sentiment is unanimously entertained by the heads of departments who participated in the proceedings which the House of Representatives has censured. It is due to Mr. Cameron to say that, although he fully approved the proceedings, they were not moved nor suggested by himself, and that not only the President but all the other heads of departments, were at least equally responsible with him for whatever error, wrong, or fault was committed in the premises.

In deciding on a successor to Mr. Cameron, the President showed more clearly, perhaps, than in any other appointment of his whole presidential career how far above personal resentments he was in his public dealings. He chose a man who six years before, at a time when consideration from a superior meant a great deal to him, had subjected him to a slight, and this for no other apparent reason than that he was rude in dress and unpolished in manner; a man who, besides,

had been his most scornful, even vituperative, critic since his election. This man was Edwin M. Stanton, a lawyer of ability, integrity, and loyalty, who had won the confidence of the North by his patriotic services in Buchanan's Cabinet from December, 1860, to the close of his administration, March 4, 1861. Lincoln's first encounter with Stanton had been in 1855, in his first case of importance outside of Illinois. He was a counsel in the case with Stanton, but the latter ignored him so openly that all those associated with them observed it.

Lincoln next knew of Stanton when, as President-elect, he watched from Springfield the deplorable dissolution of the federal authority which Buchanan allowed, and he must have felt profoundly grateful for the new vigor and determination which were infused into the Administration when, in December, 1860, Stanton and Holt entered Buchanan's Cabinet. After Lincoln was inaugurated he had nothing to do with Stanton. In fact he did not see him from the 4th of March, 1861, to the day he handed him his commission as Secretary of War, in January, 1862. Stanton, however, was watching Lincoln's administration closely, even disdainfully. After Bull Run he wrote to ex-President Buchanan: "The imbecility of this Administration culminated in that catastrophe; an irretrievable misfortune and national disgrace, never to be forgotten, are to be added to the ruin of all peaceful pursuits and national bankruptcy, as the result of Lincoln's 'running the machine' for five months."

McClellan, who saw much of Stanton in the fall of 1861, says:

The most disagreeable thing about him was the extreme virulence with which he abused the President, the Administration, and the Republican party. He carried this to such an extent that I was often shocked by it. He never spoke of the President in any other way than as the "original gorilla," and often said that Du Chaillu was a fool to wander

all the way to Africa in search of what he could so easily have found at Springfield, Illinois. Nothing could have been more bitter than his words and manner always were when speaking of the Administration and the Republican party. He never gave them credit for honesty or patriotism, and very seldom for any ability.

Lincoln, if he knew of this abuse, which is improbable, regarded it no more seriously than he did McClellan's slights. He knew Stanton was able and loyal; that the country believed in him; that he would administer the department with honesty and energy. Furthermore, he knew of the intimacy between McClellan and Stanton, and as he saw the great necessity of harmonious relations between the head of the War Department and the commander of the army, he was more in favor of Stanton. The appointment was generally regarded as a wise selection, and in many quarters aroused enthusiasm.

"No man ever entered upon the discharge of the most momentous public duties under more favorable auspices, so far as public confidence and support can create such auspices," said the New York "Tribune." "In all the loyal States there has not been one dissent from the general acclamation which hailed Mr. Stanton's appointment as eminently wise and happy. The simple truth is that Mr. Stanton was not appointed to and does not accept the War Department in support of any program or policy whatever, but the unqualified and uncompromising vindication of the authority and integrity of the Union. Whatever views he may entertain respecting slavery will not be allowed to swerve him one hair from the line of paramount and single-hearted devotion to the National cause. If slavery or anti-slavery shall at any time be found obstructing or impeding the nation in its efforts to crush out this monstrous rebellion, he will walk straight on in the path of duty though that path should lead him over or through the impediment and insure its annihilation."

Stanton took hold of his task with the aggressive earnestness and energy of his nature. He made open war on contractors. He did not hesitate to let McClellan know that he expected an advance. As he wrote Charles A. Dana on January 22:

“ This army has got to fight or run away; and while men are striving nobly in the West, the champagne and oysters on the Potomac must be stopped.”

It is evident from this same letter to Mr. Dana that he had undertaken to discipline even the President for his habit of joking:

“ I feel a deep, *earnest* feeling growing up around me. We have no jokes or trivialities, but all with whom I act show that they are in dead earnest.”

The excitement over the *Trent* affair, the investigation of the War Department, the dismissal of Cameron, and the appointment of Stanton, diverted public criticism from McClellan; but never for long at a time. The inactivity of the Army of the Potomac had become the subject of gibes and sneers. Lincoln stood by the General. He had promised him all the “ sense and information ” he had, and he gave it. When Congress opened on December 3, he took the opportunity to remind the country that the General was its own choice, as well as his, and that support was due him:

Since your last adjournment Lieutenant-General Scott has retired from the head of the army. . . . With the retirement of General Scott came the executive duty of appointing in his stead a general-in-chief of the army. It is a fortunate circumstance that neither in council nor country was there, so far as I know, any difference of opinion as to the proper person to be selected. The retiring chief repeatedly expressed his judgment in favor of General McClellan for the position, and in this the nation seemed to give a unanimous concurrence. The designation of General Mc-

Clellan is, therefore, in considerable degree the selection of the country as well as of the executive, and hence there is better reason to hope there will be given him the confidence and cordial support thus by fair implication promised, and without which he cannot with so full efficiency serve the country.

At this time Lincoln had every reason to believe that McClellan would soon move. The General certainly was assuring the few persons whom he condescended to take into his confidence to that effect. The Hon. Galusha A. Grow, of Pennsylvania, Speaker of the House, says that very soon after Congress came together, the members began to comment on the number of board barracks that were going up around Washington.

“It seemed to them,” says Mr. Grow, “that there were a great many more than were necessary for hospital and reserve purposes. The roads at that time in Virginia were excellent; everybody was eager for an advance. Congressmen observed the barracks with dismay; it looked as if McClellan was going into winter quarters. Finally several of them came to me and stated their anxiety, asking what it meant. ‘Well, gentlemen,’ I said, ‘I don’t know what it means, but I will ask the General,’ so I went to McClellan, who received me kindly, and told him how all the members were feeling, and asked him if the army was really going into winter quarters. ‘No, no,’ McClellan said, ‘I have no intention of putting the army into winter quarters; I mean the campaign shall be short, sharp, and decisive.’ He began explaining his plan to me, but I interrupted him, saying I did not desire to know his plan; I preferred not to know it, in fact. If I could assure members of Congress that the army was going to move, it was all that was necessary. I returned with his assurance that there would soon be an advance. Weeks went on, however, without the promised advance; nor did the Army of the Potomac leave the vicinity of Washington until Mr. Lincoln issued the special orders compelling McClellan to move.”



Lincoln continued to defend McClellan. "We've got to stand by the General," he told his visitors. "I suppose," he added dubiously, "he knows his business." But loyal as he was he too was losing patience. His friend, Mr. Arnold, tells how the President said one day to a friend of General McClellan, doubtless with the expectation that it would be repeated: "McClellan's tardiness reminds me of a man in Illinois, whose attorney was not sufficiently aggressive. The client knew a few law phrases, and finally, after waiting until his patience was exhausted by the non-action of his counsel, he sprang to his feet and exclaimed: "Why don't you go at him with a *Fi fa demurrer*, a *capias*, a *surrebutter*, or a *ne exeat*, or something, and not stand there like a *nudum pactum*, or a *non est*?"

Later he made a remark which was repeated up and down the country: "If General McClellan does not want to use the army for some days, I should like to borrow it and see if it cannot be made to do something."

Towards the end of December McClellan fell ill. The long-expected advance was out of the question until he recovered. Distracted at this idea, the President for the first time asserted himself as commander-in-chief of the forces of the United States. Heretofore he had used his military authority principally in raising men and commissioning officers; campaigns he had left to the generals. It had been to be sure largely because of his urgency that the Battle of Bull Run had been fought. After Bull Run he had prepared a "Memorandum of Military Policy Suggested by the Bull Run Defeat," and may have thought the War Department was working according to this. When he relieved Frémont he had offered his successor a few suggestions but he had been careful to add:

"Knowing how hazardous it is to bind down a distant commander in the field to specific lines and operations, as so

much always depends on a knowledge of localities and passing events, it is intended therefore, to leave a considerable margin for the exercise of your judgment and discretion."

Early in December, weary with waiting for McClellan, he had sent him a list of questions concerning the Potomac campaign. They were broad hints, but in no sense orders and McClellan hardly gave them a second thought. Nicolay and Hay say that after keeping them ten days, the General returned them with hurried answers in pencil. Certainly he was in no degree influenced by them. And this was about all the military authority—"interference" some critics called it,—that the President had exercised up to the time McClellan was shut up by fever.

Now, however, he undertook to learn direct from the officers the condition things were in, and if it was not possible to get some work out of the army somewhere along the line. Particularly was he anxious that East Tennessee be relieved. The Unionists there were "being hanged and driven to despair," there was danger of them going over to the South. All this the generals knew. Lincoln telegraphed Halleck, then in command of the Western Department, and Buell, in charge of the forces in Kentucky, asking if they were "in concert" and urging a movement which he supposed to have been decided upon some time before. The replies he received disappointed and distressed him. There seemed to be no more idea of advancing in the West than in the East. The plans he supposed settled his generals now controverted. He could get no promise of action, no precise information. "Delay is ruining us," he wrote to Buell on January 7, "and it is indispensable for me to have something definite." And yet, convinced though he was that his plans were practicable, he would not make them into orders.

"For my own views," he wrote Buell on January 13, "I have not offered and do not offer them as orders; and while

I am glad to have them respectfully considered, I would blame you to follow them contrary to your own clear judgment, unless I should put them in the form of orders. As to General McClellan's views, you understand your duty in regard to them better than I do. With this preliminary, I state my general idea of this war to be that we have the greater numbers, and the enemy has greater facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail unless we can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his; and that this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points at the same time, so that we can safely attack one or both if he makes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize and hold the weakened one, gaining so much."

This hesitancy about exercising his military authority, came from Lincoln's consciousness that he knew next to nothing of the business of fighting. When he saw that those supposed to know something of the science did nothing, he resolved to learn the subject himself as thoroughly as he could. "He gave himself, night and day, to the study of the military situation," say Nicolay and Hay, his secretaries. "He read a large number of strategical works. He pored over the reports from the various departments and districts of the field of war. He held long conferences with eminent generals and admirals, and astonished them by the extent of his special knowledge and the keen intelligence of his questions."

By the time McClellan was about again, Lincoln had learned enough of the situation to convince him that the Army of the Potomac could and must advance, and on January 27, he, for the first time, used his power as commander-in-chief of the army, and issued his General War Order No. 1.

Ordered, That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of all the land and naval forces of

the United States against the insurgent forces. That especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe; the Army of the Potomac; the Army of Western Virginia; the army near Munfordville, Kentucky; the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day.

That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given.

That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the general-in-chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.

Four days later the President issued his first Special War Order, applying exclusively to the Army of the Potomac.

Ordered, That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction, all details to be in the discretion of the commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next.

For a time after these orders were issued there was general hopefulness in the country. The newspapers that had been attacking the President now praised him for taking hold of the army. "It has infused new spirit into every one since the President appears to take such an interest in our operations," wrote an officer from the West, to the "Tribune."

The hope of an advance in the East was short-lived. McClellan was not willing to carry out the plan for the campaign which the President approved. Mr. Lincoln believed that the Army of the Potomac should move directly across

Virginia against Richmond, while McClellan contended that the safe and brilliant movement was down the Chesapeake, up the Rapahannock to Urbana and across land to the York river. There was much controversy between the friends of the two plans. It ended in the President giving up to his general. Of one thing he felt certain, McClellan would not work as well on a plan in which he did not believe as on one to which he was committed, and as success was what Mr. Lincoln wanted he finally consented to the Chesapeake route. It brought bitter criticism upon him, especially from the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War. Common sense told men that the direct overland route to Richmond was the better. The President, they said, was afraid of his general-in-chief.

While harassed by this inaction and obstinacy of McClellan's, Mr. Lincoln was plunged into a bitter private sorrow. Early in February his two younger boys, Willie and Tad, as they were familiarly known, fell sick. In the tenderness of his nature Mr. Lincoln could never see suffering of any kind without a passionate desire to relieve it. Especially was he moved by the distress of a child. Indeed his love for children had already become familiar to the whole public by the touching little stories which visitors had brought away from the White House and which crept into the newspapers:

"At the reception Saturday afternoon, at the President's house," wrote a correspondent of the "Independent," "many persons noticed three little girls, poorly dressed, the children of some mechanic or laboring man, who had followed the visitors into the White House to gratify their curiosity. They passed around from room to room, and were hastening through the reception room, with some trepidation, when the President called to them, 'Little girls, are you going to pass me without shaking hands?' Then he bent his tall, awkward form down, and shook each little girl warmly

by the hand. Everybody in the apartment was spellbound by the incident, so simple in itself."

Many men and women now living who were children in Washington at this time recall the President's gentleness to them. Mr. Frank P. Blair of Chicago, says:

During the war my grandfather, Francis P. Blair, Sr., lived at Silver Springs, north of Washington, seven miles from the White House. It was a magnificent place of four or five hundred acres, with an extensive lawn in the rear of the house. The grandchildren gathered there frequently. There were eight or ten of us, our ages ranging from eight to twelve years. Although I was but seven or eight years of age, Mr. Lincoln's visits were of such importance to us boys as to leave a clear impression on my memory. He drove out to the place quite frequently. We boys, for hours at a time, played "town ball" on the vast lawn, and Mr. Lincoln would join ardently in the sport. I remember vividly how he ran with the children; how long were his strides, and how far his coat-tails stuck out behind, and how we tried to hit him with the ball, as he ran the bases. He entered into the spirit of the play as completely as any of us, and we invariably hailed his coming with delight.

The protecting sympathy and tenderness the President extended to all children became a passionate affection for his own. Willie and Tad had always been privileged beings at the White House, and their pranks and companionship undoubtedly did much to relieve the tremendous strain the President was suffering. Many visitors who saw him with the lads at this period have recorded their impressions:—how keenly he enjoyed the children; how indulgent and affectionate he was with them. Again and again he related their sayings, sometimes even to grave delegations. Thus Moncure Conway tells of going to see the President with a commission which wanted to "talk over the situation." The President met them, laughing like a boy. The White House

was in a state of feverish excitement, he said; one of his boys had come in that morning to tell him that the cat had kittens, and now the other had just announced that the dog had puppies.

When both the children fell ill; when he saw them suffering, and when it became evident, as it finally did, that Willie, the elder of the two, would die, the President's anguish was intense. He would slip away from visitors and Cabinet at every opportunity, to go to the sick room, and during the last four or five days of Willie's life, when the child was suffering terribly and lay in an unbroken delirium, Mr. Lincoln shared with the nurse the nightly vigils at the bedside. When Willie finally died, on February 20, the President was so prostrated that it was feared by many of his friends that he would succumb entirely to his grief. Many public duties he undoubtedly did neglect. Indeed, a month after Willie's death, we find him apologizing for delay to answer a letter because of a "domestic affliction."

If one consults the records of the day, however, it is evident that Mr. Lincoln did try to attend to public duties even in the worst of this trial. Only two days after the funeral, on February 23, he held a Cabinet meeting, and the day following that, a correspondent wrote to the New York "Evening Post: "

Mr. Lincoln seems to have entirely recovered his health, and is again at his ordinary duties, spending, not infrequently, eighteen out of the twenty-four hours upon the affairs of the nation. He is frequently called up three and four times in a night to receive important messages from the West. Since his late bereavement he looks sad and careworn, but is in very good health again.

There is ample evidence that in this crushing grief the President sought earnestly to find what consolation the Christian religion might have for him. It was the first ex-

perience of his life, so far as we know, which drove him to look outside of his own mind and heart for help to endure a personal grief. It was the first time in his life when he had not been sufficient for his own experience. Religion up to this time had been an intellectual interest. The Christian dogma had been taught him as a child and all his life he had been accustomed to hearing every phase of human conduct and experience tested by the precepts of the Bible as they were interpreted by the more or less illiterate church of the West. For a short period of his life when he was about twenty-five years of age, it is certain that he revolted against the Christian system, and even went so far as to prepare a pamphlet against it. The manuscript of this work was destroyed by his friend, Samuel Hill. This period of doubt passed, and though there is nothing to show that Mr. Lincoln returned to the literal interpretation of Christianity which he had been taught, and though he never joined any religious sect, it is certain that he regarded the Bible and the church with deep reverence. He was a regular attendant upon religious services, and one has only to read his letters and speeches to realize that his literary style and his moral point of view were both formed by the Bible.

It was after his election to the presidency that we begin to find evidences that Mr. Lincoln held to the belief that the affairs of men are in the keeping of a Divine Being who hears and answers prayer and who is to be trusted to bring about the final triumph of the right. He publicly acknowledged such a faith when he bade his Springfield friends good-by in February, 1861. In his first inaugural address, he told the country that the difficulty between North and South could be adjusted in "the best way," by "intelligence, patriotism, Christianity and a firm reliance on Him who has never yet forsaken this favored land." When he



was obliged to summon a Congress to provide means for a civil war, he started them forth on their duties with the words, "Let us renew our trust in God, and go forward without fear and with manly hearts." In August, 1861, he issued a proclamation for a National Fast Day which is most impressive for its reverential spirit:

"Whereas it is fit and becoming in all people, at all times, to acknowledge and revere the supreme government of God; to bow in humble submission to His chastisements; to confess and deplore their sins and transgressions, in the full conviction that the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom; and to pray with all fervency and contrition for the pardon of their past offenses, and for a blessing upon their present and prospective action:

"And whereas when our own beloved country, once, by the blessing of God, united, prosperous, and happy, is now afflicted with faction and civil war, it is peculiarly fit for us to recognize the hand of God in this terrible visitation, and in sorrowful remembrance of our own faults and crimes as a nation, and as individuals, to humble ourselves before Him and to pray for His mercy—to pray that we may be spared further punishment, though most justly deserved; that our arms may be blessed and made effectual for the re-establishment of law, order, and peace throughout the wide extent of our country; and that the inestimable boon of civil and religious liberty, earned under His guidance and blessing by the labors and sufferings of our fathers, may be restored in all its original excellence."

But it is not until after the death of his son that we begin to find evidence that Mr. Lincoln was making a personal test of Christianity. Broken by his anxiety for the country, wounded nigh to death by his loss, he felt that he must have a support outside of himself; that from some source he must draw new courage. Could he find the help he needed in the Christian faith? From this time on he was seen often with the Bible in his hand, and he is known to have prayed fre-

quently. His personal relation to God occupied his mind much. He was deeply concerned to know, as he told a visiting delegation once, not whether the Lord was on his side, but whether he was on the Lord's side. Henceforth, one of the most real influences in Abraham Lincoln's life and conduct is his dependence upon a personal God.

## CHAPTER XXV

### LINCOLN AND EMANCIPATION

THE 22d of February was the day that the President had set for an advance of the army but it was evident to both the Administration and the country that the Army of the Potomac would not be ready to move then. Nor could anybody find from McClellan when he would move. The muttering of the country began again. Committee after committee waited on the President. He did his best to assure them that he was doing all he could. He pointed out to them how time and patience, as well as men and money, were needed in war, and he argued that, above all, he must not be interfered with. It was at this time that he used his striking illustration of Blondin. Some gentlemen from the West called at the White House one day, excited and troubled about some of the commissions or omissions of the Administration. The President heard them patiently, and then replied: "Gentlemen, suppose all the property you were worth was in gold and you had put it in the hands of Blondin, to carry across the Niagara river on a rope. Would you shake the cable or keep shouting at him, 'Blondin, stand up a little straighter—Blondin, stoop a little more—go a little faster—lean a little more to the north—lean a little more to the south?' No, you would hold your breath as well as your tongue, and keep your hands off until he was safe over. The Government is carrying an enormous weight. Untold treasures are in their hands; they are doing the very best they can. Don't badger them. Keep silence, and we will get you safe across."

One of the most insistent of the many bodies which beset him was the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, appointed the December before. Aggressive and patriotic, these gentlemen were determined the army should move. But it was not until March that they became convinced that anything would be done. One day early in that month, Senator Chandler, of Michigan, a member of the committee, met George W. Julian. He was in high glee. "Old Abe is mad," he said to Julian, "and the war will now go on."

Whether it would or not remained to be seen but it was soon evident to everybody that the President was going to make another effort to have it go on for on March 8 he issued General War Orders Nos. II and III, the first dividing the Army of the Potomac into four army corps and the second directing that the move against Richmond by the way of the 'Chesapeake bay should begin as early as the 18th of March and that the general-in-chief should be responsible for its moving as early as that day. In this order Lincoln made the important stipulation that General McClellan should make no change of base without leaving in and about Washington a force sufficient to guarantee its safety.

When Lincoln issued the above orders which were finally to drive McClellan from his quarters around Washington, the war against the South had been going on for nearly a year. In that time the North had succeeded in gathering and equipping an army of about 630,000 men, but this army had not so far materially changed the line of hostilities between the North and South, save in the West, where Kentucky and Northern Missouri had been cleared of most of the Confederates. A navy had been collected but beyond establishing a partial blockade of the ports of the Confederacy it had done little. The ineffectiveness of the great effort the North had made was charged naturally to the inefficiency of

the Administration. Mr. Lincoln was ignorant and weak, men said, else he would have found generals who would have won victories. A large part of the North, the anti-slavery element, bitterly denounced him, because he had taken no action as yet in regard to slavery. They would have him employ the slaves in the armies, free those which escaped.

Lincoln understood clearly how strong a weapon against the South the arming and emancipating of the slaves might be, but he did not want to use it. Throughout his entire political life he had disclaimed any desire to meddle with slavery in the States where the Constitution recognized it. He had undertaken the war not to free men but to preserve the Union. Moreover he feared that the least interference with slavery would drive from him those States lying between the North and South, which believed in the institution and yet were for the Union.

Already they had given him much substantial aid. He hoped to win them entirely to the North. Emancipation would surely make that hope vain. It was largely because he wished to keep their support that when as had happened twice already in his year of service, prominent subordinates had attempted to help the Northern cause by measures affecting slavery, he had promptly annulled their orders.

Yet now for many weeks he had been coming to the conclusion that he must do something with this weapon. He must do it to throw confusion into the South, with whom so far the military advantage lay, to win sympathy from Europe, which, exasperated by the suffering which the failure to get cotton caused the people, was threatening to recognize the Southern Confederacy as an independent nation, above all to disarm the enemy in his rear—the dissatisfied faction of his own supporters who were beginning to threaten that if he did not free and arm the slaves he could

get his hands on, they would stop the arms and money they were sending him to carry on the war.

All through the fall of 1861 he was examining this weapon of emancipation, much as a man in a desperate situation might a dagger which he did not want to unsheath, but feared he might be forced to. He was seeking a way to use it, if the time came when he must, that would accomplish all the ends he had in view and still would not drive the Border States from the Union. The plan upon which he finally settled was a simple and just, though impracticable one—he would ask Congress to set aside money gradually to buy and free the negroes in those States that could be persuaded to give up the institution of slavery. Having freed the slaves, he proposed that Congress should colonize them in territory bought for the purpose.

According to Charles Sumner, Mr. Lincoln had this plan of compensated emancipation well developed by December 1, 1861. The Senator reached Washington on that day, and went in the evening to call on the President. Together they talked over the annual message, which was to be sent to Congress on the 3d. Mr. Sumner was disappointed that it said nothing about emancipation. He had been speaking in Massachusetts on "Emancipation our Best Weapon," and he ardently desired that the President use the weapon. The President explained the plan he had developed, and Mr. Sumner urged that it be presented at once. Mr. Lincoln declined to agree to this, but as he rose to say good-by to his visitor, he remarked:

"Well, Mr. Sumner, the only difference between you and me on this subject is a difference of a month or six weeks in time."

"Mr. President," said Mr. Sumner, "if that is the only difference between us, I will not say another word to you about it till the long-set time you name has passed by."

"Nor should I have done so," continues Sumner in telling

the story, "but about a fortnight after, when I was with him, he introduced the subject himself, asked my opinion on some details of his plan, and told me where it labored his mind. At that time he had the hope that some one of the Border States, Delaware, perhaps, if nothing better could be got, might be brought to make a proposition which could be made use of as the initiation to hitch the whole thing to.\* He was in correspondence with some persons at a distance with this view, but he did not consult a person in Washington, excepting Mr. Chase and Mr. Blair, and myself. Seward knew nothing about it."

Sumner could not keep still, after this, about the plan. Almost every time he saw Lincoln he put in a word. Thus, when the *Trent* affair was up, he took occasion to read the President a little lecture:

"Now, Mr. President," he said, "if you had done your duty earlier in the slavery matter, you would not have this trouble on you. Now you have no friends, or the country has none, because it has no policy upon slavery. The country has no friends in Europe, excepting isolated persons. England is not a friend. France is not. But if you had commenced your policy about slavery, this thing could and would have come and gone and would have given you no anxiety. . . .

"Every time I saw him I spoke to him about it, and I saw him every two or three days. One day I said to him, I remember, 'I want you to make Congress a New Year's present of your plan. But he had some reason still for delay. He was in correspondence with Kentucky, there was a Mr. Speed in Kentucky to whom he was writing; he read me one of his letters once, and he thought he should hear from there how people would be affected by such a plan.' At one

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\*The conversation between Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Sumner here reported is taken from an unpublished manuscript courteously put at my disposal by the Rev. Edward Everett Hale. Mr. Hale visited Washington in April, 1862, and called on Mr. Sumner, who entertained him with the history of the President's Message on Compensated Emancipation. He made the full notes of the story, which are here published.

time I thought he would send in the message on New Year's Day; and I said something about what a glorious thing it would be. But he stopped me in a moment; 'Don't say a word about that,' he said; 'I know very well that the name which is connected with this act will never be forgotten.' Well, there was one delay and another, but I always spoke to him till one day in January he said sadly that he had been up all night with his sick child. I was very much touched, and I resolved that I would say nothing to the President about this or any other business if I could help it till that child was well or dead. And I did not. . . . I had never said a word to him again about it—one morning here, before I had breakfast, before I was up indeed, both his secretaries came over to say that he wanted to see me as soon as I could see him. I dressed at once, and went over. 'I want to read you my message,' he said; 'I want to know how you like it. I am going to send it in to-day.' "

It was on the morning of March 6, 1862, that Mr. Lincoln sent for Mr. Sumner to read his message. A few hours later, when the Senator reached the Capitol, he went to the Senate desk to see if the President had carried out his intention. Yes, the document was there.

As Mr. Sumner's history of the message given to Dr. Hale shows, Mr. Lincoln for months quietly prepared the way for his plan. One of his most adroit preparatory manœuvres, and one of which Mr. Sumner evidently knew nothing, was performed in New York City, through the Hon. Carl Schurz, who at that time was the American Minister to Spain.\*

Mr. Schurz, who had gone to Madrid in 1861, had not been long there before he concluded that there would be great danger of the Southern Confederacy being recognized by France and England unless the aspect of the situation was

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\* The following accounts of Mr. Schurz's interviews with Mr. Lincoln and the plan the two gentlemen arranged for introducing the subject of compensated emancipation to the public was given me by Mr. Schurz himself. The manuscript has been corrected by him, and is published with his permission.



speedily changed, either by a decisive military success, or by some evidence on the part of the Administration that the war was to end in the destruction of slavery. If the conflict were put on this high moral plane, Mr. Schurz believed the sympathy of the people in Europe would be so strong with the North that interference in favor of the South would be impossible. All of this he wrote to Mr. Seward in September of 1861, but he received no reply to his letter other than a formal acknowledgment.

After a little time, Mr. Schurz wrote to Mr. Lincoln, saying that he wanted to come to Washington and personally represent to the Administration what he conceived to be the true nature of public opinion in Europe. Mr. Lincoln wrote to him to come, and he arrived in Washington in the last week of January, 1862. He went at once to the White House, where he was received by the President, who listened attentively to his arguments, the same he had made by letter to Mr. Seward. When he had finished his presentation of the case, Mr. Lincoln said that he was inclined to accept that view, but that he was not sure that the public sentiment of the country was ripe for such a policy. It had to be educated up to it. Would not Mr. Schurz go to New York and talk the matter over with their friends, some of whom he named?

Mr. Schurz assented, and a few days afterwards reported to Mr. Lincoln that the organization of an "Emancipation Society," for the purpose of agitating the idea, had been started in New York, and that a public meeting would be held at the Cooper Union on March 6.

"That's it; that is the very thing," Mr. Lincoln replied. "You must make a speech at this meeting. Go home and prepare it. When you have got it outlined, bring it to me, and I will see what you are going to say."

Mr. Schurz did so, and in a few days submitted to Mr.

Lincoln the skeleton of his argument on "Emancipation as a Peace Measure."

"That is the right thing to say," the President declared after reading it, "And, remember, you may hear from me on the same day."

On March 6 the speech was delivered, as had been arranged, before an audience which packed Cooper Union. No more logical and eloquent appeal for emancipation was made in all the war period. The audience received it with repeated cheers, and when Mr. Schurz sat down "the applause shook the hall," if we may believe the reporter of the New York "Tribune." Just as the meeting was adjourning, Mr. Schurz did hear from Mr. Lincoln, a copy of the message given that afternoon to Congress being placed in his hands. He at once read it to the audience, which, already thoroughly aroused, now broke out again in a "tremendous burst of applause."

The first effect of the message was to unite the radical supporters of Mr. Lincoln with the more moderate. "We are all brought by the common-sense message," said "Harper's Weekly," "upon the same platform. The cannon shot against Fort Sumter effected three-fourths of our political lines; the President's message has wiped out the remaining fourth." But to Mr. Lincoln's keen disappointment, the Border State representatives in Congress let the proposition pass in silence. He saw one and another of them but not a word did they say of the message. The President stood this for four days, then he summoned them to the White House to explain his position.

The talk was long and entirely friendly. The President said he did not pretend to disguise his anti-slavery feeling; that he thought slavery was wrong, and should continue to think so; but that was not the question they had to deal with. Slavery existed, and that, too, as well by the act of the



LINCOLN IN 1861. AGE 52.

From photograph taken at Springfield, Illinois, early in 1861, by C. S. German, and owned by Allen Jasper Conant.



North as of the South; and in any scheme to get rid of it, the North as well as the South was morally bound to do its full and equal share. He thought the institution wrong and ought never to have existed; but yet he recognized the rights of property which had grown out of it, and would respect those rights as fully as similar rights in any other property; that property can exist, and does legally exist. He thought such a law wrong, but the rights of property resulting must be respected; he would get rid of the odious law, not by violating the right, but by encouraging the proposition, and offering inducements to give it up. The representatives assured Mr. Lincoln before they left that they believed him to be "moved by a high patriotism and sincere devotion to the happiness and glory of his country;" they promised him to "consider respectfully" the suggestions he had made, but it must have been evident to the President that they either had little sympathy with his plan or that they believed it would receive no favor from their constituents.

Although the message failed to arouse the Border States, it did stimulate the anti-slavery party in Congress to complete several practical measures. Acts of Congress were rapidly approved forbidding the army and navy to aid in the return of fugitive slaves, recognizing the independence of Liberia and Haiti, and completing a treaty with Great Britain to suppress slave trading. One of the most interesting of the acts which followed close on the message of March 6 emancipated *immediately* all the slaves in the District of Columbia. One million dollars was appropriated by Congress to pay the loyal slaveholders of the District for their loss, and \$100,000 was set aside to pay the expenses of such negroes as desired to emigrate to Haiti or Liberia.

The Administration was now committed to compensated emancipation, but there were many radicals who grew restive at the slow working of the measure. They began again to call

for more trenchant use of the weapon in Lincoln's hand. The commander of the Department of the South, General David Hunter, in his zeal, even issued an order declaring:

Slavery and martial law in a free country are altogether incompatible; the persons in . . . Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina heretofore held as slaves, are therefore declared forever free.

Mr. Lincoln's first knowledge of this proclamation came to him through the newspapers. He at once pronounced it void. At the same time he made a declaration at which a man less courageous, one less confident in his own policy, would have hesitated—a declaration of his intention that no one but himself should decide how the weapon in his hand was to be used:

I further make known that, whether it be competent for me, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, to declare the slaves of any State or States free, and whether, at any time, in any case, it shall have become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the government to exercise such supposed power, are questions which, under my responsibility, I reserve to myself, and which I cannot feel justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field.

It was a public display of a trait of Mr. Lincoln of which the country had already several examples. He made his own decisions, trusted his own judgment as a final authority.

In revoking Hunter's order, Mr. Lincoln again appealed to the Border States to accept his plan of buying and freeing their slaves, and as if to warn them that the unauthorized step which Hunter had dared to take might yet be forced upon the administration, he said:

I do not argue—I beseech you to make arguments for yourselves. You cannot, if you would, be blind to the signs of the times. I beg of you a calm and enlarged considera-

tion of them, ranging, if it may be, far above personal and partizan politics. This proposal makes common cause for a common object, casting no reproaches upon any. It acts not the Pharisee. The change it contemplates would come gently as the dews of heaven, not rending or wrecking anything. Will you not embrace it? So much good has not been done, by one effort, in all past time, as in the providence of God it is now your high privilege to do. May the vast future not have to lament that you have neglected it.

The President's treatment of Hunter's order dissatisfied many who had been temporarily quieted by the message of March 6. Again they besought the President to emancipate and arm the slaves. The authority and magnitude of the demand became such that Mr. Lincoln fairly staggered under it. Still he would not yield. He could not give up yet his hope of a more peaceful and just system of emancipation. But while he could not do what was asked of him, he seems to have felt that it was possible that he was wrong, and that another man in his place would be able to see the way. In a remarkable interview held early in the summer with several Republican senators, among whom was the Honorable James Harlan, of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa, the President actually offered to resign and let Mr. Hamlin, the Vice-President, initiate the policy.\*

The senators went to Mr. Lincoln to urge upon him the paramount importance of mustering slaves into the Union army. They argued that as the war was really to free the negro, it was only fair that he should take his part in working out his own salvation. Mr. Lincoln listened thoughtfully to every argument, and then replied:

Gentlemen, I have put thousands of muskets into the hands of loyal citizens of Tennessee, Kentucky, and Western

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\* The account of this interview was given to me by the late Hon. James Harlan of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa, and was corrected by him before his death.

North Carolina. They have said they could defend themselves, if they had guns. I have given them the guns. Now, these men do not believe in mustering in the negro. If I do it, these thousands of muskets will be turned against us. We should lose more than we should gain.

The gentlemen urged other considerations, among them that it was not improbable that Europe, which was anti-slavery in sentiment, but yet sympathized with the notion of a Southern Confederacy, preferring two nations to one in this country, would persuade the South to free her slaves in consideration of recognition. After they had exhausted every argument, Mr. Lincoln answered them.

"Gentlemen," he said, "I can't do it. I can't see it as you do. You may be right, and I may be wrong; but I'll tell you what I can do; I can resign in favor of Mr. Hamlin. Perhaps Mr. Hamlin could do it."

The senators, amazed at this proposition, "which," says Senator Harlan, "was made with the greatest seriousness, and of which not one of us doubted the sincerity," hastened to assure the President that they could not consider such a step on his part; that he stood where he could see all around the horizon; that he must do what he thought right; that, in any event, he must not resign.

If at this juncture McClellan had given the President a successful campaign it is probable that the radicals would have been more patient with the measure for compensated emancipation. The Border States seeing an overthrow of the Confederacy imminent might have hastened to avail themselves of it. But McClellan was giving the President little but anxiety. He had undertaken the long deferred campaign against Richmond at the beginning of April, but had begun by disobeying the clause of the President's order which instructed him to leave enough troops around Wash-



ington to insure its safety. When he arrived in the Peninsula he began to fortify his position as if he were entering on a defensive instead of offensive campaign, and it was only after repeated probing by the administration that he advanced. Every mile of his route towards Richmond was made only after urgent pleas and orders from the President and the Secretary of War and bitter complaints and forebodings on his part.

Mr. Lincoln's attitude towards his general-in-chief in this trying spring of 1862 is a most interesting study. He evidently had determined to exercise fully his power as commander-in-chief, to force McClellan into battle and to compel him to carry out the orders which he as chief executive gave. Conscious of his ignorance of military matters, and anxious to avoid errors, he exhausted every source of information on the army and its movements. Secretary Stanton himself did not watch the Army of the Potomac more closely in this campaign than did President Lincoln. Indeed, of the three rooms occupied by the military telegraph office at the War Department, one came to be called the "President's room," so much time did he spend there. During a part of the war, this room was occupied by Mr. A. B. Chandler, now the President of the Postal Telegraph Union.

"I was alone in this room," says Mr. Chandler, "and as few people came there to see me, Mr. Lincoln could be alone. He used to say, 'I come here to escape my persecutors. Many people call and say they want to see me for only a minute. That means, if I can hear their story and grant their request in a minute, it will be enough.' My desk was a large one with a flat top, and intended to be occupied on both sides. Mr. Lincoln ordinarily took the chair opposite mine at this desk. Here he would read over the telegrams received for the several heads of departments, all of which came to this office. It was the practice to make three

copies of all messages received, to whomsoever addressed. One of these was what we called a 'hard copy,' and was saved for the records of the War Department; two carbon copies were made by stylus, on yellow tissue paper, one for Mr. Lincoln and one for Mr. Stanton. Mr. Lincoln's copies were kept in what we called the 'President's drawer' of the 'cipher desk.' He would come in at any time of the night or day, and go at once to this drawer, and take out a file of the telegrams, and begin at the top to read them. His position in running over these telegrams was sometimes very curious. He had a habit of sitting frequently on the edge of his chair, with his right knee dragged down to the floor. I remember a curious expression of his when he got to the bottom of the new telegrams and began on those that he had read before. It was, 'Well, I guess I have got down to the raisins.' The first two or three times he said this he made no explanation, and I did not ask one. But one day, after the remark, he looked up under his eyebrows at me with a funny twinkle in his eyes, and said, 'I used to know a little girl out West who sometimes was inclined to eat too much. One day she ate a good many more raisins than she ought to, and followed them up with a quantity of other goodies. It made her very sick. After a time the raisins began to come. She gasped and looked at her mother, and said, "Well, I will be better now, I guess, for I have got down to the raisins."'

"Mr. Lincoln frequently wrote telegrams in my office. His method of composition was slow and laborious. It was evident that he thought out what he was going to say before he touched his pen to the paper. He would sit looking out of the window, his left elbow on the table, his hand scratching his temple, his lips moving, and frequently he spoke the sentence aloud or in a half whisper. After he was satisfied that he had the proper expression, he would write it

out. If one examines the originals of Mr. Lincoln's telegrams and letters, he will find very few erasures and very little interlining. This was because he had them definitely in his mind before writing them. In this he was the exact opposite of Mr. Stanton, who wrote with feverish haste, often scratching out words, and interlining frequently. Sometimes he would seize a sheet which he had filled, and impatiently tear it into pieces."

It is only necessary to examine the letters and telegrams Lincoln sent to McClellan in the campaign of 1862 to appreciate the rare patience and still rarer firmness and commonsense with which he was handling his hard military problems. As has been said McClellan began his campaign by disobeying the order to leave Washington fully guarded. The President learning this kept back a corps of the army. McClellan protested but Lincoln would not give up the force. "Do you really think," he wrote McClellan, "I should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? This is a question which the country will not allow me to evade."

When it became evident that McClellan did not intend to advance promptly the President made a vigorous protest.

Once more let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you should strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note—is noting now—that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor

with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can; but you must act.

McClellan did act but with such caution that he consumed all of April and most of May in working his way up the Peninsula to Richmond. Every move he made was under protest that his force was too small and with incessant complaint that the administration was not supporting him. Towards the end of May when an extra corps, that of McDowell, was on its way to Richmond to co-operate with McClellan the administration became alarmed by a threatened attack on Washington and recalled McDowell. The most intelligent military authorities criticise Mr. Lincoln for withdrawing this force just as the attack on the Confederates was at last to be made. It was an honest enough error on the President's part. He believed the capital in danger. —He knew too that with 98,000 men present for duty McClellan ought to be able to take care of himself. The general-in-chief, however, regarded this interference with his plans as added proof that the President did not intend to support him, wished his overthrow, and he sent the bitterest complaints to Washington. The President wrote him on May 25 full explanations of the situation as he saw it, and begged him to go ahead and do his best.

“If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach,” he said, “we should be utterly helpless. Apprehension of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's force from you. Please understand this, and do the best you can with the force you have.”

Three days later, after the fighting for Richmond had really begun, he telegraphed him, “I am painfully impressed with the importance of the struggle before you, and shall aid you all I can consistently with my view of due regard to all points.”

And through the month following while McClellan was engaged in the series of battles by which he hoped to get into Richmond the President did sustain him in every way he could, sending him troops as he could get them, counseling him whenever he saw a weak point, encouraging him after every engagement. The result of the campaign was disastrous. After working his way to within a few miles of Richmond McClellan was forced back to the James River, and in a burst of bitter despair he telegraphed to Washington:

If, at this instant I could dispose of ten thousand fresh men, I could gain a victory to-morrow. I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the Government must not and cannot hold me responsible for the result. I feel too earnestly to-night; I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.

"Save your army at all events," Lincoln replied. "Will send re-enforcements as fast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day. I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed re-enforcements. I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have been upon us before the troops could have gotten to you. Less than a week ago you notified us that re-enforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the Government are to blame. Please tell at once the present condition and aspect of things."

This was June 28. Mr. Lincoln hoped that McClellan might yet recover his position, but the developments of the next two days showed him the campaign was a failure. It was a terrible blow. "When the Peninsula campaign terminated suddenly at Harrison's Landing," Mr. Lincoln said once to a friend who asked him if he had ever despaired of his country, "I was as nearly inconsolable as I could be and live."

But he neither faltered nor blamed. He bade McClellan "find a place of security and wait and rest and repair," to maintain his ground if he could but to save his army even if he fell back to Fort Monroe. And he went to work to bring light into about as black a situation as a President ever faced. His first duty was to ask men of the sorrowing and angry country. The War Department had felt so certain in April when McClellan started on the Peninsula campaign that it had force enough to finish the war that recruiting had been stopped. Now a new call was made for 300,000 men for three years.

In order to learn the situation of the Army of the Potomac more exactly than he could from McClellan's despairing and often contradictory letters and telegrams, the President himself went to Harrison's Landing in July. The first and important result of his visit was that it fixed his determination to do something immediately about emancipation. He was convinced that he was not going to have any military encouragement very soon to offer to his supporters. But he must show them some fruits of their efforts, some sign that the men and money they were pouring into "McClellan's trap," as it was beginning to be called, were not lost; that the new call for 300,000 men just made was not to be in vain. There was nothing to do but use emancipation in some way as a weapon, and he summoned the representatives of the Border States to the White House on July

12, and made an earnest, almost passionate, appeal to them to consider his proposition of March 6.

It is doubtful if Mr. Lincoln in all his political career ever had a measure more at heart than his scheme for compensated emancipation. Isaac Arnold, who knew him well, says that rarely, if ever, was he known to manifest such solicitude as over this measure.

"Oh, how I wish the Border States would accept my proposition," he said to Arnold and Owen Lovejoy one day; "then you, Lovejoy, and you, Arnold, and all of us would not have lived in vain. The labor of your life, Lovejoy, would be crowned with success. You would live to see the end of slavery."

"Could you have seen the President," wrote Sumner once to a friend, "as it was my privilege often—while he was considering the great questions on which he has already acted—the invitation to emancipation in the States, emancipation in the District of Columbia, and the acknowledgment of the independence of Haiti and Liberia, even your zeal would have been satisfied.

*"His whole soul was occupied, especially by the first proposition, which was peculiarly his own.* In familiar intercourse with him, I remember nothing more touching than the earnestness and completeness with which he embraced this idea. To his mind it was just and beneficent, while it promised the sure end of slavery."

His address to the Border States representatives on July 12 is full of this conviction:

"I intend no reproach or complaint," he said, "when I assure you that, in my opinion, if you all had voted for the resolution in the gradual-emancipation message of last March, the war would now be substantially ended. And the plan therein proposed is yet one of the most potent and swift means of ending it. Let the States which are in rebellion see definitely and certainly that in no event will the States you represent ever join their proposed confederacy, and they

cannot much longer maintain the contest. But you cannot divest them of their hope to ultimately have you with them so long as you show a determination to perpetuate the institution within your own States. Beat them at elections, as you have overwhelmingly done, and, nothing daunted, they still claim you as their own. You and I know what the lever of their power is. Break that lever before their faces, and they can shake you no more forever. \* \* \* If the war continues long, as it must if the object be not sooner attained, the institution in your States will be extinguished by mere friction and abrasion—by the mere incidents of the war. It will be gone, and you will have nothing valuable in lieu of it. Much of its value is gone already. How much better for you and for your people to take the step which at once shortens the war and secures substantial compensation for that which is sure to be wholly lost in any other event! \* \* \*

“I am pressed with a difficulty not yet mentioned—one which threatens division among those who, united, are none too strong. An instance of it is known to you. General Hunter is an honest man. He was, and I hope still is, my friend. I valued him none the less for his agreeing with me in the general wish that all men everywhere could be free. He proclaimed all men free within certain States, and I repudiated the proclamation. He expected more good and less harm from the measure than I could believe would follow. Yet, in repudiating it, I gave dissatisfaction, if not offense, to many whose support the country cannot afford to lose. And this is not the end of it. The pressure in this direction is still upon me, and is increasing. By conceding what I now ask, you can relieve me, and, much more, can relieve the country, in this important point. \* \* \* Our common country is in great peril, demanding the loftiest views and boldest action to bring it speedy relief. Once relieved, its form of government is saved to the world, its beloved history and cherished memories are vindicated, and its happy future fully assured and rendered inconceivably grand. To you, more than to any others, the privilege is given to assure that happiness and swell that grandeur, and to link your own names therewith forever.”



The majority of the Border States representatives rejected the President's appeal. Now Mr. Lincoln never came to a point in his public career where he did not have a card in reserve, and he never lacked the courage to play it if he was forced to. "I must save this government if possible," he said, now that his best efforts for compensated emancipation were vain. "What I cannot do, of course I will not do; but it may as well be understood, once for all, that I shall not surrender this game leaving any available card unplayed." Just what his "available card" was he hinted to Secretary Seward and Secretary Welles the very day after his interview with the Border State representatives. He had about come to the conclusion, he said, that he must free the slaves by proclamation or be himself subdued. "It was a new departure for the President," writes Welles in his Diary, "for until this time, in all our previous interviews whenever the question of emancipation or the mitigation of slavery had been in any way alluded to, he had been prompt and emphatic in denouncing any interference by the General Government with the institution."

It was probably very shortly after this that a curious interview took place between Mr. Lincoln and his old and intimate friend, Leonard Swett, which shows admirably the struggle in the President's mind. The story of this interview Mr. Swett used to tell often to his friends, and it is through the courtesy of one of them, the Hon. Peter Stenger Grosscup, United States Circuit Judge for the Seventh Judicial Circuit, that it is given here:

One day, during the course of the war, when Mr. Swett was at his home in Bloomington, Illinois, he received a telegram asking him to come immediately to the President. The second morning afterwards found him in Washington. Thinking that something unusual was at hand, he went to the White House upon arrival and before eating his break-

fast. Mr. Lincoln asked him immediately into the cabinet room, and after making a few inquiries about mutual friends in Illinois, pulled up his chair to a little cabinet of drawers. Swett, of course, awaited in silence the developments. Opening a drawer, Lincoln took out a manuscript which, he said, was a letter from William Lloyd Garrison, and which he proceeded to read. It proved to be an eloquent and passionate appeal for the immediate emancipation of the slaves. It recalled the devotion and loyalty of the North, but pointed out, with something like peremptoriness, that unless some step was taken to cut out by the roots the institution of slavery, the expectations of the North would be disappointed and its ardor correspondingly cooled. It went into the moral wrong that lay at the bottom of the war, and insisted that the war could not, in the nature of things, be ended until the wrong was at an end. The letter throughout was entirely characteristic of Garrison.

Laying it back without comment, Mr. Lincoln took out another, which proved to be a letter from Garrett Davis, of Kentucky. It, too, treated of emancipation; but from the Border State point of view. It carefully balanced the martial and moral forces of the North and South, and pointed out that if the Border States, now divided almost equally between the belligerents, were thrown unitedly to the South, a conclusion of the war favorable to the North would be next to impossible. It then proceeded to recall that slavery was an institution of these Border States with which their people had grown familiar and upon which much of their prosperity was founded. Emancipation, especially emancipation without compensation, would, in that quarter of the country, be looked upon as a stab at prosperity and a departure from the original Union purposes of the war. It begged Mr. Lincoln to be led by the Northern abolition sentiment into no such irretrievable mistake.

Laying this back, Mr. Lincoln took out another, which turned out to be from a then prominent Swiss statesman, a sympathizer with the Northern cause, but whose name I cannot recall. It breathed all through an ardent wish that the North should succeed. The writer's purpose was to call attention to the foreign situation and the importance of pre-

venting foreign intervention. This he summed up as follows: The governing classes in England and Napoleon in France were favorable to the success of the Confederacy. They were looking for a pretext upon which to base some sort of intervention. Anything that, in international law, would justify intervention would be quickly utilized. A situation justifying such a pretext must be avoided. The writer then pointed out that from the earliest times any interference with the enemy's slaves had been regarded as a cruel and improper expedient; that emancipation would be represented to Europe as an equivalent of inciting slave insurrection; and would be seized upon, the writer feared, as a pretext upon which forcibly to intervene. The letter went over the whole foreign situation, bringing out clearly this phase of the consequences of emancipation.

Laying this letter back, the President turned to Mr. Swett, and without a word of inquiry, took up himself the subject of emancipation, not only in the phases pointed out by the letters just read, but every possible phase and consequence under which it could be considered. For more than an hour he debated the situation, first the one side and then the other of every question arising. His manner did not indicate that he wished to impress his views *upon* his hearer, but rather to weigh and examine them for his own enlightenment *in the presence* of his hearer. It was an instance of stating conclusions aloud, not that they might convince another, or be combatted by him, but that the speaker might see for himself how they looked when taken out of the region of mere reflection and embodied in words. The President's deliverance was so judicial, and so free from the quality of debate, or appearance of a wish to convince, that Mr. Swett felt himself to be, not so much a hearer of Lincoln's views, as a witness of the President's mental operations. The President was simply framing his thought in words, under the eye of his friend, that he might clear up his own mind.

When the President concluded, he asked for no comment, and made no inquiry, but rising, expressed his hope that Mr. Swett would get home safely, and entrusted to him some messages to their mutual friends. The audience thus ended.

Mr. Lincoln had, no doubt, determined at this time on the Emancipation Proclamation, perhaps had in his drawer, with the letters he read to Mr. Swett, the original draft which, as he afterwards told Mr. F. B. Carpenter, he prepared "without consultation with or the knowledge of the cabinet." It was on July 22 that, "after much anxious thought," he called a cabinet meeting to consider the subject.

"I said to the cabinet," the President told Mr. Carpenter, "that I had resolved upon this step, and had not called them together to ask their advice, but to lay the subject matter of a proclamation before them; suggestions as to which would be in order, after they had heard it read."

The gist of the proclamation which Mr. Lincoln read to the cabinet was that, on the first day of January, 1863, all persons held as slaves within any State or States wherein the constitutional authority of the United States should not then be practically recognized, should "then, thenceforward, and forever be free." He called his proclamation "a fit and necessary military measure," and prefaced it by declaring that, upon the next meeting of Congress, he intended to recommend a practical plan for giving pecuniary aid to any State which by that time had adopted "gradual abolishment of slavery."

The cabinet seems to have been bewildered by the sweeping proposition of the President. Nicolay and Hay quote a memorandum of the meeting made by Secretary Stanton, in which he says: "The measure goes beyond anything I have recommended." Mr. Lincoln, in his account of the meeting given to Mr. Carpenter, says:

Various suggestions were offered. . . . Nothing, however, was offered that I had not already fully an-





## FIRST READING OF THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION

From the original painting by F. B. Carpenter


The original was painted in the state dining-room of the White-House between February 5 and August 1, 1864, under the eye and with the kindly help of President Lincoln. According to a letter of Secretary Chase to Mr. Carpenter, "Mr. Lincoln, before reading his manuscript of the proclamation, said, in substance: 'I have considered everything that has been said to me about the expediency of emancipation, and have made up my mind to issue this proclamation, and I have invited you to come together, not to discuss what is to be done, but to have you hear what I have written and to get your suggestions about form and style;' adding: 'I have thought it all over, and have made a promise that this should be done to myself and to God.'" Secretary Chase adds: "The picture well represents that moment which followed the reading of the proclamation. It puts the two members who thoroughly advised and heartily believed in the measure on the right of Mr. Lincoln; the others (who, though they all acquiesced, and Mr. Seward, who, particularly, made important suggestions, had hitherto doubted or advised delay or even opposed) on the left."

Welles.

Smith.  
Seward

Blair.

Bates.



BEFORE THE CABINET, SEPTEMBER 20, 1862.

now in the Capitol at Washington.

Upon its completion, the painting was exhibited for two days in the East Room of the White House. After having been exhibited through the country, it was purchased by Mrs. Elizabeth Thompson, of New York, and presented to the re-United States Congress unanimously accepting the gift and voting Mrs. Thompson the "thanks of Congress," the highest honor ever paid a woman in our country, and setting apart Lincoln's birthday, February 12, 1878, for the acceptance of the painting. On that day both houses of Congress adjourned in honor of the celebration; the painting was elevated over the chair of the Speaker of the House of Representatives; Garfield, then a member of Congress, made the speech of presentation on behalf of Mrs. Thompson, while the Hon. Alexander Stephens, former vice-president of the Confederacy, who, in a famous speech at the beginning of the war, had declared, "Slavery is the cornerstone of the new Confederacy," made the speech accepting, on behalf of Congress, this painting which commemorates the abolition of slavery.





anticipated and settled in my own mind, until Secretary Seward spoke. He said in substance: "Mr. President, I approve of the proclamation, but I question the expediency of its issue at this juncture. The depression of the public mind, consequent upon our repeated reverses, is so great that I fear the effect of so important a step. It may be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted government, a cry for help; the government stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the government." His idea was that it would be considered our last *shriek*, on the retreat. "Now," continued Mr. Seward, "while I approve the measure, I suggest, sir, that you postpone its issue, until you can give it to the country, supported by military success, instead of issuing it, as would be the case now, upon the greatest disasters of the war!" The wisdom of the view of the Secretary of State struck me with very great force. It was an aspect of the case that, in all my thoughts upon the subject, I had entirely overlooked. The result was that I put the draft of the proclamation aside, as you do your sketch for a picture, waiting for a victory. From time to time I added or changed a line, touching it up here and there, anxiously waiting the progress of events.

The victory Mr. Lincoln waited for was long in coming. Disaster after disaster followed. Each new delay or failure only intensified the radical anti-slavery sentiment, and made the demand for emancipation more emphatic and threatening. The culmination of this dissatisfaction was an editorial signed by Horace Greeley, and printed in the New York "Tribune" of August 20, entitled, "The Prayer of 20,000,000"—two columns of bitter and unjust accusations and complaints addressed to Mr. Lincoln, charging him with "ignoring, disregarding, and defying" the laws already enacted against slavery.

Mr. Lincoln answered it in a letter published in the "National Intelligencer" of Washington, August 23. The document challenges comparison with the State papers of all times and all countries for its lucidity and its courage:

"As to the policy I 'seem to be pursuing,' as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt.

"I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be 'the Union as it was.' If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views.

The "Greeley faction," as it was called, not only pursued Mr. Lincoln through the press and pulpit and platform; an unending procession of radical committees and delegations waited upon him. Although he was at that time, by his own statement, adding or changing a line of the proclamation, "touching it up here and there," he seems almost invariably to have argued against emancipation with those who came to plead for it.

It was only his way of making his own judgment surer. He was not only examining every possible reason for emancipation; he was steadily seeking reasons against it. Perhaps the best illustration preserved to us of this intellectual method of Lincoln is his argument to a committee from the

religious denominations of Chicago, who came to him on September 13:

“What good would a proclamation of emancipation from me do, especially as we are now situated? I do not want to issue a document that the whole world will see must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope’s bull against the comet. Would my word free the slaves, when I cannot even enforce the Constitution in the rebel States? Is there a single court, or magistrate, or individual that would be influenced by it there? And what reason is there to think it would have any greater effect upon the slaves than the late law of Congress, which I approved, and which offers protection and freedom to the slaves of rebel masters who come within our lines? Yet I cannot learn that that law has caused a single slave to come over to us. And suppose they could be induced by a proclamation of freedom from me to throw themselves upon us, what should we do with them? How can we feed and care for such a multitude? \* \* If we were to arm them, I fear that in a few weeks the arms would be in the hands of the rebels; and, indeed, thus far we have not had arms enough to equip our white troops. I will mention another thing, though it meets only your scorn and contempt. There are fifty thousand bayonets in the Union armies from the border slave States. It would be a serious matter if, in consequence of a proclamation such as you desire, they should go over to the rebels.”

The letter to Greeley, the passages quoted above, show how the President was wrestling with the question. There is every indication indeed that an incessant struggle against violent emancipation went on in his mind through the whole period. He regarded it as the act of a dictator. He feared it might be fruitless. He dreaded the injury it would do the loyal people of the South. He said once to a friend, that he had prayed to the Almighty to save him from the necessity of it, adopting the very language of Christ, “If it be possible, let this cup pass from me.” In talking to the

Chicago delegations, who argued that it was God's will that he issue a proclamation, he said:

"I hope it will not be irreverent for me to say that if it is probable that God would reveal His will to others on a point so connected with my duty, it might be supposed He would reveal it directly to me; for unless I am more deceived in myself than I often am, it is my earnest desire to know the will of Providence in this matter. And if I can learn what it is, I will do it. These are not, however, the days of miracles, and I suppose it will be granted that I am not to expect a direct revelation. I must study the plain physical facts of the case, ascertain what is possible, and learn what appears to be wise and right."

The victory for which the President waited came on September 17. McClellan had followed Lee into Maryland, and defeated him. The President was at his summer house at the Soldier's Home when the news of Antietam reached him. He at once finished the second draft of the Emancipation Proclamation, and called the cabinet together on Monday, September 22. Secretary Chase recorded in his diary, that day, how, after reading his colleagues a chapter from Artemus Ward, the President "took a graver tone." The words he spoke, as recorded by Mr. Chase, are a remarkable revelation of the man's feelings at the moment:

I have, as you are aware, thought a great deal about the relation of this war to slavery; and you all remember that, several weeks ago, I read to you an order I had prepared on this subject, which, on account of objections made by some of you, was not issued. Ever since then my mind has been much occupied with this subject, and I have thought, all along, that the time for acting on it might probably come. I think the time has come now. I wish it was a better time. I wish that we were in a better condition. The action of the army against the rebels has not been quite what I should have best liked. But they have been driven out of Maryland,

and Pennsylvania is no longer in danger of invasion. When the rebel army was at Frederick, I determined, as soon as it should be driven out of Maryland, to issue a proclamation of emancipation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I said nothing to any one, but I made the promise to myself and [hesitating a little] to my Maker. The rebel army is now driven out, and I am going to fulfil that promise. I have got you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wish your advice about the main matter, for that I have determined for myself. This, I say without intending anything but respect for any one of you. But I already know the views of each on this question. They have been heretofore expressed, and I have considered them as thoroughly and carefully as I can. What I have written is that which my reflections have determined me to say. If there is anything in the expressions I use, or in any minor matter, which any of you thinks had best be changed, I shall be glad to receive the suggestions. One other observation I will make. I know very well that many others might, in this matter as in others, do better than I can; and if I was satisfied that the public confidence was more fully possessed by any one of them than by me, and knew of any constitutional way in which he could be put in my place, he should have it. I would gladly yield it to him. But, though I believe that I have not so much of the confidence of the people as I had some time since, I do not know that, all things considered, any other person has more; and, however this may be, there is no way in which I can have any other man put where I am. I am here; I must do the best I can, and bear the responsibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to take.

The proclamation appeared in the newspapers of the following morning. One substantial addition had been made to the document since July 22. It now declared that the Government of the United States would "recognize and maintain" the freedom of the persons set at liberty.

There was no exultation in the President's mind; indeed there was almost a groan in the words which, the night after he had given it out, he addressed to a party of sere-

naders, "I can only trust in God that I have made no mistake." The events of the fall brought him little encouragement. Indeed, the promise of emancipation seemed to effect nothing but discontent and uneasiness; stocks went down, troops fell off. In five great States—Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York—the elections went against him. Little but menaces came from Europe. Many said that the President would not dare, in the face of the unrest of the country, fulfil his promise, and issue the proclamation. But when Congress opened on December 1, he did submit the proclamation, together with the plan for compensated emancipation which he had worked out. Over one-half of the message, in fact, was given to this plan.

Mr. Lincoln pleaded with Congress for his measure as he had never pleaded before. He argued that it would "end the struggle and save the Union forever," that it would "cost no blood at all," that Congress could do it if they would unite with the executive, that the "good people" would respond and support it if appealed to.

"It is not," he said, "'Can any of us imagine better?' but, 'Can we all do better?' Object whatsoever is possible, still the question occurs, 'Can we do better?' The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.

"Fellow citizens, we cannot escape history. We of this Congress and this Administration will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation. We say we are for the Union. The world will not forget that we say this. We know how to save the Union. The world knows we do know how to save it. We—even we here—hold the power and bear the re-

sponsibility. In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free—honorable alike in what we give and what we preserve. We shall nobly save or meanly lose the last, best hope of earth. Other means may succeed; this could not fail. The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just—a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud, and God must forever bless.”

As the 1st of January drew near, many friends of the proclamation doubted that Mr. Lincoln would keep his promise. Among these was the Rev. Byron Sunderland, of Washington, at that time chaplain of the Senate and one of the most aggressively loyal ministers in the city. Dr. Sunderland feared that there was truth in the rumor that the President would withdraw, not issue, the proclamation on the 1st of January, and on the Sunday before the New Year he preached a sermon on the subject. Mr. Z. S. Robbins, of Washington, a friend of Mr. Lincoln, asked Dr. Sunderland to go with him to the President and urge him to keep his promise.

“We were ushered into the cabinet room,” says Dr. Sunderland. “It was very dim, but one gas-jet burning. As we entered, Mr. Lincoln was standing at the farther end of the long table which filled the middle of the room. As I stood by the door, I am so very short, that I was obliged to look up to see the President. Mr. Robbins introduced me, and I began at once by saying: ‘I have come, Mr. President, to anticipate the New Year with my respects, and if I may, to say to you a word about the serious condition of this country.’

“‘Go ahead, Doctor,’ replied the President; ‘every little helps.’ But I was too much in earnest to laugh at his sally at my smallness. ‘Mr. President,’ I continued, ‘they say that you are not going to keep your promise to give us the Emancipation Proclamation; that it is your intention to withdraw it.’

“ ‘ Well, Doctor,’ said Mr. Lincoln, ‘ you know Peter was going to do it, but when the time came he didn’t.’ ”

“ ‘ Mr. President,’ I continued, ‘ I have been studying Peter. He did not deny his Master until after his Master rebuked him in the presence of the enemy. You have a master, too, Mr. Lincoln, the American people. Don’t deny your master until he has rebuked you before all the world.’ ”

“ My earnestness seemed to interest the President, and his whole tone changed immediately. ‘ Sit down, Doctor Sunderland,’ he said; ‘ let us talk.’ ”

“ We seated ourselves in the room, and for a moment the President was silent, his elbow resting on the table, his big, gnarled hands closed over his forehead. Then looking up gravely at me, he began to speak :

“ ‘ Doctor, if it had been left to you and me, there would have been no war. If it had been left to you and me, there would have been no cause for this war; but it was not left to us. God has allowed men to make slaves of their fellows. He permits this war. He has before Him a strange spectacle. We, on our side, are praying Him to give us victory, because we believe we are right; but those on the other side pray Him, too, for victory, believing they are right. What must He think of us? And what is coming from the struggle? What will be the effect of it all on the whites and on the negroes?’ And then suddenly a ripple of amusement broke the solemn tone of his voice. ‘ As for the negroes, Doctor, and what is going to become of them: I told Ben Wade the other day, that it made me think of a story I read in one of my first books, “ Æsop’s Fables.” It was an old edition, and had curious rough wood-cuts, one of which showed four white men scrubbing a negro in a potash kettle filled with cold water. The text explained that the men thought that by scrubbing the negro they might make him white. Just about the time they thought they were succeeding, he took cold and died. Now, I am afraid that by the time we get through this war the negro will catch cold and die.’ ”

“ The laugh had hardly died away before he resumed his grave tone, and for half an hour he discussed the question of emancipation. He stated it in every light, putting his points



so clearly that each statement was an argument. He showed the fullest appreciation of every side. It was like a talk of one of the old prophets. And though he did not tell me at the end whether the proclamation would be issued or not, I went home comforted and uplifted, and I believed in Abraham Lincoln from that day."

Mr. Lincoln had no idea of withdrawing the proclamation. On December 30, he read the document to his cabinet, and asked the members to take copies home and give him their criticisms. The next day at cabinet meeting these criticisms and suggestions were presented by the different members. Mr. Lincoln took them all to his office, where, during that afternoon and the morning of January 1, 1863, he rewrote the document. He was called from it at eleven o'clock to go to the East Room and begin the customary New Year's handshaking. It was the middle of the afternoon before he was free and back in the executive chamber, where the Emancipation Proclamation, which in the interval had been duly engrossed at the State Department and brought to the White House by Secretary Seward and his son, was waiting his signature.

"They found the President alone in his room," writes Frederick Seward. "The broad sheet was spread out before him on the cabinet table. Mr. Lincoln dipped his pen in the ink, and then, holding it a moment above the paper, seemed to hesitate. Looking around, he said:

" 'I never, in my life, felt more certain that I was doing right, than I do in signing this paper. But I have been receiving calls, and shaking hands since nine [eleven?] o'clock this morning, till my arm is stiff and numb. Now, this signature is one that will be closely examined, and if they find my hand trembled, they will say "he had some compunctions." But, any way, it is going to be done!'

"So saying, he slowly and carefully wrote his name at the bottom of the proclamation."

At last the Emancipation Proclamation was a fact. But there was little rejoicing in the heart of the man who had framed and given it to the world. In issuing it, all he had dared hope was that in the long run it would give greater gain than loss. He was not confident that this would be so, but he was willing to risk it. "Hope and fear and doubt contended over the new policy in uncertain conflict," he said months later. As he had foreseen, dark days followed. There were mutinies in the army; there was ridicule; there was a long interval of waiting for results. Nothing but the greatest care in enforcing the proclamation could make it a greater good than evil, and Mr. Lincoln now turned all his energies to this new task. "We are like whalers," he said one day, "who have been long on a chase; we have at last got the harpoon into the monster, but we must now look how we steer, or with one 'flop' of his tail he will send us all into eternity."

## CHAPTER XXVI

### LINCOLN'S SEARCH FOR A GENERAL

THE failure of McClellan in the Peninsular Campaign not only forced the emancipation proclamation from Lincoln, it set him to working on a fresh set of military problems. The most important of these was a search for a competent general-in-chief for the armies of the United States. As has already been noted General McClellan had been appointed general-in-chief in July, 1861, after the first battle of Bull Run. A few months' experience had demonstrated to the Administration that able as McClellan was in forming an army and inspiring his soldiers, he lacked the ability to direct a great concerted movement extending over so long a line as that from the Mississippi to the Atlantic. In March when he took the field at the head of the Army of the Potomac the President relieved him from the command of all military departments except that of the Department of the Potomac. From March to July, 1862, Lincoln had no general-in-chief. He felt so keenly his need of an experienced military counsellor that towards the end of June he made a hurried and secret visit to General Scott, who since he had been superseded by McClellan had been in retirement.

One result of his visit to McClellan at Harrison's Landing in July was to fix Lincoln's determination to have in Washington a general-in-chief of all the armies who could supplement his own meagre knowledge of military matters, and who could aid him in forming judgments. He knew that in the campaign against Richmond he had, at more than one

critical moment, made decisions which were contrary to McClellan's plans. He knew that McClellan claimed that these decisions had caused his failure. He had acted to the best of his judgment in every case, but he undoubtedly felt the danger in a civilian's taking such a responsibility. He wanted a man at his side whom he believed was wiser than he in these matters. So far the war had brought out but one man who seemed to him at all fit for this work, Major-General H. W. Halleck, the commander of the Department of the Mississippi. On his return to Washington from his visit to McClellan, almost the first act of the President was to summon Halleck to Washington as general-in-chief. Halleck was a West Point man highly regarded by General Scott, who had been appointed to take charge of the Department of the West after Frémont's failure there. He had shown such vigor in his field in the winter of 1861-'62, that in March, when McClellan was relieved of the position of general-in-chief, a new department including all the Mississippi region west of Knoxville, Tennessee, was given to Halleck. Since that time he had succeeded in opening the Mississippi with the aid of the gunboats as far south as Memphis.

Halleck was appointed on July 11, and soon after his arrival in Washington he went to Harrison's Landing to look over McClellan's situation. He found McClellan determined to make another attack on Richmond after he received reinforcements. Halleck disapproved of the idea. He believed that McClellan should return to the Potomac and unite with the new army of Virginia which had just been formed of the troops around Washington and placed under the direction of General John Pope, another product of the Mississippi campaign, from whom the President hoped great things.

McClellan persistently fought this plan and his removal was seriously discussed at this time. The great body of the

Republican party indeed demanded it. Many did not hesitate to say that McClellan was a traitor only waiting the proper opportunity to surrender his army to the enemy—an accusation which never had other foundation than McClellan's obstinacy and procrastination. Lincoln would not relieve him. He believed him loyal. He knew that no man could be better loved by his soldiers or more capable of putting an army into form. He had no one to put in his place. There was a political reason, too; McClellan was a Democrat. The party took his view of the disastrous Peninsular campaign—that Mr. Lincoln had not supported him. To remove him was to arouse bitter Democratic opposition and so to decrease the support of the Union cause and at this juncture to hold as solid a North as possible to the war was quite as imperative as to win a battle.


Lincoln would not relieve McClellan, but he sanctioned the plan for a change of base from the James to the Potomac and early in August, McClellan was ordered to move his army. He continued to struggle against the movement, believing he could, if re-enforced, capture Richmond, and when forced to yield he had made the movement with delay and ill-humor. The withdrawal of McClellan freed Lee's army, and the Confederate general marched quickly northward against the Army of Virginia under General Pope. On August 30, Lee defeated Pope in the second battle of Bull Run—a defeat scarcely less discouraging to the Federals than the first Bull Run had been, and one that caused almost as great a panic at Washington. Pope was defeated, the country generally believed, because McClellan, who was hardly twenty miles away, did not, in spite of orders, do anything to relieve him. It seemed to Lincoln that McClellan even wanted Pope to fail. The indignation of the Secretary of War and of the majority of the members of the cabinet was so great against McClellan that a protest against keeping him any longer in

command of any force was written by Stanton and signed by three of his colleagues. Major A. E. H. Johnson, the private secretary of Stanton, first published this protest in the Washington "Evening Star," March 18, 1893. Mr. Johnson says that the President thought it unwise to publish the document that Mr. Stanton had prepared; but he consented that the following protest should be signed and handed to him as a substitute. The understanding of the cabinet members interested was that this revised protest should go to the country. Mr. Johnson believes that Mr. Lincoln himself wrote this protest; at all events, he is certain that the President consented to it.

The undersigned, who have been honored with your selection as part of your confidential advisers, deeply impressed with our great responsibility in the present crisis, do but perform a painful duty in declaring to you our deliberate opinion that at this time it is not safe to intrust to Major-General McClellan the command of any army of the United States. And we hold ourselves ready at any time to explain to you in detail the reasons upon which this opinion is based.

In spite of this evident sympathy of Lincoln with the indignation against McClellan, on September 2 he placed that general in command of all the troops around Washington. Probably no act of his ever angered the Secretary of War so thoroughly. A large part of the North, too, was indignant. A general cry went up to the President for a new leader.

Lincoln only showed again in this determined and bitterly criticised action his courage in acting in a crisis according to his own judgment. The army under Pope was demoralized. Washington was, perhaps, in danger. The defeat had robbed Pope of confidence. Halleck, worn out with fatigue and anxiety, was beseeching McClellan to come to his relief. There was no other general in the army who could so quickly "lick the troops into shape," as Lincoln put



LINCOLN AT MCCLELLAN'S HEADQUARTERS, ANTIETAM, OCTOBER 3, 1862.

From photograph loaned by Mr. C. M. Derickson, Mercer, Pa. After defeating Lee at Antietam on September 17, McClellan had failed to follow up his advantage, alleging that his army lacked "everything" and needed rest. Lincoln then went to Antietam to study the situation for himself; and it was during this visit that the picture was taken. At Lincoln's right stands McClellan.





it, and man the fortifications around the city. He made the order, and McClellan entirely justified the President's faith in him. He did put the army into form, and was able to follow at once after Lee, who was making for Maryland and Pennsylvania. Overtaking Lee at Antietam, north of the Potomac, McClellan defeated him on September 17. But to Lincoln's utter despair, he failed to follow up his victory and allowed Lee to get back south of the Potomac river; nor would he follow him, in spite of Lincoln's reiterated urging. It was this failure to move McClellan's army from camp that sent Lincoln to visit him early in October. He would find out the actual condition of the army; see if, as McClellan complained, it lacked "everything" and needed rest. He found McClellan with over 100,000 men around him; two days of his visit he spent in the saddle reviewing this force. He visited the hospitals, talked with the men, interviewed the generals, saw everything. What his opinion of the ability of the army to do something was, is evident from an order sent McClellan the day after he returned to Washington: "The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him south." This was on October 6. A week later, McClellan being still in camp, Mr. Lincoln wrote him the following letter:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
WASHINGTON, D. C., *October 13, 1862.*

MAJOR-GENERAL MCCLELLAN.

*My Dear Sir:* You remember my speaking to you of what I called your over-cautiousness. Are you not over-cautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim? As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry

to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named. He now waggons from Culpepper Court House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with waggons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to give it to you, and, in fact, ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not be ignored. Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is to "operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own." You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? . . .

If he should move northward, I would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications, and move toward Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him, if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say "try;" if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he makes a stand at Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us he tenders us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond. . . .

This patient, sensible letter had no effect on McClellan. Now, forbearing as Lincoln was as a rule, he could lose his patience in a way which it does one good to see. He lost it a

few days later, when McClellan gave as a reason for inaction that his cavalry horses had sore tongues.

"I have just read your dispatch about sore-tongued and fatigued horses," Lincoln telegraphed. "Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?"

Yet even for this telegram he half apologized two days later:

Most certainly I intend no injustice to any, and if I have done any I deeply regret it. To be told, after more than five weeks' total inaction of the army, and during which period we have sent to the army every fresh horse we possibly could, amounting in the whole to 7,918, that the cavalry horses were too much fatigued to move, presents a very cheerless, almost hopeless, prospect for the future, and it may have forced something of impatience in my dispatch.

On the first day of November, McClellan crossed the Potomac; but four days later the President, acting on a curious, half-superstitious ultimatum which he had laid down for his own guidance, removed the General. He had decided, Mr. Hay heard him say, that if McClellan permitted Lee to cross the Blue Ridge and place himself between Richmond and the Army of the Potomac, there would be a change in generals. Four days later Lee did this very thing, and Lincoln, unmoved by the fact that McClellan had at last begun the movement south, kept the compact with himself.

But who should be asked to take the command of the army? There was no man whose achievements made him pre-eminent—no one whom the country demanded as it had Frémont and McClellan. The choice seemed to be confined to the corps commanders of the Army of the Potomac, and General Ambrose Burnside was ordered to relieve McClellan. Lincoln had been watching Burnside closely for many

months. Indeed, he had already twice asked him to take the command, but Burnside, believing in McClellan and mistrusting his own fitness, had refused.

With an anxious heart the President watched the new commander as he followed Lee into Virginia and took a position north of the Rappahannock, facing Lee, who was now at Fredericksburg, on the south of the river. Burnside at once made ready for battle and Lincoln wanting as always to see with his own eyes the army's condition, went down the Potomac on November 27 to Acquia Creek, where Burnside met him and explained his plan. The President thought it risky and in a letter to Halleck suggested a less hazardous substitute. Both Burnside and Halleck objected however and the President yielded.

Burnside began his movement on December 9. During the 10th, 11th, 12th, and 13th, the President studied intently the yellow-tissue telegrams in his drawer at the telegraph office, telling where troops were crossing the river and what positions had been gained. At half-past four o'clock on the morning of the 14th, a message was received saying that the troops were all over the river—"loss, 5,000." This meant that the final struggle was at hand. About eight o'clock that morning, Mr. Lincoln appeared at the telegraph office of the War Department in dressing-gown and carpet slippers. Mr. Rosewater, the present editor of the Omaha "Bee," was receiving messages, and he says that the President did not leave the room until night. Secretary Stanton, Major Eckert, and Captain Fox were the only other persons present, as he remembers. The excitement and suspense were too great for any one to eat, and it was not until evening that the Secretary sent out for food for the watchers. All day the 15th the anxiety lasted; then, at a quarter past four o'clock on the morning of the 16th, came news of a retreat. "I have thought it necessary," telegraphed Burnside from the north

of the Rappahannock, "to withdraw the army to this side of the river." Slowly the dreadful returns came in—over 10,000 men dead and wounded, 2,000 more missing. The government did its utmost to conceal the disaster, but gradually it came out and again the heart-sick country heaped its anger on the President.

Lincoln's faith in Burnside was sorely tried by the battle of Fredericksburg. Reports which soon came to him of the discouragement of the army, and the disaffection of the corps commanders, alarmed him still further, and he refused, without Halleck's consent, to allow Burnside to make a new movement which the latter had planned. But Halleck declined, at this critical moment, to accept the responsibilities of his position as General-in-Chief and to give a decision. Lincoln felt his desertion deeply.

"If in such a difficulty as this," he wrote Halleck, "you do not help, you fail me precisely in the point for which I sought your assistance. You know what General Burnside's plan is, and it is my wish that you go with him to the ground, examine it as far as practicable, confer with the officers, getting their judgment and ascertaining their temper—in a word, gather all the elements for forming a judgment of your own, and then tell General Burnside that you do approve or that you do not approve his plan. Your military skill is useless to me if you will not do this."

The passing weeks only added to the disorganization of the Army of the Potomac, and on January 25 the President ordered General Joseph Hooker to relieve General Burnside. Stanton and Halleck were not satisfied with the selection. They wanted the next experiment tried on a Western general who was promising well, General W. S. Rosecrans. That Lincoln himself saw danger in the appointment is evident from the letter he wrote to General Hooker:

*General:* I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appear to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skillful soldier, which of course I like. I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable if not an indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country, and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it; and now beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories. Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

Hooker had a manly heart, and the President's words appealed to the best that was in him. Noah Brooks tells how he heard the General read the letter soon after its receipt. "He finished reading it," writes Mr. Brooks, "almost with tears in his eyes; and as he folded it and put it back in the breast of his coat, he said, 'That is just such a letter as a father might write to a son. It is a beautiful letter, and al-

though I think he was harder on me than I deserved, I will say that I love the man who wrote it. ' "

By the first of April, the Army of the Potomac had been put into splendid form by General Hooker. An advance against the enemy, still entrenched at Fredericksburg, where Burnside had engaged him, was contemplated, but prior to the battle a grand review of the troops before the President was planned. It was on Saturday, April 4, that Lincoln left Washington, by a river steamer, for Hooker's headquarters at Falmouth, Virginia. A great snow-storm began that night, and it was with serious delay and discomfort that the review was conducted. Difficult as it was, the President was indefatigable in his efforts to see all the army, to talk with every officer, to shake hands with as many men as possible. A strange foreboding seemed to possess him. Hooker's confident assurance, "I am going straight to Richmond, if I live," filled him with dread. "It's about the worst thing I have seen since I have been down here," he told Noah Brooks, who was one of the party. When he watched the splendid column of that vast army of a hundred thousand, there was no rejoicing in his face. The defeats of two years, the angry clamor of an unhappy North, the dead of a dozen battle-fields, seemed written there instead. So haggard was his countenance that even the men in the line noticed it. Ira Seymour Dodd, in one of his graphic Civil War stories, has described this very review, and he tells how he and his comrades were almost awe-stricken by the glimpse they caught of the President's face:

As we neared the reviewing-stand, the tall figure of Lincoln loomed up. He was on horseback, and his severely plain, black citizen's dress set him in bold relief against the crowd of generals in full uniform grouped behind him. Distinguished men were among them; but we had no eyes save for our revered President, the Commander-in-Chief of the

army, the brother of every soldier, the great leader of a nation in its hour of trial. There was no time save for a marching salute; the occasion called for no cheers. Self-examination, not glorification, had brought the army and its chief together. But we passed close to him, so that he could look into our faces and we into his.

None of us to our dying day can forget that countenance! From its presence we marched directly onward toward our camp, and as soon as "route step" was ordered and the men were free to talk, they spoke thus to each other: "Did you ever see such a look on any man's face?" "He is bearing the burdens of the nation." "It is an awful load; it is killing him." "Yes, that is so; he is not long for this world!"

Concentrated in that one great, strong yet tender face, the agony of the life or death struggle of the hour was revealed as we had never seen it before. With new understanding we knew why we were soldiers.

A day later Lincoln left the army, but before going he said to Hooker and his generals, "Gentlemen, in your next battle put in all your men." The next battle occurred on May 1, 2, 3, and 4. Over 37,000 men were left out of the fight, and on May 5 the army again withdrew north of the Potomac. The news of the retreat reached the President soon after noon of May 6.

"About three o'clock in the afternoon," says Noah Brooks, "The door opened, and Lincoln came into the room. I shall never forget that picture of despair. He held a telegram in his hand, and as he closed the door and came toward us, I mechanically noticed that his face, usually sallow, was ashen in hue. The paper on the wall behind him was of the tint known as 'French gray,' and even in that moment of sorrow and dread expectation I vaguely took in the thought that the complexion of the anguished President's visage was almost exactly like that of the wall. He gave me the telegram, and in a voice trembling with emotion, said, 'Read it—news from the army.' The despatch was from General Butterfield, Hooker's chief of staff, addressed to the War



Department, and was to the effect that the army had been withdrawn from the south side of the Rappahannock, and was then 'safely encamped' in its former position. The appearance of the President, as I read aloud these fateful words, was piteous. Never, as long as I knew him, did he seem to be so broken up, so dispirited, and so ghostlike. Claspings his hands behind his back, he walked up and down the room, saying, 'My God, my God, what will the country say! What will the country say!'

This consternation was soon mastered. Lincoln's almost superhuman faculty of putting disaster behind him and turning his whole force to the needs of the moment came to his aid. Ordering a steamer to be ready at the wharf, he summoned Halleck, and at four o'clock the two men were on their way to Hooker's headquarters. The next day, the President had the situation in hand, and was planning the next move of the Army of the Potomac.

The country could not rally so quickly from the blow of Chancellorsville. From every side came again the despairing cry, "Abraham Lincoln, give us a man!" But Lincoln had no man of whom he felt surer than he did of Hooker, and for two months longer he tried to sustain that General. A fundamental difficulty existed, however—what Lincoln called a "family quarrel"—an antagonism between Halleck and Hooker, which caused constant friction. Since the beginning of the war, Lincoln had been annoyed, his plans thwarted, the cause crippled, by the jealousies and animosities of men. So far as possible the President tried to keep out of these complications. "I have too many family controversies, so to speak, already on my hands, to voluntarily, or so long as I can avoid it, take up another," he wrote to General McClelland once. "You are now doing well—well for the country, and well for yourself—much better than you could possibly be if engaged in open war with General Halleck." But his letters and telegrams show how, in spite of himself,

he was continually running athwart somebody's prejudice or dislike.

The trouble between Halleck and Hooker reached a climax at a critical moment. On June 3, Lee had slipped from his position on the Rappahannock and started north. Hooker had followed him with great skill. Both armies were well north of the Potomac, and a battle was imminent when, on June 27, angered by Halleck's refusal of a request, Hooker resigned.

During the days when Hooker was chasing Lee northward, the President had spent much of his time in his room at the telegraph office. Mr. Chandler, who was on duty there, relates that one of his most constant inquiries was about the Fifth Corps, under General Meade. "Where's Meade?" "What's the Fifth Corps doing?" he was asking constantly. He had seen, no doubt, that he might be obliged to displace Hooker, and was observing the man whom he had in mind for the position. At all events, it was Meade whom he now ordered to take charge of the army.

The days following were ones of terrible suspense at Washington. The North, panic-stricken by the Southern invasion, was clamoring at the President for a hundred things. Among other demands was a strongly supported one for the recall of McClellan. Col. A. K. McClure, of Philadelphia, who, among others, urged Lincoln to restore McClellan, says in a letter to the writer:

When Lee's army entered Pennsylvania in June, 1863, there was general consternation throughout the State. The Army of the Potomac was believed to be very much demoralized by the defeat of Chancellorsville, by want of confidence in Hooker as commander, and by the apprehension that any of the corps commanders, called suddenly to lead the army just on the eve of the greatest battle of the war, would not inspire the trust of the soldiers. The friends of General McClellan believed that he could best defend the

State. He was admittedly the best organizer in our entire army, and preëminently equipped as a defensive officer, and they assumed that his restoration to the command would bring in immense Democratic support to the Administration.

Lincoln's view of the matter is fully shown by the telegram which he sent in reply to the one from Colonel McClure urging McClellan's appointment.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WASHINGTON CITY, *June 30, 1863.*

A. K. McCLURE, Philadelphia :

Do we gain anything by opening one leak to stop another? Do we gain anything by quieting one clamor merely to open another, and probably a larger one? A. LINCOLN.

Three days after his appointment, Meade met Lee at Gettysburg, in Pennsylvania, and after three days of hard fighting defeated him. During these three terrible days—the 1st, 2d, and 3d of July—Mr. Lincoln spent most of his time in the telegraph office.

"He read every telegram with the greatest eagerness," says Mr. Chandler, "and frequently was so anxious that he would rise from his seat and come around and lean over my shoulder while I was translating the cipher. After the battle of Gettysburg, the President urged Meade to pursue Lee and engage him before he should cross the Potomac. His anxiety seemed as great as it had been during the battle itself, and now, as then, he walked up and down the floor, his face grave and anxious, wringing his hands and showing every sign of deep solicitude. As the telegrams came in, he traced the positions of the two armies on the map, and several times called me up to point out their location, seeming to feel the need of talking to some one. Finally, a telegram came from Meade saying that under such and such circumstances he would engage the enemy at such and such

a time. 'Yes,' said the President bitterly, 'he will be ready to fight a magnificent battle when there is no enemy there to fight!'

Perhaps Lincoln never had a harder struggle to do what he thought to be just than he did after Meade allowed Lee to escape across the Potomac. He seems to have entertained a suspicion that the General *wanted* Lee to get away, for in a telegram to Simon Cameron, on July 15, he says: "I would give much to be relieved of the impression that Meade, Couch, Smith, and all, since the battle at Gettysburg, have striven only to get Lee over the river without another fight." The day before, he wrote Meade a letter in which he put frankly all his discontent:

. . . . My dear General, I do not believe you appreciate the magnitude of the misfortune involved in Lee's escape. He was within your easy grasp, and to have closed upon him would, in connection with our other late successes, have ended the war. As it is, the war will be prolonged indefinitely. If you could not safely attack Lee last Monday, how can you possibly do so south of the river, when you can take with you very few more than two-thirds of the force you then had in hand? It would be unreasonable to expect and I do not expect that you can now effect much. Your golden opportunity is gone, and I am distressed immeasurably because of it.

I beg you will not consider this a prosecution or persecution of yourself. As you had learned that I was dissatisfied, I have thought it best to kindly tell you why.\*

He never sent the letter. Thinking it over, in his dispassionate way, he evidently concluded that it would not repair the misfortune and that it might dishearten the General. He smothered his regret, and went on patiently and loyally for many months in the support of his latest experiment.

But while in the East the President had been experiment-

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\*Abraham Lincoln. A History. By Nicolay and Hay.





GRAND REVIEW OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC BY PRESIDENT  
General Joseph Hooker had now been in command of the army since



LINCOLN, AT FALMOUTH, VA., IN APRIL, 1863.

January 25, 1863, and had brought it into "splendid form."





ing with men, in the West a man had been painfully and silently making himself. His name was Ulysses S. Grant. The President had known nothing of his coming into the army. No political party had demanded him; indeed he had found it difficult at first, West Point graduate though he was and great as the need of trained service was, to secure the lowest appointment. He had taken what he could get, however, and from the start he had always done promptly the thing asked of him; more than that, he seemed always to be looking for things to do. It was these habits of his that brought him at last, in February of 1862, to the command of a movement in which Lincoln was deeply interested. This was the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, near the mouth of the Tennessee river. "Our success or failure at Fort Donelson is vastly important, and I beg you to put your soul in the effort," Lincoln wrote on February 16 to Halleck and Buell, then in command of Missouri and Tennessee. While the President was writing his letters, Grant, in front of Fort Donelson, was writing a note to the Confederate commander, who had asked for terms of capitulation: "No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately on your works." To the harrassed President at Washington these words must have been like a war-cry. He had spent the winter in a vain effort to inspire his supposed great generals with the very spirit breathed in the words and deeds of this unknown officer in the West.

Grant was now made a major-general, and entrusted with larger things. He always brought about results; but in spite of this, the President saw there was much opposition to him. For a long period he was in partial disgrace; but Lincoln must have noticed that while many other generals, whose achievements were less than Grant's, complained loudly and incessantly at reprimands—"snubbing," the President

called it—Grant said nothing. He stayed at his post doggedly, working his way inch by inch down the Mississippi.

Finally, in July, 1862, when General Halleck was called to Washington as General-in-Chief, Grant was put at the head of the armies of the West. There was much opposition to him. Men came to the President urging his removal. Lincoln shook his head. "I can't spare this man," he said; "he  *fights*." Many good people complained that he drank. "Can you tell me the kind of whisky?" asked Lincoln, "I should like to send a barrel to some of my other generals."

Nevertheless, the President grew anxious as the months went on. The opening of the Mississippi was, after the capture of Richmond, the most important task of the war. The wrong man there was only second in harm to the wrong man on the Potomac. Was Grant a "wrong man?" Little could be told from his telegrams and letters. "General Grant is a copious worker and fighter," said Lincoln later, "but he is a very meager writer or telegrapher." Finally, the President and the Secretary of War sent for a brilliant and loyal newspaper man, Charles A. Dana, and asked him to go to Grant's army, "to act as the eyes of the Government at the front," said the President. His real mission was to find out for them what kind of a man Grant was. Dana's letters soon showed Lincoln that Grant was a general that nothing could turn from a purpose. That was enough for the President. He let him alone, and watched. When, finally, Vicksburg was captured, he wrote him the following letter—it may be called his first recognition of the General:

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL GRANT.

*My Dear General:* I do not remember that you and I ever met personally. I write this now as a grateful acknowledgment for the almost inestimable service you have done the country. I wish to say a word further. When you first

reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I thought you should do what you finally did—march the troops across the neck, run the batteries with the transports, and thus go below; and I never had any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yazoo Pass expedition and the like could succeed. When you got below and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join General Banks, and when you turned northward, east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make the personal acknowledgment that you were right and I was wrong.

Yours very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

Grant was busy with new movements before this letter reached him; indeed, as soon as Vicksburg capitulated, he had begun getting ready to do something else. So occupied was he that he did not even take time to write his plans to the Government, asking Mr. Dana to do it for him.

Three and a half months later, after the Army of the Cumberland had been defeated at Chickamauga and had retired into Chattanooga, Grant was called to its relief. In a month the Confederates were driven from their positions on the ridges above him and East Tennessee was saved. There was no longer in Lincoln's mind a doubt that at last he had found the man he wanted. In the winter following, '63 and '64, after much discussion Congress revived the grade of lieutenant-general in the army purposely for Grant's benefit and on February 29, Lincoln nominated the general to the rank. He proceeded at once to Washington, where on March 9 the President and the General met for the first time. What did the President want him to do, Grant asked. Take Richmond was the President's reply, could he do it? If he had the troops Grant answered. The President promised them. Two months later Grant had re-organized the Army of the Potomac and had started at its head for the final march to Richmond.

## CHAPTER XXVII

### LINCOLN AND THE SOLDIERS

ANOTHER serious problem which the failure of the Peninsular campaign thrust on the President was where to get troops for a renewal of the war. When one recalls the eagerness with which men rushed into arms at the opening of the Civil war, it seems as if President Lincoln should never have had anxiety about filling the ranks of the army. For the first year, indeed, it gave him little concern. So promptly were the calls of 1861 answered that in the spring of 1862 an army of 637,126 men was in service. It was believed that with this force the war could be ended, and in April recruiting was stopped. It was a grave mistake. Before the end of May, the losses and discouragements of the Peninsular campaign made it necessary to re-enforce the Army of the Potomac. More men were needed, in fact, all along the line. Lincoln saw that, rather than an army of 600,000 men, he should have one of a million, and, July 2, he issued a call for 300,000 men for three years, and August 4 an order was issued for a draft of 300,000 more for nine months.

By the end of 1862, nearly one and a half million men had been enrolled in the army. Nevertheless, the "strength of the army" at that time was counted at but 918,000. What had become of the half million and more? Nearly 100,000 of them had been killed or totally disabled on the battlefield; 200,000 more, perhaps, had fallen out in the seasoning process. Passed by careless medical examiners, the first five-mile march, the first week of camp life, had brought out some physical weakness which made soldiering out of the

question. The rest of the loss was in three-months', six-months', or nine-months' men. They had enlisted for these short periods, and their terms up, they had left the army.

Moreover, the President had learned by this time that, even when the Secretary of War told him that the "strength of the army" was 918,000, it did not by any means follow that there were that number of men present for duty. Experience had taught him that about one-fourth of the reputed "strength" must be allowed for shrinkage; that is, for men in hospitals, men on furloughs, men who had deserted. He had learned that this enormous wastage went on steadily. It followed that, if the army was to be kept up to the million-men mark, recruiting must be as steady as, and in proportion to, the shrinkage.

Recruiting, so easy at the beginning of the war, had become by 1862 quite a different matter. Patriotism, love of adventure, excitement could no longer be counted on to fill the ranks. It was plain to the President that hereafter, if he was to have the men he needed, military service must be compulsory. Nothing could have been devised which would have created a louder uproar in the North than the suggestion of a draft. All through the winter of 1862-63, Congress wrangled over the bill ordering it, much of the press in the meantime denouncing it as "despotic" and "contrary to American institutions." The bill passed, however, and the President signed it in March, 1863. At once there was put into operation a huge new military machine, the Bureau of the Provost-Marshall-General, which had for its business the enrollment of all the men in the United States whom the new law considered capable of bearing arms and the drafting enough of them to fill up the quota assigned to each State. This bureau was also to look after deserters.

A whole series of new problems was thrust on the President when the Bureau of the Provost-Marshall-General came

into being. The quotas assigned the States led to endless disputes between the governors and the War Department; the drafts caused riots; an inferior kind of soldier was obtained by drafting, and deserters increased. Lincoln shirked none of these new cares. He was determined that the efficiency of the war engine should be kept up, and nobody in the Government studied more closely how this was to be done, or insisted more vigorously on the full execution of the law. In assigning the quotas to the different States, certain credits were made of men who had enlisted previously. Many disputes arose over the credits and assignments, some of them most perplexing. Ultimately most of these reached the President. The draft bore heavily on districts where the percentage of death among the first volunteers had been large, and often urgent pleas were made to the President to release a city or county from the quota assigned. The late Joseph Medill, the editor of the Chicago "Tribune," once told me how he and certain leading citizens of Chicago went to Lincoln to ask that the quota of Cook County be reduced.

"In 1864, when the call for extra troops came, Chicago revolted," said Mr. Medill. "She had already sent 22,000 men up to that time, and was drained. When the new call came, there were no young men to go—no aliens except what were bought. The citizens held a mass meeting, and appointed three persons, of whom I was one, to go to Washington and ask Stanton to give Cook County a new enrollment. I begged off; but the committee insisted, so I went. On reaching Washington, we went to Stanton with our statement. He refused entirely to give us the desired aid. Then we went to Lincoln. 'I cannot do it,' he said, 'but I will go with you to Stanton and hear the arguments of both sides.' So we all went over to the War Department together. Stanton and General Frye were there, and they, of course, contended that the quota should not be changed. The argument went on for some time, and finally was referred to Lin-

coln, who had been sitting silently listening. I shall never forget how he suddenly lifted his head and turned on us a black and frowning face.

" 'Gentlemen,' he said, in a voice full of bitterness, 'after Boston, Chicago has been the chief instrument in bringing this war on the country. The Northwest has opposed the South as New England has opposed the South. It is you who are largely responsible for making blood flow as it has. You called for war until we had it. You called for Emancipation, and I have given it to you. Whatever you have asked you have had. Now you come here begging to be let off from the call for men which I have made to carry out the war you have demanded. You ought to be ashamed of yourselves. I have a right to expect better things of you. Go home, and raise your 6,000 extra men. And you, Medill, you are acting like a coward. You and your 'Tribune' have had more influence than any paper in the Northwest in making this war. You can influence great masses, and yet you cry to be spared at a moment when your cause is suffering. Go home and send us those men.'

" I couldn't say anything. It was the first time I ever was whipped, and I didn't have an answer. We all got up and went out, and when the door closed, one of my colleagues said: 'Well, gentlemen, the old man is right. We ought to be ashamed of ourselves. Let us never say anything about this, but go home and raise the men.' And we did—6,000 men—making 28,000 in the war from a city of 156,000. But there might have been crape on every door almost in Chicago, for every family had lost a son or a husband. I lost two brothers. It was hard for the mothers.'\*"

Severe as Lincoln could be with any disposition to shirk what he considered a just and necessary demand, strenuously as he insisted that the ranks must be kept full, he never came to regard the army as a mere machine, never forgot the individual men who made it up. Indeed, he was the one man

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\* These notes were made immediately after an interview given me by Mr. Medill in June, 1895. They were to be corrected before publication, but Mr. Medill's death occurred before they were in type, so that the account was never seen by him.

in the Government who, from first to last, was big enough to use both his head and his heart. From the outset, he was the personal friend of every soldier he sent to the front, and somehow every man seemed to know it. No doubt, it was on Lincoln's visits to the camps around Washington, in the early days of the war, that the body of the soldiers got this idea. They never forgot his friendly hand-clasp, his hearty "God bless you," his remonstrance against the youth of some fifteen-year-old boy masquerading as twenty, his jocular remarks about the height of some soldier towering above his own six feet four. When, later, he visited the Army of the Potomac on the Rappahannock and at Antietam, these impressions of his interest in the personal welfare of the soldiers were renewed. He walked down the long lines of tents or huts, noting the attempts at decoration, the housekeeping conveniences, replying by smiles and nods and sometimes with words to the greetings, rough and hearty, which he received. He inquired into every phase of camp life, and the men knew it, and said to one another, "He cares for us; he makes us fight, but he cares."

Reports of scores of cases where he interfered personally to secure some favor or right for a soldier found their way to the army and gave solid foundation to this impression that he was the soldier's friend. From the time of the arrival of the first troops in Washington, in April, 1861, the town was full of men, all of them wanting to see the President. At first they were gay and curious merely, their requests trivial; but later, when the army had settled down to steady fighting, and Bull Run and the Peninsula and Antietam and Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville had cut and scarred and aged it, the soldiers who haunted Washington were changed. They stumped about on crutches. They sat pale and thin in the parks, empty sleeves pinned to their breasts; they came to the White House begging for furloughs to see



dying parents, for release to support a suffering family. No man will ever know how many of these soldiers Abraham Lincoln helped. Little cards are constantly turning up in different parts of the country, treasured by private soldiers, on which he had written some brief note to a proper authority, intended to help a man out of a difficulty. Here is one:

*Sec. of War please see  
this Pittsburgh boy.  
He is very young, and  
I shall be satisfied with  
whatever you do with him.  
Aug. 21, 1863. A. Lincoln*

SEC. OF WAR, please see this Pittsburgh boy. He is very young, and I shall be satisfied with whatever you do with him.  
A. LINCOLN.  
Aug. 21, 1863.

The "Pittsburgh boy" had enlisted at seventeen. He had been ill with a long fever. He wanted a furlough, and with a curious trust that anything could be done if he could only get to the President, he had slipped into the White House, and by chance met Lincoln, who listened to his story and gave him this note.

Many applications reached Lincoln as he passed to and from the White House and the War Department. One day as he crossed the park he was stopped by a negro who told him a pitiful story. The President wrote him out a check for five dollars. "Pay to colored man with one leg," it read. This check is now in the collection of H. H. Officee of Denver, Colorado.

A pleasing scene between Lincoln and a soldier once fell under the eye of Mr. A. W. Swan of Albuquerque, New

Mexico, on this same path between the White House and the War Department :

“ In company with a gentleman, I was on the way to the War Department one day. Our way led through a small park between the White House and the War Department building. As we entered this park we noticed Mr. Lincoln just ahead of us, and meeting him a private soldier who was evidently in a violent passion, as he was swearing in a high key, cursing the Government from the President down. Mr. Lincoln paused as he met the irate soldier, and asked him what was the matter. ‘ Matter enough,’ was the reply. ‘ I want my money. I have been discharged here, and can’t get my pay.’ Mr. Lincoln asked if he had his papers, saying that he used to practice law in a small way and possibly could help him. My friend and I stepped behind some convenient shrubbery where we could watch the result. Mr. Lincoln took the papers from the hands of the crippled soldier, and sat down with him at the foot of a convenient tree, where he examined them carefully, and writing a line on the back told the soldier to take them to Mr. Potts, Chief Clerk of the War Department, who would doubtless attend to the matter at once. After Mr. Lincoln had left the soldier, we stepped out and asked him if he knew whom he had been talking with. ‘ Some ugly old fellow who pretends to be a lawyer,’ was the reply. My companion asked to see the papers, and on their being handed to him, pointed to the indorsement they had received. This indorsement read: ‘ Mr. Potts, attend to this man’s case at once and see that he gets his pay. A. L.’ The initials were too familiar with men in position to know them to be ignored. We went with the soldier, who had just returned from Libby Prison and had been given a hospital certificate for discharge, to see Mr. Potts, and before the Paymaster’s office was closed for the day, he had received his discharge and check for the money due him, he in the meantime not knowing whether to be the more pleased or sorry to think he had cursed ‘ Abe Lincoln ’ to his face.”

It was not alone the soldier to whom the President listened; it was also to his wife, his mother, his daughter.

"I remember one morning," says Mr. A. B. Chandler, "his coming into my office with a distressed expression on his face and saying to Major Eckert, 'Eckert, who is that woman crying out in the hall? What is the matter with her?' Eckert said he did not know, but would go and find out. He came back soon, and said that it was a woman who had come a long distance expecting to go down to the army to see her husband, that she had some very important matters to consult him about. An order had gone out a short time before to allow no women in the army, except in special cases. She was bitterly disappointed, and was crying over it. Mr. Lincoln sat moodily for a moment after hearing this story, and suddenly looking up, said, 'Let's send her down. You write the order, Major.' Major Eckert hesitated a moment, and said, 'Would it not be better for Colonel Hardie to write the order?' 'Yes,' said Mr. Lincoln, 'that is better; let Hardie write it.' The major went out, and soon returned, saying, 'Mr. President, would it not be better in this case to let the woman's husband come to Washington?' Mr. Lincoln's face lighted up with pleasure. 'Yes, yes,' he said; 'let's bring him up.' The order was written, and the woman was told that her husband would come to Washington. This done, her sorrows seemed lifted from Mr. Lincoln's heart, and he sat down to his yellow tissue telegrams with a serene face."

The futility of trying to help all the soldiers who found their way to him must have come often to Lincoln's mind. "Now, my man, go away, *go away*," General Fry overheard him say one day to a soldier who was pleading for the President's interference in his behalf; "I cannot meddle in your case. I could as easily bail out the Potomac with a teaspoon as attend to all the details of the army."

The President's relations with individual soldiers were, of course, transient. Washington was for the great body of soldiers, whatever their condition, only a half-way house between North and South. The only body of soldiers with which the President had long association was Company K

of the 150th Pennsylvania Volunteers. This company, raised in Crawford County, in northwestern Pennsylvania, reached Washington in the first days of September, 1862. September 6, Captain D. V. Derickson of Meadville, Pennsylvania, who was in command of the company, received orders to march his men to the Soldiers' Home, to act there as a guard to the President, who was occupying a cottage in the grounds.

"The next morning after our arrival," says Mr. Derickson, "the President sent a messenger to my quarters, stating that he would like to see the captain of the guard at his residence. I immediately reported. After an informal introduction and handshaking, he asked me if I would have any objection to riding with him to the city. I replied that it would give me much pleasure to do so, when he invited me to take a seat in the carriage. On our way to the city, he made numerous inquiries, as to my name, where I came from, what regiment I belonged to, etc. . . .

"When we entered the city, Mr. Lincoln said he would call at General Halleck's headquarters and get what news had been received from the army during the night. I informed him that General Cullum, chief aid to General Halleck, was raised in Meadville and that I knew him when I was a boy. He replied, 'Then we must see both the gentlemen.' When the carriage stopped, he requested me to remain seated, and said he would bring the gentlemen down to see me, the office being on the second floor. In a short time the President came down, followed by the other gentlemen. When he introduced them to me, General Cullum recognized and seemed pleased to see me. In General Halleck I thought I discovered a kind of quizzical look, as much as to say, 'Isn't this rather a big joke to ask the Commander-in-Chief of the Army down to the street to be introduced to a country captain?' . . .

"Supposing that the invitation to ride to the city with the President was as much to give him an opportunity to look over and interview the new captain as for any other purpose, I did not report the next morning. During the day I was in-

formed that it was the desire of the President that I should breakfast with him and accompany him to the White House every morning, and return with him in the evening. This duty I entered upon with much pleasure, and was on hand in good time next morning; and I continued to perform this duty until we moved to the White House in November. It was Mr. Lincoln's custom, on account of the pressure of business, to breakfast before the other members of the family were up; and I usually entered his room at half-past six or seven o'clock in the morning, where I often found him reading the Bible or some work on the art of war. On my entering, he would read aloud and offer comments of his own as he read.

"I usually went down to the city at four o'clock and returned with the President at five. He often carried a small portfolio containing papers relating to the business of the day, and spent many hours on them in the evening. . . . I found Mr. Lincoln to be one of the most kind-hearted and pleasant gentlemen that I had ever met. He never spoke unkindly of any one, and always spoke of the rebels as 'those Southern gentlemen.' "\*"

This kindly relation begun with the captain, the President extended to every man of his company. It was their pride that he knew every one of them by name. "He always called me Joe," I heard a veteran of the guard say, a quaver in his voice. He never passed the men on duty without acknowledging their salute, and often visited their camp. Once in passing when the men were at mess, he called out, "That coffee smells good, boys; give me a cup." And on another occasion he asked for a plate of beans, and sat down on a camp-stool and ate them. Mrs. Lincoln frequently visited the company with the President, and many and many a gift to the White House larder from enthusiastic supporters of the Administration was sent to the boys—now a barrel of apple butter, now a quarter of beef. On holidays, Mrs. Lin-

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\* Major D. V. Derickson in the Centennial Edition of the Meadville "Tribune-Republican."

coln made it a rule to provide Company K with a turkey dinner.

Late in the fall of 1862, an attempt was made to depose the company. Every member of the guard now living can quote verbatim the note which the President wrote settling the matter:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON,  
*November 1, 1862.*

To Whom it May Concern: Captain Derickson, with his company, has been for some time keeping guard at my residence, now at the Soldiers' Retreat. He and his company are very agreeable to me, and while it is deemed proper for any guard to remain, none would be more satisfactory than Captain Derickson and his company. A. LINCOLN.

The welfare of the men, their troubles, escapades, amusements, were treated by the President as a kind of family matter. He never forgot to ask after the sick, often secured a pass or a furlough for some one, and took genuine delight in the camp fun.

"While we were in camp at the Soldiers' Home in the fall of 1862," says Mr. C. M. Derickson of Mercer, Pennsylvania, "the boys indulged in various kinds of amusement. I think it was the Kepler boys who introduced the trained elephant. Two men of about the same size, both in a stooped position, were placed one ahead of the other. An army blanket was then thrown over them so that it came about to their knees, and a trunk, improvised by wrapping a piece of a blanket around a small elastic piece of wood, was placed in the hands of the front man. Here you have your elephant. Ours was taught to get down on his knees, stand on one leg, and do various other tricks. While the elephant was going through his exercises one evening, the President strolled into camp. He was very much amused at the wonderful feats the elephant could perform, and a few evenings after he called again and brought a friend with him,

and asked the captain if he would not have the elephant brought out again, as he would like to have his friend see him perform. Of course it was done, to the great amusement of both the President and his friend."

No doubt much of the President's interest in Company K was due to his son Tad. The boy was a great favorite with the men, and probably carried to his father many a tale of the camp. He considered himself, in fact, no unimportant part of the organization, for he wore a uniform, carried a lieutenant's commission, often drilled with the men or rode on his pony at their head in reviews, and much of the time messed with them. One of the odd duties which devolved upon Company K was looking after Tad's goats. These animals have been given a place in history by Lincoln himself in telegrams to Mrs. Lincoln, duly filed in the records of the War Department: "Tell Tad the goats and father are very well, especially the goats," he wired one day; and again. "All well, including Tad's pony and the goats." They were privileged beings on the White House lawn, and were looked after by the company because of Tad's affection for them. They met an untimely end, being burned to death in a fire, which destroyed the White House stables, February 10, 1864.

The two most harrowing consequences of war, the havoc of the battlefield and the disease of camp life, from the beginning to the end of the Civil War, centered in Washington. It was the point to which every man disabled in the Army of the Potomac must come sooner or later for care or to be transferred to the North. After battles, the city seemed turned into one great hospital. For days then a long, straggling train of mutilated men poured in. They came on flat cars or open transports, piled so close together that no attendant could pass between them; protected occasionally from the cold by a blanket which had escaped with

its owner, or from the sun by green boughs placed in their hands or laid over their faces. When Washington was reached, all that could be done was to lay them in long rows on the wharfs or platforms until ambulances could carry them to the hospitals. It is when one considers the numbers of wounded in the great Virginia battles that he realizes the length and awfulness of the streams which flowed into Washington. At Fredericksburg they numbered 9,600; at Chancellorsville, 9,762; in the Wilderness, 12,037; at Spottsylvania, 13,416.

In the early days of the war, Washington was so poorly supplied with hospitals that after the first battle of Bull Run churches, dwellings, and government buildings were seized to place the wounded in, and there were so few nurses that the people of Washington had to be called upon. Very rapidly little settlements of board barracks or of white army tents multiplied in the open spaces in and around the town, quarters for the sick and wounded. Nurses poured in from the North. Organizations for relief multiplied. By the end of 1862, Mr. Lincoln could scarcely drive or walk in any direction about Washington without passing a hospital. Even in going to his summer cottage, at the Soldiers' Home, the President did not escape the sight of the wounded. The rolling hillside was dotted with white hospital tents during the entire war. In many places the tents were placed close to the road, so as to get more air, the grounds being more thickly wooded than they are now. As he drove home, after a harrowing day in the White House, the President frequently looked from his carriage upon the very beds of wounded soldiers.

Every member of the Government, whether he would or not, was obliged to give some attention to this side of the war. It became a regular feature of a congressman's life in those days to spend every Saturday or Sunday afternoon



in the hospitals, visiting the wounded men from his district. He wrote their letters, brought them news, saw to their wants. If he had not done it, his constituents would have disposed of him in short order.

In 1862, Mr. Lincoln called Dr. D. Willard Bliss from the field to Washington, to aid in organizing a more perfect system of general hospitals in and about the city. One result of Dr. Bliss's coming was the building of Armory Square Hospital, one of the best conducted institutions of the Civil War. Lincoln gave his personal attention to the building of Armory Square, and for a long time met Dr. Bliss twice each week to consider the ingenious appliances which the latter devised to aid in caring for and treating the wounded. Some of these appliances the President paid for out of his own pocket. Not infrequently he had some suggestion to make for the comfort of the place. It was due to him that Armory Square became a bower of vine and bloom in the summer. "Why don't you plant flower seeds?" he asked Dr. Bliss one day. The doctor said he would if he had seeds. "I'll order them for you from the Agricultural Department," replied the President, and sure enough he did; and thereafter, all through the season, each of the long barracks had its own flower bed and vines.

The President himself visited the hospitals as often as he could, visits never forgotten by the men to whom he spoke as he passed up and down the wards, shaking hands here, giving a cheering word there, making jocular comments everywhere. There are men still living who tell of a little scene they witnessed at Armory Square in 1863. A soldier of the 140th Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, had been wounded in the shoulder at the battle of Chancellorsville and taken to Washington. One day, as he was becoming convalescent, a whisper ran down the long row of cots that the President was in the building and would soon pass

by. Instantly every boy in blue who was able arose, stood erect, hands to the side, ready to salute his Commander-in-Chief. The Pennsylvanian stood six feet seven inches in his stockings. Lincoln was six feet four. As the President approached this giant towering above him, he stopped in amazement, and casting his eyes from head to foot and from foot to head, as if contemplating the immense distance from one extremity to the other, he stood for a moment speechless. At length, extending his hand, he exclaimed, "Hello, comrade, do you know when your feet get cold?"

Lincoln rarely forgot a patient whom he saw a second time, and to stubborn cases that remained from month to month he gave particular attention. There was in Armory Square Hospital for a long time a boy known as "little Johnnie." He was hopelessly crippled—doomed to death, but cheerful, and a general favorite. Lincoln never failed to stop at "little Johnnie's" cot when he went to Armory Square, and he frequently sent him fruit and flowers and a friendly message through Mrs. Lincoln.

Of all the incidents told of Lincoln's hospital visits, there is nothing more characteristic, better worth preservation, than the one following, preserved by Dr. Jerome Walker of Brooklyn:

"Just one week before his assassination, President Lincoln visited the Army of the Potomac, at City Point, Virginia, and carefully examined the hospital arrangements of the Ninth, Sixth, Fifth, Second, and Sixteenth Corps hospitals and of the Engineer Corps, there stationed. At that time I was an agent of the United States Sanitary Commission attached to the Ninth Corps Hospital. Though a boy of nineteen years, to me was assigned the duty of escorting the President through our department of the hospital system. The reader can imagine the pride with which I fulfilled the duty, and as we went from tent to tent I could not but note his gentleness, his friendly greetings to the sick and

wounded, his quiet humor as he drew comparisons between himself and the very tall and very short men with whom he came in contact, and his genuine interest in the welfare of the soldiers.

"Finally, after visiting the wards occupied by our invalid and convalescing soldiers, we came to three wards occupied by sick and wounded Southern prisoners. With a feeling of patriotic duty, I said, 'Mr. President, you won't want to go in there; they are only *rebels*.' I will never forget how he stopped and gently laid his large hand upon my shoulder and quietly answered, 'You mean *Confederates*.' And I have meant Confederates ever since.

"There was nothing left for me to do after the President's remark but to go with him through these three wards; and I could not see but that he was just as kind, his handshakings just as hearty, his interest just as real for the welfare of the men, as when he was among our own soldiers.

"As we returned to headquarters, the President urged upon me the importance of caring for them as faithfully as I should for our own sick and wounded. When I visited next day these three wards, the Southern officers and soldiers were full of praise for 'Abe' Lincoln, as they called him, and when a week afterwards the news came of the assassination, there was no truer sorrow nor greater indignation anywhere than was shown by these same Confederates."

One great cause of sorrow to Lincoln throughout the war was the necessity of punishing soldiers. Not only did the men commit all the crimes common to society, like robbery and murder; they were guilty of others peculiar to military organization and war, such as desertion, sleeping on post, disobedience to orders, bounty jumping, giving information to the enemy. As the army grew larger, desertion became so common and so disastrous to efficiency that it had to be treated with great severity. Lincoln seems to have had his attention first called to it seriously when he visited McClellan's army in July, 1862, for he wrote to McClellan, July 13:

*My Dear Sir:* I am told that over 160,000 men have gone into your army on the Peninsula. When I was with you the other day we made out 86,500 remaining, leaving 73,500 to be accounted for. I believe 23,500 will cover all the killed, wounded, and missing in all your battles and skirmishes, leaving 50,000 who have left otherwise. Not more than 5,000 of these have died, leaving 45,000 of your army still alive and not with it. I believe half or two-thirds of them are fit for duty to-day. Have you any more perfect knowledge of this than I have? If I am right, and you had these men with you, you could go into Richmond in the next three days. How can they be got to you, and how can they be prevented from getting away in such numbers for the future?

A. LINCOLN.

About the same time, Buell reported 14,000 absentees from his army. In the winter of 1862 and 1863 it grew worse. General Hooker says that when he took charge of the Army of the Potomac in January, 1863, the desertions were at the rate of 200 a day. "I caused a return to be made of the absentees of the army," he continues, "and found the number to be 2,922 commissioned officers and 81,964 non-commissioned officers and privates. These were scattered all over the country, and the majority were absent from causes unknown."

When the Bureau of the Provost-Marshal was established in March, 1863, finding and punishing deserters became one of its duties. Much of the difficulty was due to the methods of recruiting. To stimulate volunteering for long periods, the Government began in 1861 to offer bounties. The bounties offered by the Government were never large, however, and were paid in installments, so that no great evil resulted from them. But later, when the quota of each State and district was fixed, and the draft instituted, State and local bounties were added to those of the Government. In some places the bounties offered aggregated \$1,500, a large part

of which was paid on enlistment. Immediately a new class of military criminals sprang up, "bounty-jumpers," men who enlisted, drew the bounty, deserted, and reënlisted at some other point.

The law allowed men who had been drafted to send substitutes, and a new class of speculators, known as "substitute-brokers," appeared. They did a thriving business in procuring substitutes for drafted men who, for one reason or another, did not want to go into the war. These recruits were frequently of a very poor class, and a large percentage of them took the first chance to desert. It is said that, out of 625 recruits sent to re-enforce one regiment, over 40 per cent. deserted on the way. In the general report of the Provost-Marshall-General made at the close of the war, the aggregate deserting was given at 201,397.

The result of all this was that the severest penalties were enforced for desertion. The President never ceased to abhor the death penalty for this offense. While he had as little sympathy as Stanton himself with the frauds practised and never commuted the sentence of a bounty-jumper, as far as I have been able to discover, over the great number of sentences he hesitated. He seemed to see what others ignored, the causes which were behind. Many and many a man deserted in the winter of 1862-1863 because of the Emancipation Proclamation. He did not believe the President had the right to issue it, and he refused to fight. Lincoln knew, too, that the "copperhead" agitation in the North reached the army, and that hundreds of men were being urged by parents and friends hostile to the Administration to desert. His indignation never was against the boy who yielded to this influence.

"Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts," he said, "while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? This is none the less injurious

when effected by getting a father, or brother, or friend into a public meeting, and there working upon his feelings until he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked administration of a contemptible government, too weak to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that in such a case, to silence the agitator, and save the boy, is not only constitutional, but withal a great mercy."

Another cause he never forgot was that mortal homesickness which so often ate the very heart out of a boy away from home for the first time. It filled many a hospital cot in the Civil War, and shriveled the nerves and sapped the courage until men forgot everything but home, and fled. Lincoln seemed to see in a flash the whole army history of these cases: the boy enlisting in the thrill of perhaps his first great passion; his triumphal march to the field; the long, hard months of seasoning; the deadly longing for home overtaking him; a chance to desert taken; the capture. He could not condemn such a boy to death.

The time Lincoln gave to listening to the intercessions of friends in behalf of condemned deserters, the extent of his clemency, is graphically shown in the manuscript records of the War Department which refer to prisoners of war. Scores of telegrams are filed there, written out by Lincoln himself, inquiring into the reasons for an execution or suspending it entirely. These telegrams, which have never been published, furnish the documentary proof, if any is wanted, of the man's great heart, his entire willingness to give himself infinite trouble to prevent an injustice or to soften a sorrow. "Suspend execution and forward record for examination," was his usual formula for telegrams of this nature. The record would be sent, but after it was in his hands he would defer its examination from week to week. Often he telegraphed, "Suspend execution of death sentence until

further orders." "But that does not pardon my boy," said a father to him once.

"My dear man," said the President, laying his hand on his shoulder, "do you suppose *I* will ever give orders for your boy's execution?"

In sending these orders for suspension of execution, the President frequently went himself personally to the telegraph office and watched the operator send them, so afraid was he that they might not be forwarded in time. To dozens of the orders sent over from the White House by a messenger is attached a little note signed by Mr. Lincoln, or by one of his secretaries, and directed to Major Eckert, the chief of the office: "Major Eckert, please send above despatch," or "Will you please hurry off the above? To-morrow is the day of execution." Not infrequently he repeated a telegram or sent a trailer after it inquiring, "Did you receive my despatch suspending sentence of ——?"

Difficulty in tracing a prisoner or in identifying him sometimes arose. The President only took additional pains. The following telegrams are to the point:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
WASHINGTON, D. C., *November 20, 1863.*

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,  
ARMY OF POTOMAC.

If there is a man by the name of K—— under sentence to be shot, please suspend execution till further order, and send record.

A. LINCOLN.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
WASHINGTON, D. C., *November 20, 1863.*

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,  
ARMY OF POTOMAC.

An intelligent woman in deep distress called this morning, saying her husband, a lieutenant in the Army of the Poto-

mac, was to be shot next Monday for desertion, and putting a letter in my hand, upon which I relied for particulars, she left without mentioning a name or other particular by which to identify the case. On opening the letter I found it equally vague, having nothing to identify it, except her own signature, which seems to be Mrs. A—— S. K——. I could not again find her. If you have a case which you think is probably the one intended, please apply my despatch of this morning to it.

A. LINCOLN.

In another case, where the whereabouts of a man who had been condemned were unknown, Lincoln telegraphed himself to four different military commanders, ordering suspension of the man's sentence.

The execution of very young soldiers was always hateful to him. "I am unwilling for any boy under eighteen to be shot," he telegraphed Meade in reference to one prisoner. And in suspending another sentence he gave as an excuse, "His mother says he is but seventeen." This boy he afterward pardoned "on account of his tender age."

If a reason for pardoning was not evident, he was willing to see if one could not be found:

S—— W——, private in —— ——, writes that he is to be shot for desertion on the 6th instant. His own story is rather a bad one, and yet he tells it so frankly, that I am somewhat interested in him. Has he been a good soldier except the desertion? About how old is he?

A. LINCOLN.

Some of the deserters came very close to his own life. The son of more than one old friend was condemned for a military offense in the war, and in the telegrams is recorded Lincoln's treatment of these trying cases. In one of them the boy had enlisted in the Southern Army and had been taken a prisoner. "Please send him to me by an officer," the President telegraphed the military commander having him in charge. Four days later he telegraphed to the boy's father:



Your son —— has just left me with my order to the Secretary of War to administer to him the oath of allegiance, discharge him and send him to you.

In another case, where the son of a friend was under trial for desertion, Lincoln kept himself informed of the trial, telegraphing to the general in charge, "He is the son of so close a friend that I must not let him be executed."

And yet, in spite of the evident reluctance which every telegram shows to allowing the execution of a death sentence, there are many which prove that, unless he had what he considered a good reason for suspending a sentence, he would not do it. The following telegrams are illustrative:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
WASHINGTON, D. C., *November 23, 1863.*

E. P. EVANS,

WEST UNION, ADAMS COUNTY, OHIO.

Yours to Governor Chase in behalf of J—— A. W—— is before me. Can there be a worse case than to desert, and with letters persuading others to desert? I cannot interpose without a better showing than you make. When did he desert? When did he write the letters? A. LINCOLN.

In this case sentence was later suspended "until further orders."

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
WASHINGTON, D. C., *April 21, 1864.*

MAJOR-GENERAL DIX,

NEW YORK.

Yesterday I was induced to telegraph the officer in military command at Fort Warren, Boston Harbor, Massachusetts, suspending the execution of C—— C——, to be executed to-morrow for desertion. Just now, on reading your order in the case, I telegraphed the same order withdrawing

the suspension, and leaving the case entirely with you. The man's friends are pressing me, but I refer them to you, intending to take no further action myself.

A. LINCOLN.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
WASHINGTON, CITY, *April 25, 1864.*

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,  
ARMY OF POTOMAC.

A Mr. Corby brought you a note from me at the foot of a petition, I believe, in the case of D——, to be executed to-day. The record has been examined here, and it shows too strong a case for a pardon or commutation, unless there is something in the poor man's favor outside of the record, which you on the ground may know, but I do not. My note to you only means that if you know of any such thing rendering a suspension of the execution proper, on your own judgment, you are at liberty to suspend it. Otherwise I do not interfere.

A. LINCOLN.

It is curious to note how the President found time to attend to these cases even on the most anxious days of his administration. On the very day on which he telegraphed to James G. Blaine in response to the latter's announcement that Maine had gone for the Union, "On behalf of the Union, thanks to Maine. Thanks to you personally for sending the news," he sent two telegrams suspending sentences. Such telegrams were sent on days of great battles, in the midst of victory, in the despair of defeat. Whatever he was doing, the fate of the sentenced soldier was on his heart. On Friday, which was usually chosen as execution day, he often was heard to say, "They are shooting a boy at —— to-day. I hope I have not done wrong to allow it." In spite of his frequent interference, there were 267 men executed by the United States military authorities during the Civil War. Of these, 141 were executed for desertion, and

eight for desertion coupled with some other crime, such as murder. After those for desertion, the largest number of executions were for murder, sixty-seven in all. As to the manner of the executions, one hundred and eighty-seven were shot, seventy-nine hung, and in one case the offender was sent out of the world by some unknown way.

Incidents and documents like those already given, showing the care and the sympathy President Lincoln felt for the common soldier, might be multiplied indefinitely. Nothing that concerned the life of the men in the line was foreign to him. The man might have shown cowardice. The President only said, "I never felt sure but I might drop my gun and run away if I found myself in line of battle." The man might be poor and friendless. "If he has no friends, I'll be his friend," Lincoln said. The man might have deserted. "Suspend execution, send me his record," was the President's order. He was not only the Commander-in-chief of all the armies of the United States, he was the father of the army, and never did a man better deserve a title than did he the one the soldiers gave him—"Father Abraham."

## CHAPTER XXVIII

### LINCOLN'S RE-ELECTION IN 1864

IT WAS not until the fall of 1863 that Abraham Lincoln was able to point to any substantial results from the long months of hard thought and cautious experiment he had given to the Civil War. By that time he did have something to show. The borders of the Confederacy had been pressed back and shut in by an impregnable wall of ships and men. Not only were the borders of the Confederacy narrowed; the territory had been cut in two by the opening of the Mississippi, which, in Lincoln's expressive phrase, now ran "unvexed to the sea." He had a war machine at last which kept the ranks of the army full. He had found a commander-in-chief in Grant; and, not less important, he had found, simultaneously with Grant, also Sherman, McPherson, and Thomas, as well as the proper places for the men with whom he had tried such costly experiments—for Burnside and Hooker. He had his first effective results, too, from emancipation, that policy which he had inaugurated with such foreboding. Fully 100,000 former slaves were now in the United States service, and they had proved beyond question their value as soldiers. More than this, it was evident that some form of emancipation would soon be adopted by the former slave States of Tennessee, Arkansas, Maryland, and Missouri.

At every point, in short, the policy which Lincoln had set in motion with painful foresight and labor was working as he had believed it would work, but it was working slowly. He saw that many months of struggle and blood and pa-

tience were needed to complete his task; many months—and in less than a year there would be a presidential election, and he might be obliged to leave his task unfinished. He did not hesitate to say frankly that he wanted the opportunity to finish it. Among the leaders of the Republican party were a few conservatives who, in the fall of 1863, supported Lincoln in his desire for a second term; but there were more who doubted his ability and who were secretly looking for an abler man. At the same time, a strong and open opposition to his re-election had developed in the radical wing of the party.

The real cause of this opposition was Lincoln's unswervable purpose to use emancipation purely as a military measure. The earliest active form this opposition took was probably under the direction of Horace Greeley. In the spring of 1863, Mr. Greeley had become thoroughly disheartened by the slow progress of the war and the meager results of the Emancipation Proclamation. He was looking in every direction for some one to replace Lincoln, and eventually he settled on General Rosecrans, who at that moment was the most successful general before the country. Greeley, after consulting with a number of Republican leaders, decided that some one should go to Rosecrans and sound him. James R. Gilmore ("Edmund Kirke") was chosen for this mission. Mr. Gilmore recounts, in his "Personal Recollections of Abraham Lincoln," as an evidence of the extent of the discontent with Lincoln, that when he started on his mission, Mr. Greeley gave him letters to Rosecrans from about all the more prominent Republican leaders except Roscoe Conkling, Charles Sumner, and Henry Wilson.

Mr. Greeley's idea was, as he instructed Mr. Gilmore, to find out, first, if Rosecrans was "sound on the goose" (political slang for sound on the anti-slavery policy), and, secondly, if he would consider the nomination to the presi-

dency. If Mr. Gilmore found Rosecrans satisfactory, Greeley declared that he would force Lincoln to resign, put Hamlin in his place, and compel the latter to give Rosecrans the command of the whole army. His idea was, no doubt, that the war would then be finished promptly and Rosecrans would naturally be the candidate in 1864.

Mr. Gilmore went on his mission. Rosecrans seemed to him to fulfil Mr. Greeley's ideas, and finally he laid the case before him. The General replied very promptly: "My place is here. The country gave me my education, and so has a right to my military services." He also declared that Mr. Greeley was wrong in his estimate of Lincoln and that time would show it.

Lincoln knew thoroughly the feeling of the radicals at this time; he knew the danger there was to his hopes of a second term in opposing them; but he could be neither persuaded nor frightened into modifying his policy. The most conspicuous example of his firmness was in the case of the Missouri radicals.

The radical party in Missouri was composed of men of great intelligence and perfect loyalty; but they were men of the Frémont type, idealists, incapable of compromise and impatient of caution. They had been in constant conflict with the conservatives of the State since the breaking out of the war, and by the spring of 1863, the rupture had become almost a national affair. Both sides claimed to be Union men and to believe in emancipation; but while the conservatives believed in gradual emancipation, the radicals demanded that it be immediate. The fight became so bitter that, as Lincoln said to one of the radicals who came to him early in 1863, begging his interference: "Either party would rather see the defeat of their adversary than that of Jefferson Davis. You ought to have your heads knocked together," he added in his exasperation.

Finally, he determined that he must break up somehow what he called their "pestilent, factional quarrel," and sent a new military governor, General J. M. Schofield, to Missouri. The advice he gave him was this:

Let your military measures be strong enough to repel the invader and keep the peace, and not so strong as to unnecessarily harass and persecute the people. It is a difficult rôle, and so much greater will be the honor if you perform it well. If both factions, or neither, shall abuse you, you will probably be about right. Beware of being assailed by one and praised by the other.

General Schofield was not able to live up to Lincoln's counsel. He incurred the suspicion and dislike of the radicals, and they determined that he must be removed. September 1, a great convention was held, and a committee of seventy persons was appointed to go to Washington and demand from Mr. Lincoln a redress of grievances. The convention of course had the sympathy of the radical anti-slavery element of the whole North in its undertaking, and when the Committee of Seventy started for Washington they received an ovation in almost every State through which they passed. Arrived in Washington, they became the centre of the town's interest, and a great reception was given them in Union League Hall, at which eminent men denounced the conservatives of Missouri and demanded immediate emancipation.

Mr. Lincoln did not receive the Committee at once but sent for their Secretary, Dr. Emil Preetorius, a leading German Radical. Mr. Preetorius says:

"In response to a request from the President himself I immediately, in company with Senator 'Jim' Lane, called at the White House. Mr. Lane soon excused himself and left me alone with the President. I had a long talk with him,

explaining the situation in Missouri, as we Radicals viewed it, and stating just why we had come to Washington. We Germans had not felt so kindly toward Mr. Lincoln since he had set aside Frémont's proclamation of emancipation. We thought he had missed a great opportunity and had thereby displayed a lack of statesmanship. We believed him to be under the influence of the Blair family. Now that he himself had issued an emancipation proclamation we felt wronged because it applied only to the States in rebellion, and not to our own State. 'Thus,' I said to the President, 'you are really punishing us for our courage and patriotism.' We felt, as Gratz Brown expressed it, that we had to fight three administrations—Lincoln's, Jeff Davis's, and our own Governor Gamble's. We felt that we had a right to complain because Lincoln sent out to Missouri generals that were not in sympathy with us.

"Our talk was of the very frankest kind. Lincoln said he knew I was a German revolutionist and expected me to take extreme views. I recollect distinctly his statement that he would rather be a follower than a leader of public opinion. He had reference to public opinion in the Border States. 'We need the Border States,' said he. 'Public opinion in them has not matured. We must patiently educate them up to the right opinion.' The situation at that time was less favorable in the other Border States than in Missouri. Their Union men had not the strong fighters that Missouri had. As things were then going, the attitude of the Border States was of the very highest importance. I could realize that the more fully as Lincoln argued the case."

An arrangement was made for the President to receive the committee on September 30 and hear their statement of grievances. The imposing procession of delegates went to the White House at nine o'clock in the morning. At the Committee's own request, all reporters and spectators were refused admission to the audience, only the President and one of his secretaries meeting them. Even the great front doors of the White House were locked during the forenoon.

The conference began by the reading of an address which



denounced the conservative party, and demanded that General Schofield be removed and General Benjamin F. Butler be put in his place, and that the enrolled militia of the State be discharged and national troops replace them.

After the reading of the address, the President replied. Mr. Enos Clarke of St. Louis, who was one of the delegates, records the impression this reply made upon his mind :

"The President listened with patient attention to our address," says Mr. Clarke, "and at the conclusion of the reading replied at length. I shall never forget the intense chagrin and disappointment we all felt at the treatment of the matter in the beginning of his reply. He seemed to belittle and minimize the importance of our grievances and to give magnitude to minor or unimportant matters. He gave us the impression of a pettifogger speaking before a justice of the peace jury. But as he talked on and made searching inquiries of members of the delegation and invited debate, it became manifest that his manner at the beginning was really the foil of a master, to develop the weakness of the presentation. Before the conclusion of the conference, he addressed himself to the whole matter in an elevated, dignified, exhaustive, and impressive manner.

"There was no report made of this conference, but I remember that Mr. Lincoln made this statement: 'You gentlemen must bear in mind that in performing the duties of the office I hold I must represent no one section of the Union, but I must act for all sections of the Union in trying to maintain the supremacy of the government.' And he also said this: 'I desire to so conduct the affairs of this Administration that if, at the end, when I come to lay down the reins of power, I have lost every other friend on earth, I shall at least have one friend left, and that friend shall be down inside of me.' These were characteristic expressions.

"Toward the conclusion of the conference and after the whole matter had been exhaustively discussed by the President and the petitioners, Mr. C. D. Drake, our chairman, stepped forward and said: 'Mr. President, the time has now come when we can no longer trespass upon your attention,

but must take leave of you; ' and in those deep, impressive, stentorian tones peculiar to Mr. Drake, he added, ' Many of these men who stand before you to-day return to inhospitable homes, where rebel sentiments prevail, and many of them, sir, in returning there do so at the risk of their lives, and if any of those lives are sacrificed by reason of the military administration of this government, let me tell you, sir, that their blood will be upon your garments and not upon ours.'

"During this impressive address the President stood before the delegation with tears streaming down his cheeks, seeming deeply agitated.

"The members of the delegation were then presented individually to the President and took leave of him. I shall always remember my last sight of Mr. Lincoln as we left the room. I was withdrawing, in company with others, and as I passed out I chanced to look back. Mr. Lincoln had met some personal acquaintances with whom he was exchanging pleasantries, and instead of the tears of a few moments before, he was indulging in hearty laughter. This rapid and wonderful transition from one extreme to the other impressed me greatly."

Ex-Governor Johnson of Missouri, another member of the committee, says of Lincoln's reply to their address:

"The President in the course of his reply hesitated a great deal and was manifestly, as he said, very much troubled over the condition of affairs in Missouri. He said he was sorry there should be such divisions and dissensions; that they were a source of more anxiety to him than we could imagine. He expressed his appreciation of the zeal of the radical men, but sometimes thought they did not understand the real situation. He besought us not to get out of humor because things were not going as rapidly as we thought they should. The war, he pointed out, affected a much larger territory than that embraced within the borders of Missouri, and possibly he had better opportunities of judging of things than some of us gentlemen. He spoke with great kindness, but all the way through showed his profound regret at the

condition of affairs in our State. He regretted especially that some of the men who had founded the Republican party should now be arrayed apparently against his administration.

"I had met Mr. Lincoln twice before then. This time he appeared different from what he had on the two former occasions. There was a perplexed look on his face. When he said he was bothered about this thing, he showed it. He spoke kindly, yet now and then there was a little rasping tone in his voice that seemed to say: 'You men ought to fix this thing up without tormenting me.' But he never lost his temper."

One of Mr. Lincoln's secretaries was present at this conference and made notes on Mr. Lincoln's answer to the delegation. The following sentences quoted from these notes in Nicolay and Hay's "Abraham Lincoln" show still further how plainly the President dealt with the committee:

"Your ideas of justice seem to depend on the application of it."

"When you see a man loyally in favor of the Union—willing to vote men and money—spending his time and money and throwing his influence into the recruitment of our armies, I think it ungenerous, unjust, and impolitic to make views on abstract political questions a test of his loyalty. I will not be a party to this application of a pocket inquisition.

"You appear to come before me as my friends, if I agree with you, and not otherwise. I do not here speak of mere personal friendship. When I speak of my friends I mean those who are friendly to my measures, to the policy of the Government. I am well aware that by many, by some even among this delegation—I shall not name them—I have been in public speeches and in printed documents charged with 'tyranny and wilfulness,' with a disposition to make my own personal will supreme. I do not intend to be a tyrant. At all events I shall take care that in my own eyes I do not become one."

Mr. Lincoln then sent the committee away, promising to reply by letter to their address. The events of the next day showed him more plainly than ever what a following they had. The night after the conference, Secretary Chase gave them a great reception at his house. He did not hesitate to say, in the course of the evening, that he was heartily in sympathy with their mission and that he hoped their military department would be entrusted to a gentleman whose motto was "Freedom for all." Going on to New York, the committee were given a great and enthusiastic meeting at Cooper Union: William Cullen Bryant made a sympathetic speech, and various members of the committee indulged in violent denunciations of the conservative element of the country, and did not hesitate to threaten Mr. Lincoln with revolutionary action if he did not yield to their demands.

Mr. Lincoln of course was not insensible to the political power of the Missouri radicals. He knew that this was a test case. He knew that they made their issue at a critical time for him, it being the eve of the fall elections. So important did his supporters consider it that he do something to pacify radical sentiment that Mr. Leonard Swett, one of his most intimate friends, and one heartily in sympathy with his policy, urged him, one day in October, to take a more advanced position and recommend in his annual message a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery:

Turning to me suddenly, he said, "Is not the question of emancipation doing well enough now?" I replied it was. "Well," said he, "I have never done an official act with a view to promote my own personal aggrandizement, and I don't like to begin now. I can see that emancipation is coming; whoever can wait for it will see it; whoever stands in its way will be run over by it."

**In spite of the pressure and threats of the Committee of**

Seventy, Lincoln, when he answered their letter on October 5, yielded to none of their demands. He would not remove General Schofield. He would not discharge the enrolled militia.

He repeated that they were acting as factionists, declared that they had failed to convince him that General Schofield and the enrolled militia which they charged caused the suffering of the Union party in the State were responsible, and in a few remarkable paragraphs described what in his opinion was the cause of the trouble in Missouri:

We are in civil war. In such cases there always is a main question; but in this case that question is a perplexing compound—Union and slavery. It thus becomes a question not of two sides merely, but of at least four sides, even among those who are for the Union, saying nothing of those who are against it. Thus, those who are for the Union with, but not without slavery—those for it without, but not with—those for it with or without, but prefer it with—and those for it with or without, but prefer it without.

Among these again is a subdivision of those who are for gradual, but not for immediate, and those who are for immediate, but not for gradual extinction of slavery. It is easy to conceive that all these shades of opinion, and even more, may be sincerely entertained by honest and truthful men. Yet, all being for the Union, by reason of these differences each will prefer a different way of sustaining the Union. At once sincerity is questioned and motives are assailed. Actual war coming, blood grows hot, and blood is spilled. Thought is forced from old channels into confusion. Deception breeds and thrives. Confidence dies and universal suspicion reigns. Each man feels an impulse to kill his neighbor, lest he be first killed by him. Revenge and retaliation follow. And all this, as before said, may be amongst honest men only; but this is not all. Every foul bird comes abroad and every dirty reptile rises up. These add crime to confusion. Strong measures deemed indispensable, but harsh at best, such men make worse by maladministration. Murders for old grudges, and mur-

ders for pelf, proceed under any cloak that will best cover for the occasion. These causes amply account for what has occurred in Missouri, without ascribing it to the weakness or wickedness of any general.

He closed his letter refusing their requests with a few of those resolute sentences of which he was capable when he had made up his mind to do a thing in spite of all opposition :

I do not feel justified to enter upon the broad field you present in regard to the political differences between Radicals and Conservatives. From time to time I have done and said what appeared to me proper to do and say. The public knows it all. It obliged nobody to follow me, and I trust it obliges me to follow nobody. The Radicals and Conservatives each agree with me in some things and disagree in others. I could wish both to agree with me in all things, for then they would agree with each other and would be too strong for any foe from any quarter. They, however, choose to do otherwise ; and I do not question their right. I too shall do what seems to be my duty. I hold whoever commands in Missouri or elsewhere responsible to me and not to either Radicals or Conservatives. It is my duty to bear all, but at last I must within my sphere, judge what to do and what to forbear.

There was no mistaking this letter of Lincoln. It told the radicals not only of Missouri, but of the whole North, that the President was not to be moved from his emancipation policy.

Another complaint which many Republicans as well as all Democrats made against Mr. Lincoln in 1864, was his interpretation of what constituted treason against the government. Their dissatisfaction culminated in what is known as the Vallandigham case. Mr. Vallandigham was an Ohio Democrat of the Copperhead variety who, from the beginning had opposed the war, although declaring himself for the Union. In the spring of 1863 his attacks on the administra-

tion were particularly virulent. He accused the government of not being willing to meet the Confederacy and arrange a peace, of being unconstitutional in enforcing the draft and of making arbitrary military arrests and imprisonments. The party which he represented seemed to be growing in influence every day, and it was known that the efficiency of the army in the winter of 1862-63 had been seriously undermined by the influence of the Copperhead element at home. Mr. Lincoln was opposed to noticing any opposition of this kind unless driven to it, but not all of his subordinates felt the same way. Some of the generals in the army were especially incensed by it, among them General Burnside, then at the head of the Department of the Ohio, who, on April 13, 1863, issued an order in which he said:

"The habit of declaring sympathies for the enemy will not be allowed in this department. Persons committing such offenses will be at once arrested with a view to being tried as above stated or sent beyond our lines into the lines of their friends.

"It must be distinctly understood that treason expressed or implied will not be tolerated in this department."

Mr. Vallandigham was angered by this order and in public addresses declared it a "base usurpation of arbitrary authority," which he should resist. General Burnside retaliated by ordering Vallandigham's arrest at Dayton, Ohio, after a public address in which he had declared among other things that the present war was a "wicked, cruel and unnecessary war;" "a war not being waged for the preservation of the Union;" "a war for the purpose of crushing out liberty and erecting a despotism;" "a war for the freedom of the blacks and the enslavement of the white;" stating "that if the Administration had so wished the war could have been honorably terminated months ago;" that "peace might have been

honorably obtained by listening to the proposed intermeditation of France," etc., etc.

Vallandigham was tried soon after arrest by a military commission, pronounced guilty and sentenced to "close confinement in some fortress of the United States." The arrest, the trial by military instead of by civil court, the sentence, aroused a tremendous outcry throughout the country. The best newspapers, including the New York "Evening Post" and the New York "Tribune" condemned the government. Protests and applications for his release poured in upon the President.

It is probable that Mr. Lincoln regretted the arrest of Vallandigham, for he wrote Burnside afterward: "All the Cabinet regret the necessity of arresting . . . . Vallandigham, some perhaps doubting there was a real necessity for it; but, being done, all were for seeing you through with it." Lincoln had, however, no idea of releasing Vallandigham. His one concern was to prevent the prisoner appearing to the country as a martyr for liberty, the victim of tyranny, and, taking the hint from Burnside's order he directed that "the prisoner be put beyond our military lines," that is, that he be sent over to the Confederates. General Burnside objected to this. His earnestness had so blinded his sense of humor that he did not see that this disposition of the prisoner would take away much of the sympathy and dignity which must always attend the tragedy of close confinement. Mr. Lincoln insisted, and finally Vallandigham, attended only by a military escort, was secretly conducted under a flag of truce within the lines of the Confederate general, Braxton Bragg.

There was nothing heroic about this turn in the affair. Vallandigham protested vehemently that he was not a sympathizer of the South, that he was for the Union. The Confederates were as disgusted as the prisoner. Mr. Lincoln,



they said to one another, intends to make a Botany Bay of the Confederacy. The Confederate Secretary of War wrote General Bragg in a rather irritable tone that it was clearly an abuse of the flag of truce to employ it to cover a guard over expelled citizens, non-combatants. An old friend of Vallandigham in Virginia offered the government to give him a home if he desired to remain in the Confederacy, but both Vallandigham and the Confederates saw the absurdity of the situation and desired only that it be changed as quickly as possible. Considerable correspondence passed between the prisoner and the authorities with the result that on June 2, Jefferson Davis ordered General Bragg to send Vallandigham, as an alien enemy, under guard of an officer, to Wilmington, and the Secretary of War wrote to the commissioner having the prisoner in charge, the following directions:

. . . It is not the desire or purpose of this government to treat this victim of unjust and arbitrary power with other than lenity and consideration, but as an alien enemy he cannot be received to friendly hospitality or allowed a continued refuge in freedom in our midst. This is due alike to our safety and to him in his acknowledged position as an enemy. You have therefore been charged with the duty, not inappropriate to the commission you hold in relation to prisoners, etc., of meeting him in Lynchburg, and there assuming direction and control of his future movements. He must be regarded by you as under arrest, permitted, unless in your discretion you deem it necessary to revoke the privilege to be at large on his parole not to attempt to escape nor hereafter to reveal to the prejudice of the Confederate States anything he may see or learn while therein. You will see that he is not molested or assailed or unduly intruded upon, and extend to him the attentions and kind treatment consistent with his relations as an alien enemy. After a reasonable delay with him at Lynchburg, to allow rest and recreation from the fatigues of his recent exposure and travel, you will proceed with him to Wilmington, N. C., and there de-

liver him to the charge of Major-General Whiting, commanding in that district, by whom he will be allowed at an early convenient opportunity to take shipping for any neutral port he may prefer, whether in Europe, the Islands, or on this Continent. More full instructions on this point will be given to General Whiting, and your duty will be discharged when you shall have conducted Mr. Vallandigham to Wilmington and placed him at the disposition of that commander.

These directions were carried out and Vallandigham sailed for Bermuda and thence for Halifax. August 27 the Provost-Marshal-General was notified that he was at Windsor, opposite Detroit.

Although Lincoln, by his adroit disposition of Vallandigham had taken much of the dignity out of his position, his supporters were determined to make the matter an issue, and on May 19 the New York Democrats, and again on June 26, the Ohio Democrats, while urging their loyalty to the Union protested against the arrest, and called upon the President to restore the exile to his home. Such arrests and trials as his were, they declared, contrary to the Constitution, a violation of the right of free speech and the right to a fair trial. On June 12 and June 29, Lincoln replied respectively to these protests in a couple of letters in which he defended his course. Only the briefest extract can be given here, but they show the clearness and boldness of his argument.

“ . . . The resolutions promise to support me in every constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the rebellion; and I have not knowingly employed, nor shall knowingly employ, any other. But the meeting, by their resolutions assert and argue that certain military arrests, and proceedings following them, for which I am ultimately responsible, are unconstitutional. I think they are not.

. . . . .

“ . . . he who dissuades one man from volunteering, or induces one soldier to desert, weakens the Union cause as much as he who kills a Union soldier in battle. Yet this dissuasion or inducement may be so conducted as to be no defined crime of which any civil court would take cognizance.

“ Ours is a case of rebellion—so called by the resolutions before me—in fact, a clear, flagrant, and gigantic case of rebellion; and the provision of the Constitution that, ‘the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it,’ is the provision which specially applies to our present case.

. . . . .

“ Mr. Vallandigham avows his hostility to the war on the part of the Union; and his arrest was made because he was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising of troops, to encourage desertions from the army, and to leave the rebellion without an adequate military force to suppress it. He was not arrested because he was damaging the political prospects of the administration or the personal interests of the commanding general, but because he was damaging the army, upon the existence and vigor of which the life of the nation depends. He was warring upon the military, and this gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands upon him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging the military power of the country, then his arrest was made on mistake of fact, which I would be glad to correct on reasonably satisfactory evidence.

“ I understand the meeting whose resolutions I am considering to be in favor of suppressing the rebellion by military force—by armies. Long experience has shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertion shall be punished by the severe penalty of death. The case requires, and the law and the Constitution sanction, this punishment.

. . . . .

“ If I be wrong on this question of constitutional power, my error lies in believing that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public

safety requires them, which would not be constitutional when, in absence of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does not require them; in other words, that the Constitution is not in its application in all respects the same in cases of rebellion or invasion involving the public safety, as it is in times of profound peace and public security. The Constitution itself makes the distinction, and I can no more be persuaded that the government can constitutionally take no strong measures in time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man because it can be shown to not be good food for a well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended by the meeting, that the American people will by means of military arrests during the rebellion lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trial by jury, and habeas corpus throughout the indefinite peaceful future which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life."

The Democrats called the letter despotic, but the people saw the sound sense of the arguments, and when in the fall Vallandigham, still in exile, was run for Governor of Ohio, he was defeated by over 100,000 votes. When a few months later he dared the President, came back and began to make violent speeches, no attention was paid to him. The right of the President to suppress any man who hurt the army and thus the Union cause was clearly fixed in the people's mind. If anybody wavered, Lincoln's letters were brought out. Vallandigham henceforth rather helped than injured the President.

The first effect of Lincoln's resolution in enforcing his own policy was to stimulate the search his opponents were making for a man to put in his place. At that time—the fall of 1863—Grant was the military hero of the country,

and his name began to be urged for the Presidency. Now Lincoln had never seen Grant. Was he a man whose head could be turned by a sudden notoriety? Could it be that, just as he had found the commander for whom he had searched so long, he was to lose him through a burst of popular gratitude and hero-worship? He decided to find out Grant's feeling. He did this through Mr. J. Russell Jones of Chicago, a friend of the General.

"In 1863," says Mr. Jones, "some of the newspapers, especially the New York 'Herald,' were trying to boom Grant for the Presidency.\* While General Grant was at Chattanooga, I wrote him, in substance, that I did not wish to meddle with his affairs, but that I could not resist suggesting that he pay no attention to what the newspapers were saying in that connection. He immediately replied, saying that everything of that nature which reached him went into the waste-basket; that he felt he had as big a job on hand as one man need desire; that his only ambition was to suppress the rebellion; and that, even if he had a desire to be President, he could not possibly entertain the thought of becoming a candidate for the office, nor of accepting a nomination were one tendered him, so long as there was a possibility of keeping Mr. Lincoln in the presidential chair. The whole spirit of his letter was one of the most perfect devotion to Lincoln.

"Before this letter reached me, however, President Lincoln telegraphed me to come to Washington. The telegram gave no hint of the business upon which he wished to see me, and I had no information upon which to found even a suspicion of its nature. On my way to the train I stopped at my office, in the postoffice building, and in passing my box in the postoffice I opened it and took out several letters. I put them into my pocket, and did not look at them until after I had gotten aboard the train. I then discovered that one of the letters was from General Grant; it was the letter of which

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\*The "Herald" published its first editorial advocating Grant on December 15, 1863. It was headed, "Grant as the People's Candidate."

I have already spoken. The circumstance has always seemed to me to have been providential.

"Upon my arrival at Washington, I sent word to the President that I had arrived and would be glad to call whenever it was most convenient and agreeable for him to receive me. He sent back a request for me to call that evening at eight o'clock. I went to the White House at that hour.

"When the President had gotten through with the persons with whom he was engaged, I was invited into his room. The President then gave directions to say to all that he was engaged for the evening. Mr. Lincoln opened the conversation by saying that he was anxious to see somebody from the West with whom he could talk upon the general situation and had therefore sent for me. Mr. Lincoln made no allusion whatever to Grant. I had been there but a few minutes, however, when I fancied he would like to talk about Grant, and I interrupted him by saying:

" 'Mr. President, if you will excuse me for interrupting you, I want to ask you kindly to read a letter that I got from my box as I was on my way to the train.'

"Whereupon I gave him Grant's letter. He read it with evident interest. When he came to the part where Grant said that it would be impossible for him to think of the presidency as long as there was a possibility of retaining Mr. Lincoln in the office, he read no further, but arose and, approaching me, put his hand on my shoulder and said:

" 'My son, you will never know how gratifying that is to me. No man knows, when that presidential grub gets to gnawing at him, just how deep it will get until he has tried it; and I didn't know but what there was one gnawing at Grant.'

"The fact was that this was just what Mr. Lincoln wanted to know. He had said to Congressman Washburne, as I afterwards ascertained:

" 'About all I know of Grant I have got from you. I have never seen him. Who else besides you knows anything about Grant?'

"Washburne replied:

" 'I know very little about him. He is my townsman, but I never saw very much of him. The only man who really

knows Grant is Jones. He has summered and wintered with him.' (This was an allusion to the winter I spent with Grant in Mississippi, at the time Van Dorn got into Holly Springs.)

"It was this statement of Washburne's which caused Lincoln to telegraph me to come to Washington."

But there were other names than Grant's in the mouth of the opposition. All through the winter of 1863-1864, in fact, the great majority of the Republican leaders were discussing different candidates. One of the men whom they approached was the Vice-President, Hannibal Hamlin. He was a man of strong anti-slavery feeling, and it was well known that Lincoln never had gone fast enough to suit him. Would he accept the candidacy? he was asked. Mr. Hamlin would not listen to the suggestion. Lincoln, he said, was his friend. Their views were not always the same, but he believed in Lincoln, and would not be untrue to his official relation. Not every member of the official family, however, had the same sense of loyalty. Indeed, before the end of 1863, an active campaign for the nomination was being conducted by one of the members of the cabinet, Mr. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury.

Mr. Chase had been a rival of Lincoln in 1860. He had gone into the cabinet with a feeling very like that of Mr. Seward, that Lincoln was an inexperienced man, incapable of handling the situation, and that he or Mr. Seward would be the premier. Mr. Seward soon found that Lincoln was the master, and he was great enough to acknowledge the supremacy. But Mr. Chase was never able to realize Lincoln's greatness. He continued to regard him as an inferior mind, and seemed to believe, honestly enough, that the people would prefer himself as President if they could only have an opportunity to vote for him. All through the winter of 1863-1864 he carried on a voluminous private correspond-

ence in the interests of his nomination, and about the middle of the winter he consented that his name be submitted to the people. The first conspicuous effort to promote his candidacy was a circular marked "confidential," sent out in February 1864, by Senator Pomeroy of Kansas, calling on the country to organize in behalf of Mr. Chase. The Secretary hastened to assure Mr. Lincoln that he knew nothing of this circular until he saw it in the newspapers, but he confessed that he had consented that his name be used as a presidential candidate, and said that if Mr. Lincoln felt that this impaired his usefulness as Secretary of the Treasury, he did not wish to continue in his position.

Lincoln had known for many months of Mr. Chase's anxiety for the nomination, but he had studiously ignored it. He could not be persuaded by anybody to do anything to interrupt Mr. Chase's electioneering. Now that the Secretary had called his attention to the matter of the circular, however, he replied courteously, though indifferently:

" . . . My knowledge of Mr. Pomeroy's letter having been made public came to me only the day you wrote; but I had, in spite of myself, known of its existence several days before. I have not yet read it, and I think I shall not. I was not shocked or surprised by the appearance of the letter, because I had had knowledge of Mr. Pomeroy's committee, and of secret issues which, I supposed came from it, and of secret agents who I supposed were sent out by it, for several weeks. I have known just as little of these things as my friends have allowed me to know. They bring the documents to me, but I do not read them; they tell me what they think fit to tell me, but I do not inquire for more. . . .

"Whether you shall remain at the head of the Treasury Department is a question which I will not allow myself to consider from any standpoint other than my judgment of the public service, and, in that view, I do not perceive occasion for a change."



Mr. Chase was free, as far as Lincoln was concerned, to conduct his presidential campaign from his seat in the cabinet. But the Republicans of his State were not willing that he should do so, and three days after the Pomeroy circular first appeared in print, the Union members of the legislature demanded, in the name of the people and of the soldiers of Ohio, that Lincoln be renominated. There was nothing to do then but for Mr. Chase to withdraw.

Indeed, it was already becoming evident to Lincoln's most determined antagonists in the party that it would be useless for them to try to nominate anybody else. On all sides—in State legislatures, Union leagues, caucuses—the people were demanding that Lincoln be renominated. The case was a curious one. Four years before, Lincoln had been nominated for the Presidency of the United States because he was an available candidate, not from any general confidence that he was the best man in the Republican party for the place. Now, on the contrary, it was declared that he would have to be nominated because he had won the confidence of the people so completely that no candidate would have any chance against him. In four years he had risen from a position of comparative obscurity to be the most generally trusted man in the North. The great reason for this confidence was that the people understood exactly what he was trying to do and why he was trying to do it. From the beginning of his Administration, in fact, Lincoln had taken the people into his confidence. Whenever a strong opposition to his policy developed in any quarter, it was his habit to explain in a public letter exactly why he was doing what he was doing, and why he was not doing the thing he was urged to do. He had written such a letter to Greeley in August, 1862, explaining his view of the relation of emancipation to the war; such were his letters in June, 1863, replying to the Democrats of New York and Ohio who protested

against the arrest of Vallandigham for treasonable speech; such his letter to James C. Conkling in August, 1863, explaining his views of peace, of emancipation, of colored troops. These public letters are Lincoln's most remarkable state papers. They are invincible in their logic and incomparable in their simplicity and lucidity of expression. By means of them he convinced the people of his own rigid mental honesty, put reasons for his actions into their mouths, gave them explanations which were demonstrations. They believed in him because he had been frank with them, and because he tried to make matters so clear to them, used words they could understand, kept the principle free from all non-essential and partisan considerations.

Scarcely less important than these letters in convincing the people of the wisdom of his policy were Lincoln's stories and sayings. In February, 1864, just after the popular demand for his renomination began to develop, the New York "Evening Post" published some two columns of Lincoln's stories. The New York "Herald" jeered at the collection as the "first electioneering document" of the campaign, and reprinted them as a proof of the unfitness of Lincoln for the presidency. But jeer as it would, the "Herald" could not hide from its readers the wit and the philosophy of the jokes. Every one of them had been used to explain a point or to settle a question, and under their laughter was concealed some of the man's soundest reasoning. Indeed, at that very moment the "Herald" might have seen, if it had been more discerning, that it was a Lincoln saying going up and down the country that was serving as one the strongest arguments for his renomination, the remark that it is never best to swap horses in crossing a stream. Lincoln had used it in speaking of the danger of changing Presidents in the middle of the war. He might have written a long message on the value of experience in a national crisis, and it would have been

meaningless to the masses; but this homely figure of swapping horses in the middle of the stream appealed to their humor and their common sense. It was repeated over and over in the newspapers of the country. It was in every man's mouth, and was of inestimable value in helping plain people to see the danger of changing Presidents while the war was going on.

The Union convention was set for June. As the time approached, Lincoln enthusiasm grew. It was fed by Grant's steady beating back of Lee toward Richmond. The country, wild with joy, cried out that before July Grant would be in the Confederate capital and the war would be ended. The opposition to Lincoln that had worked so long steadily dwindled in the face of military success, until all of which it was capable was a small convention in May, in Cleveland, at which Frémont was nominated.

The Union convention met in June. That it would nominate Lincoln was a foregone conclusion. "The convention has no candidate to choose," said the Philadelphia "Press." "Choice is forbidden it by the previous action of the people." The preliminary work of the convention, seating delegates and framing a platform, was rapidly disposed of. Then on June 8, after a skirmish about the method of nominating the candidates, Illinois presented the name of Abraham Lincoln. A call of States was immediately taken. One after another they answered: Pennsylvania for Lincoln, New York for Lincoln, New England solid for him, Kentucky solid, and so on through the thirty States and Territories represented; only one dissenting delegation in the entire thirty: Missouri, whose radical Union representatives gave twenty-two votes for Grant. On the second reading of the vote this ballot was changed, so that the final vote stood 506 for Lincoln.

The President took his renomination calmly. "I do not

allow myself to suppose," he said to a delegation from the National Union League which came to congratulate him, "that either the convention or the League have concluded to decide that I am either the greatest or best man in America, but rather they have concluded that it is not best to swap horses while crossing the river, and have further concluded that I am not so poor a horse that they might not make a botch of it trying to swap."

The renomination of Lincoln had taken place when the country and the Administration were rejoicing in Grant's successes and still prophesying that the war was practically over. The developments of the next few days after the nomination put a new look on the military situation. Instead of entering Richmond, Grant attacked Petersburg; but before he could capture it the town had been so re-enforced that it was evident nothing but a siege could reduce it. Now the Army of the Potomac in its march from the Rapidan to the James, extending from May 4th to June 24th, had lost nearly 55,000 men. If Petersburg was to be besieged, it was clear that the army must be re-enforced, that there must be another draft. The President had hinted that this was possible only a week after his nomination, in an address in Philadelphia at a sanitary fair:

"If I shall discover," he asked, "that General Grant and the noble officers and men under him can be greatly facilitated in their work by a sudden pouring forward of men and assistance, will you give them to me? Are you ready to march?" Cries of "yes" answered him. "Then I say, stand ready," he replied, "for I am watching for the chance."

A few days later he visited Grant, and rode the lines in front of Petersburg. All that he saw, all the events of the following days, only made it clearer to him that there must be another outpouring of men. His friends besought him to

try to get on without it. The country was growing daily more discouraged as it realized that its hope of speedy victory was vain. A new draft would arouse opposition, give a new weapon to the Democrats, make his re-election uncertain: he could not afford it. He refused their counsels. "We must lose nothing even if I am defeated," he said. "I am quite willing the people should understand the issue. My re-election will mean that the rebellion is to be crushed by force of arms." And on July 18, he called for 500,000 volunteers for one, two, and three years.

All the discontent that had been prophesied broke forth on this call. The awful brutality of the war came upon the country as never before. There was a revulsion of feeling against the sacrifice going on, such as had not been experienced since the war began. All the complaints that had been urged against Lincoln both by radical Republicans and by Democrats broke out afresh. The draft was talked of as if it were the arbitrary freak of a tyrant. It was declared that Lincoln had violated constitutional rights, personal liberty, the liberty of the press, the rights of asylum; that, in short, he had been guilty of all the abuses of a military dictator. Much bitter criticism was made of his treatment of peace overtures. It was declared that the Confederates were anxious to make peace, and had taken the first steps, but that Lincoln was so bloodthirsty that he was unwilling to use any means but force. Even Horace Greeley joined now in this criticism, though up to this summer he had stood with the President on the question. In May, 1864, when Congressman Dawson proposed in the Senate that the North should "tender the olive branch of peace as an exchange for the sword," the "Tribune" ridiculed the idea and suggested that Mr. Dawson, without waiting for the House to adopt his resolution, should start at once on his private account for the camp of General Lee "with a whole cart-load of olive

branches." "Some good may come of it," said Mr. Greeley; "Mr. Dawson may possibly be treated as a spy."

Later, when peace was proposed in the Confederate Congress, Mr. Greeley said:

"Speaking generally, it is safe to say that if there had been any foundation other than the unconditional surrender of the 'Confederacy,' upon which to build it, we would have had peace long ago. But the quarrel is a mortal one . . . there can be no peace the terms of which are not dictated and enforced by the Congress of the United States."

On June 10, in answer to an attack on the administration for refusing to allow a Confederate gun-boat to bring Stephens to Washington, Greeley said:

"The naked truth lies here: Up to this hour the rebels have never been ready or willing to treat with our government on any other footing than that of independence; and this we have not been inclined to concede. When they (or we) have been beaten into a willingness to concede the vital matter in dispute, negotiations for peace will be in order—and not till then."

In spite of these utterances however, Mr. Greeley wavered in July, upon receiving from an irresponsible and officious individual known as "Colorado Jewett," a communication stating that two ambassadors of "Davis and Company" were in Canada with full and complete powers for a peace, and requesting Mr. Greeley to come immediately to Niagara, Taking the matter seriously he wrote the President a long and hysterical letter, urging that the offer be accepted, and some one sent to Niagara. Mr. Lincoln saw his chance to demonstrate to the country the futility of peace negotiations. He replied immediately appointing Greeley himself as an ambassador to meet the parties.



MR. LINCOLN AND HIS SON THOMAS, FAMILIARLY KNOWN AS "TAD." ABOUT 1864. BY BRADY.






"If you can find any person anywhere," he wrote, "professing to have any proposition of Jefferson Davis in writing, for peace, embracing the restoration of the Union and abandonment of slavery, whatever else it embraces, say to him he may come to me with you; and that if he really brings such proposition, he shall at the least have safe conduct with the paper (and without publicity, if he chooses) to the point where you shall have met him. The same if there be two or more persons."

This was a turn that the editor of the "Tribune" had evidently not expected, but Mr. Lincoln insisted that he carry out the commission, his only conditions being the ones stated above, and he sent him the following paper:

"To Whom It May Concern: Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will be received and considered by the Executive Government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other substantial and collateral points, and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways. ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

Mr. Greeley went to Niagara, but as it turned out the persons whom he had taken seriously had no authority whatever from Davis, and they declared that no negotiations for peace were possible if Mr. Lincoln's conditions must be conceded. So the conference, which ran over a number of days, and which was enveloped in much mystery, fell through. At the end it got into the newspapers, though only a portion of the correspondence was published at the time. It was evident to people of sense however, that Mr. Greeley had been hoodwinked. It was evident, too, that the President was willing to carry on peace negotiations if those points for which the war had been fought were yielded. All the effectiveness of peace cries after this, was gone. Senator

Harlan of Iowa, who, with other Republicans, appreciated thoroughly the clever way in which Lincoln had disposed of the editor of the "Tribune," said to him one day on the terrace of the White House: "Some of us think, Mr. Lincoln, that you didn't send a very good ambassador to Niagara." "Well, I'll tell you about that, Harlan," replied the President, "Greeley kept abusing me for not entering into peace



LEGEND SCRATCHED ON A WINDOW PANE BY J. WILKES BOOTH, AT MEADVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA, AUGUST, 1864.

negotiations. He said he believed we could have peace if I would do my part and when he began to urge that I send an ambassador to Niagara to meet Confederate emissaries, I just thought I would let him go up and crack that nut for himself."

As July dragged on and August passed there was no break in the gloom. Farragut was threatening Mobile; Sherman,

Atlanta; Grant, Petersburg; but all of these three great undertakings seemed to promise nothing but a fruitless slaughter of men. The despair and indignation of the country in this dreadful time all centered on Lincoln. Republicans, hopeless of reëlecting him, talked of replacing him by another candidate. The Democrats argued that the war and all its woes were the direct result of his tyrannical and unconstitutional policy. The more violent intimated that he should be put out of the way. A sign of the bitterness against him little noted at the moment, but sinister in the light of after events, was an inscription found one August morning written on the window of a room in a Meadville (Pennsylvania) hotel. The room had been occupied the night before by a favorite actor, J. Wilkes Booth. The inscription ran: "Abe Lincoln Departed this Life Aug. 13th, 1864, By the effects of Poison."

In the dreadful uproar of discontent one cry alarmed Lincoln more than all others; this was the revival of the demand that Grant be presented for the presidency. It was not so much the fear of defeat by Grant that affected him as it was the dread that the campaign would be neglected if the General went into politics. He concluded that he ought to sound Grant again. Colonel John Eaton (now General), a friend of Grant, was in Washington at the time and often with Mr. Lincoln. Referring to the efforts making to nominate Grant, Lincoln asked if the Colonel knew what the General thought of the attempt. No, the Colonel said, he didn't.

"Well," said Lincoln, "if Grant is the great general we think he is, he must have some consciousness of it, and know that he cannot be satisfied with himself and secure the credit due for his great generalship if he does not finish the job." And he added, "I don't believe they can get him to run."

The President then asked the Colonel if he could not go to Grant and find out for him how the General felt. Colonel

Eaton started at once on his errand. Reaching headquarters and being received by the General, he worked his way to the subject by recounting how he had met persons recently in travelling who had asked him if he thought Grant could be induced to run against Lincoln, not as a partisan, but as a citizen's candidate, to save the Union. Grant brought his hand down emphatically on the strap arm of his camp-chair. "They can't do it! They can't compel me to do it!"

"Have you said this to the President?" asked Colonel Eaton.

"No," said Grant, "I have not thought it worth while to assure the President of my opinion. I consider it as important for the cause that he should be elected as that the army should be successful in the field."

Lincoln's friends took the situation at this period more seriously than he. Their alarm is graphically pictured in the following letter from Leonard Swett to his wife. It was probably written toward the end of August:

ASTOR HOUSE, NEW YORK,  
Monday,                   , 1864.

*My Dear Wife:* The fearful things in relation to the country have induced me to stay a week here. I go to Washington to-night, and can't see how I can get away from there before the last of the week.

A summary of movements is as follows:

The malicious foes of Lincoln are calling or getting up a Buffalo convention to supplant him. They are Sumner, Wade, Henry Winter Davis, Chase, Frémont, Wilson, etc.

The Democrats are conspiring to resist the draft. We seized this morning three thousand pistols going to Indiana for distribution. The war Democrats are trying to make the Chicago nominee a loyal man. The peace Democrats are trying to get control of the Government, and through alliance with Jefferson Davis, to get control of both armies and make universal revolution necessary.

The most fearful things are probable.

I am acting with Thurlow Weed, Raymond, etc., to try to avert. There is not much hope.

Unless material changes can be wrought, Lincoln's election is beyond any possible hope. It is probably clean gone now.\*

Lincoln himself had made up his mind that he would be defeated. What would be his duty then? It was so clear to him, that he wrote it down on a slip of paper:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
WASHINGTON, *August 23, 1864.*

This morning, as for some days past, it seems exceedingly probable that this administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President-elect as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration; as he will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterward.

A. LINCOLN.†

He folded the slip, and when the cabinet met, he asked the members to put their names on the back. What was inside he did not tell them. In the incessant buffeting of his life he had learned that the highest moral experience of which a man is capable is standing clear before his own conscience. He laid the paper away, a compact with his conscience in case of defeat.

The Democrats had deferred their national convention as long as possible, hoping for a military situation which would enable them to win the people. They could not have had a situation more favorable to their plans. But they miscalculated in one vital particular. They took the despair of the country as a sign that peace would be welcome even at the

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\* Letter loaned by Mr. Leonard Herbert Swett, of Aurora, Ill.

† "Abraham Lincoln; A History." By Nicolay and Hay.

cost of the Union, and they adopted a peace platform. They nominated on this platform a candidate vowed to war and to the Union, General McClellan. So unpopular was the combination that General McClellan, in accepting the nomination, practically repudiated the platform.

But at this moment something further interfered to save the Administration. Sherman captured Atlanta, and Farragut took Mobile Bay. "Sherman and Farragut," said Seward, "have knocked the bottom out of the Chicago nominations." If they had not quite done that, they had at least given heart to Lincoln's supporters, who went to work with a will to secure his re-election. The following letter by Leonard Swett shows something of what was done:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
WASHINGTON, *September 8, 1864.*

*My Dear Wife:* There has never been an instance in which Providence has kindly interposed in our behalf in our national struggles in so marked and essential manner as in the recent Union victories.

You know I had become very fearful before leaving home. When I arrived in New York, I found the most alarming depression possessing the minds of all the Republicans, Greeley, Beecher, Raymond, Weed; and all the small politicians without exception utterly gave up in despair. Raymond, the chairman of the National Committee, not only gave up, but would do nothing. Nobody would do anything. There was not a man doing anything except mischief.

A movement was organizing to make Mr. Lincoln withdraw or call a convention and supplant him.

I felt it my duty to see if some action could not be inaugurated. I got Raymond, after great labor, to call the committee at Washington three days after I would arrive here, and came first to see if Mr. Lincoln understood his danger and would help to set things in motion. He understood fully the danger of his position, and for once seemed anxious I should try to stem the tide bearing him down. When the

committee met, they showed entire want of organization and had not a dollar of money.

Maine was calling for speakers. Two men were obtained, and I had to advance them a hundred dollars each to go.

The first gleam of hope was in the Chicago convention. The evident depression of the public caused the peace men to control that convention, and then, just as the public began to shrink from accepting it, God gave us the victory at Atlanta, which made the ship right itself, as a ship in a storm does after a great wave has nearly capsized it.

Washburne, of Illinois, a man of great force, came, and he and I have been working incessantly. I have raised and provided one hundred thousand dollars for the canvass.

Don't think this is for improper purposes. It is not. Speakers have to be paid. Documents have to be sent, and innumerable expenses have to be incurred.

The Secessionists are flooding the Northwest with money. Voorhees and Vallandigham are arming the people there, and are trying to make the draft an occasion for an uprising. We are in the midst of conspiracies equal to the French Revolution.

I have felt it my solemn duty under these circumstances to stay here. I have been actuated by no other motive than that of trying to save our country from further dismemberment and war. People from the West, and our best people, say if we fail now the West will surely break off and go with the South. Of course that would be resisted, and the resistance would bring war.\*

All through September and October the preparation for the November election continued. The loyal governors of the North, men to whom the Union cause owed much more than has ever been fully realized, worked incessantly. The great orators of the Republican party were set at work, Carl Schurz even giving up his opportunity in the army to take the platform, and many an officer and private who had influence in their communities going home on furloughs to aid in electioneering. The most elaborate preparations were

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\*Letter loaned by Mr. Herbert Leonard Swett of Aurora, Ill.

made for getting the vote of every man, most of the States allowing the soldiers to vote in the field. Where this was not arranged for, the War Department did its utmost to secure furloughs for the men. Even convalescents from the hospitals were sent home to vote.

In this great burst of determined effort Lincoln took little part. The country understood, he believed, exactly what his election meant. It meant the preservation of the Union by force. It meant that he would draft men so long as he needed them; that he would suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and employ a military tribunal, whenever he deemed it necessary. It meant, too, that he would do his utmost to secure an amendment to the Constitution abolishing slavery forever, for the platform the Union convention had adopted before nominating him contained that plank. He could not be persuaded by the cautious and timid to modify or obscure this policy. He wanted the people to understand exactly what he intended, he said, and whenever he did speak or write, it was only to reiterate his principles in his peculiarly plain, unmistakable language. Nor would he allow any interference with the suffrage of men in office. They must vote as they pleased. "My wish is," he wrote to the postmaster of Philadelphia, who had been accused of trying to control the votes of his subordinates, "that you will do just as you think fit with your own suffrage in the case, and not constrain any of your subordinates to do other than as he thinks fit with his."

Thus when the election finally came off, on November 8, there was not a man of any intelligence in the country who did not know exactly what he was voting for, if he voted for Lincoln. What these men thought of him the work of that day showed. Out of 233 electoral votes, General McClellan received twenty-one, 212 being for Lincoln. The opportunity to finish the task was now his.







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